Sistema americano de protección de derechos humanos

The concept of political opportunity structures (POS) has been developed and used by scholars of social movements for decades (e.g. Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994;

McAdam et al 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Osa M. and Corduneanu-Huci C. 2003;

Meyer 2004). The POS broadly represent “objectivated realities [of state induced policies]

that are subject to transformation” (Benford R. 1997; 423). These “objectivated realities”

are regime policies directly related to the dis/enabling of a social mobilization’s shape, size, outcome and the social space within which it takes place in a particular society (Meyer 2004; 131).

Moreover, opportunities here refer to a state’s actions, the rules projected on society, and the general power relations between state institutions and civil society. Political opportunities are a set of political circumstances that “encourage, discourage, channel, and otherwise affect movement activity” (Campbell 2005, 44). The political structure is therefore a representation of a perceived structured social reality within which social actors operate (most often) in accordance with general principles of that society. It further follows that the narrower the opportunities to express one’s opinion, dissent and objections are, the smaller the space, regime tolerance and freedom of expression there is.

The effect of opportunity structures in authoritarian regimes is often reflected in the level and method of repressive actions, such as the enforcement of emergency laws, prohibition of organized political opposition, torture and imprisonment, military tribunals for civilians, media censorship etc. These and other observable repression policies usually raise the personal costs of dissent resulting in the discouragement of political dissent. For instance, dissidents have been jailed, harassed, economically sanctioned and professionally disadvantaged etc. These observations presuppose that the state apparatus is capable of changing the structure of social relations through control of the public space including state institutions and the distribution of wealth (see Tilly 2008).

What is, on the other hand, lacking in much of the scholarship on the POS, is the observance of state institutions and their operations as part of a larger cultural framework, partly discussed in the political culture section. The observation and description of institutional state structures and an evaluation of its repressive outcomes

145 (Appendix II) does not explain dissenting social action, which is based on more than calculations of personal gains and losses (Polletta 2006, 140-144). Therefore, the baseline of the POS as they relate to social movement mobilization is that of their contextual relevance. For instance, the collective dissent dealt with in this study questions the legitimacy and authority of the ruling regime on the premise that it is morally bankrupt.

On the other hand, the regime claimed moral legitimacy through all available means, including religious arguments and authority. These considerations are therefore directly linked to the cultural context of that particular society.

Consequently, one might assume that political opportunities are consequences of regime policies directly affecting, not only the instrumentality of dissent but also the way this collective action is invoked and voiced. Although Tarrow had not brought into play the cultural dimension of political opportunities and social movement action before the second edition of Power in Movement (1998), he had argued earlier that the political opportunity structure is essentially a macro-level power structure made up by the policy-maker (i.e. the regime) (Tarrow 1988, 428-429). The power structure is nevertheless contingent on historical events and rooted in the political traditions of a particular society.

The cultural turn in social movement theory (and studies of political opportunity structures) returned and developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Mellucci 1989; 1995;

Emirbayev and Goodwin 1994; Williams 1995; Goodwin J. and Jasper 1999), and it is clear that this approach is here to stay (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000; Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Eyerman 2006; Polletta 2006).

This study follows the development of this cultural(ist) trend, as this approach is useful in explaining individual motivations behind political dissent. It is therefore important to narrow down the concept of political opportunity structures. First, it is necessary to explain and situate the power structure of the repressive regime. Including its decision-making processes (e.g. those targeting SMOs and other opposition groups), which are commonly initiated and structured at the top of the political hierarchy. A widely held belief among the Islamists and even other Egyptians was that the Mubarak regime lacked the proper legitimacy to rule the nation (Zahid 2010; Ikhwanweb 2011f) and for that reason had to rely on largely interpersonal relations between the (representatives of) power elites including the army (see section on neopatrimonialism).

146 Second, the regime’s tactical responses to perceived threats have largely been looked at through the types of repressive action employed against its opponents. In other words, scholars have not probed the regime’s justification for such tactics and long-term strategies as this is not the purpose of their investigation. Instead, their goal was to describe and analyze observable repressive state actions carried out by the security forces such as the (mass) arrests of activists, taunting these activists, interrogation techniques used on them, seizures of funds etc.

For instance, the Mubarak regime’s repression tactics are described as more complex and more sensitive to various socio-political elements than previously thought:

The Mubarak government also clearly prefers to use the tactic of repression sparingly, and by regional standards, successfully limits its recourse to "the stick". Whether from calculation or conviction, the government is committed to a process of consultation with important social actors and of political reform. The government's style, in marked contrast to that of its predecessor's, has been one of consensus building. From the point of view of economic reform, this has sometimes, perhaps rightly, been viewed as a weakness. It is important to stress, however, that it is also a political strength.

(Richards and Baker 1992, 36).

Other preemptive state actions, such as the limitation of political and religious freedoms, were accomplished through state dominance of religious institutions, media outlets, education and many other facets of civil society, such as, worker unions. State propaganda tactics and various levels of intimidation techniques are also significant elements which are discussed below (see Jasper 1997, 36).

Moreover, as the regime’s repression tactics are complex they also need to be further nuanced. Political opportunity structures can be subdivided into stable and volatile elements (Gamson and Meyer 1996; 281). The stable component of the POS is the existing political culture. To be exact, the political culture is connected with long-term power relations between the elites and the population. This includes a historical heritage regarding the alternation of political power, its procedural traditions, constitutive class, and consequences (historical outcomes).

147 An assumption, related to Egypt, is that power relations within the ruling elites and the history of power ascension produces a fear of losing the hold on power, which, in turn, feeds repression policies. An initial argument, favored in this study, has claimed that modern Egypt has had a relatively long tradition of a strong and stable society. In addition, we find here a tradition of stable; however, a weak central state authority (see Migdal 1988; Fahmy 2002). The notion of political tradition and its subsequent transition has been discussed in the previous chapter. These long-term traits of regime repression are acquired over extensive periods of time and are subjected to, more often than not, slow changes. What is remarkable though, is that the revolutionary events during the 18 days of massive popular protest throughout Egypt (January 25- February 11, 2011) did dismantle the Mubarak regime which had effectively ruled the country for 30 years.⁹²

The volatile part of political opportunities describes the disorderly aspects of political power and it is dynamic. For instance, network relations between the political elites, shifting capacities of social control, but also increasingly (ir)regular international political pressure. Egypt has experienced rapid political changes since the military coup of 1952, which resulted in sweeping changes of the allegiance of the elites and attitudinal policy-shifts regarding political opposition.

The situation has some resemblance to the recent change of the regime in power, although lacking the same popular element. The fallen Mubarak regime was in tune with the political and economic pressures and incentives from abroad and therefore was volatile in its domestic policies. The regime’s dynamics of repression, including its attitude toward political opposition (i.e. Islamists), was one of the regime’s main claims to justify repression to foreign audiences (Brumberg 2002, 66; Al-Awadi 2004, 162).