MUJERES EN EL CONGRESO DE DIPUTADOS AÑO 2000
B. Fundamentos de la Democracia Paritaria en la Unión Europea
The questions central for this study have been concerned with the motivational drive of people to engage in contentious activism which is directly combated by the ruling regime.107 In the Egyptian case, young people have increasingly experienced intense political alienation.108 Some had argued that this development had in turn encouraged much of the middle-class youth to seek alternative strategies to voice their (political) opinions (see Abdalla 1985; Wickham 2002, 77-85). For instance, a survey from the 1980s showed that the vast majority of young university students did not participate in the political process at that time.109
Later studies had shown that the rural population of Egypt had higher voter turnout compared to the urban regions (Wickham 2002, 86-87). This electoral trend indicated that patrimonial networks linking the dominant politicians and subordinate local “voters” was easier to establish in the countryside than in urban areas where similar allegiances are more unstable. Other studies have compared literacy levels and electoral voter turnout
107 The limitation of the study’s focus and primarily its scope put restraints on an investigation which might have broadened even further our understanding of the processes of motivation.
108 Periods prior to the growth of social movement organizations, such as, the beginning of 1970s, mid-1980s, early 1990s and mid-2000s.
109 The survey data from the early 1980s reported that 91% of university students were not
politically engaged (i.e. voting in elections or participating in political parties) (Abdalla 1985, 233).
170 demonstrating that it is twice as high among illiterate voters. These findings further support the argument about prevailing nepotism, where personal favors are exchanged for political support (Zaki 1995; Blaydes 2006).
Youth dissatisfaction connected to unashamed patrimonialism in Egyptian politics (incl.
state admistration and education) under the Mubarak regime had been the cause of rising frustration among large segments of the population throughout the 2000s (Al-Husseini 2008, a Kifaya activist; Diehl 2005; Ibrahim 2007; Ikhwanweb 2010e). “The regime is self-centered actually. The only thing that concerns them is their profits. [It is about] what to do to get more from the people, not how to give to the people” (interview No. 5).
Some of the youths who decided to mobilize in a bid to change the regime they perceived as unjust and corrupt were later violently repressed - a new experience for them. Sudden arrests, short police detentions, long-term imprisonments, military tribunals, suspensions from universities and/or places of work, random beatings, insults and other forms of personal humiliation were all part of the activists’ cognitive process and the formation of emotional and identity responses. Nearly all of the activists interviewed for this research had been arrested at some point by the State Security Intelligence Service (SSIS).110 This in turn changes their perception of the regime, but more importantly, it brings about a different attitude towards their mobilization and a sense of urgency for their activism.
For instance, all the activists interviewed described their prison experiences111 as a traumatic set of events. This is something that they had been warned about by their senior fellow activists. During their preparatory period, the activists were advised to anticipate and mentally prepare themselves for such experiences. It was the SSIS officers who most commonly performed the arrests of activists and they apparently follow a similar procedure. The activists112 are usually, however, not always taken in custody, with other activists during the SSIS raids. They often take place between 02.30 and 03.30 in the night catching the activists totally by surprise, i.e. while sleeping. The SSIS officers were usually armed with handguns and in civilian clothing. The activists were rounded up, handcuffed
110 Amn Al-Dawlah
111 This is a summary and construction of the practical process by which the SSIS apprehend the members of the MB based on multiple interviews.
112 The description of the SSIS arrest procedure is based on the information collected from several interviews (No. 3, 4, 8, 16, 21).
171 and taken to the detention center (tarhilah) where they are photographed and registered (feesh wa tashbih). Shortly thereafter, usually the morning after the arrest, they are taken to see a jury of (3-4) judges where they are questioned about the events surrounding their arrest. The description of the arrest is presented to the judges by the SSIS in a written statement. After the jury has questioned the activists they are usually taken to one of the detention centers spread out throughout the country, of which Lazoughly in central Cairo, is historically considered to be the most notorious.
The headquarters of the SSIS and the Ministry of the Interior are both located in the same place as Lazoughly. Next, the SSIS agents interrogate the activists and it is during this process when most of the alleged torture takes place (see HRW 1991; EOHR 2003; Stacher 2005; U.S. Department of State 2006; Galal 2008; HRW 2011, 518-519). Torture as a means of intimidation and information gathering had been a regular part of the state security practices: “Police and security forces regularly engaged in torture in police stations, detention centers, and at points of arrest. In March [2010] the SSIS arrested Muslim Brotherhood member Nasr al-Sayed, detained him incommunicado for three months, and tortured him for 45 days during interrogation. They released him without charge in June”
(HRW 2011, 519). After questioning, the activists are usually transferred to prison and placed in a shared cell (usually housing at least 10 prisoners) with either other activists or non-activist inmates.113 Most of the activists interviewed for this research were never sentenced to prison; instead they were eventually released without any formal charge.
One interviewee recounted his experiences in the custody of the SSIS on various further occasions (interview no. 16). He is a well-known blogger and freelance journalist, often writing about the regime and its methods of suppressing free speech and political dissent.
Consequently, he is a widely recognized MB member, primarily through his (online) writings and critique. As such, he had “made” himself a direct target of the regime’s repressive machinery. He was first arrested in 2003, a 23 year old student at the time,
113 The following is a summary of the arrest procedure deduced from multiple interviews and other sources: The imprisoned activists are held for at least a couple of days, up to 30 days, or even several months without charge. The Emergency Laws allow detention without charge for up to 30 days, which can be renewed every 30 days after that indefinitely. There are unconfirmed accounts of such detention of prisoners arrested in the early 1990s still residing in the Egyptian prisons (interview with a salafi activist in February 2009; see also U.S. Department, Bureau of Democracy 2008). The young MB activists are usually held for up to 45 days upon which they are generally released while leaders that are more senior can be in custody for several months (IHRC 2010).
172 which proved to be his most difficult prison experience. The last time he was arrested (2007) he was additionally charged with cooperating with a foreign organization (referring to Amnesty International). The most common charge brought against the activists is “belonging to an illegal organization” and the same applied to the activists from Nasr City.
In 2003, interviewee no. 16 was subjected to torture by beating in the well-known SSIS detention center in Nasr City (Madinat Al-Nasr) in the vicinity of Cairo (see HRW 2003b);
“It [interrogation experience] reinforced my [previously held] view of the oppressors [the regime]. I could relate to the old slogan [of the Muslim Brotherhood], which says ‘prison does not change ideas.’ For sure, I was terrified by being blindfolded, having my hands tied behind my back for the duration of [the initial] 13 days. It didn’t change me...”
During the period of interrogation, the SSIS agents asked about the information pertaining to the organizational structure of the MB. At the same time, the agents were
“advising” the activist to renounce his MB membership and focus on “more productive activities.”
During the course of SSIS’ interrogations, the activist felt that the questions the agents asked him made less sense and that he felt more convinced of his (activist) beliefs and the purpose of his activities. Other interviewed activists (with no immediate connection to the previous one), experienced a similar set of circumstances. They, in many ways, repeated similar feelings connected to their experiences of torture and interrogation (interviews no.
4, 8, 17). They confirmed their pervasive feeling of growing dissent and conviction of their previously held ideas. The data indicates that arrests, detention and interrogation (beating) by the SSIS contributed to an increase in personal commitment. The activists expressed this commitment to activism and the organization by increasing their involvement in administrative work and mobilizing efforts (e.g. distribution of information and propaganda material both online and in printed form, using their time normally dedicated to study and work to carry out duties in different activities and committees, etc.).
When asked the question, “how would harsher levels of state repression affect your activism and the organization,” the majority of the interviewees answered confidently that they would continue to mobilize “in the most appropriate way.” A 24-year-old
173 physician from a city in the Nile Delta) stated: “If they arrest the Brotherhood leadership, then we will choose other leaders. If it gets worse, we will go underground. We [the MB]
are too big to be destroyed by the regime” (interview no. 1)
Another 23 year-old medical student at the al-Azhar university (from the same region in Upper Egypt) responded: “If we are not given the opportunity to sustain our work in the open we will go underground. We shall avoid the public display of our presence and work in secrecy until our numbers are high [enough]” (interview no. 10) Very similar responses were given during interviews with other activists indicating a high level of commitment to their cause and the MB’s organizational framework (interviews no. 1, 2, 7, 9). Furthermore, the activists seemed to hold a determinate perception of the regime as the primary enemy, as well as, the focus of their emotional animosity.
State repression in the form of arrests, detention, and even torture cannot be claimed to directly motivate regime dissent in the form of nonviolent Islamist mobilization. However, what can be claimed is that this specific form of increasing repression strengthens the resolve of these particular activists. It amalgamates the collective resolve of, what has been presented as, a diverse cohort of individual dissidents who would otherwise not cooperate in the same form or fashion. Their common and collective experiences reinforce previously held feelings of “regime induced injustice and corruption upon entire society”.
In other words, their initial individual motivation for dissent is toughened by negative experiences with the regime authorities. Some reasons behind such developments are discussed in the next section.