Tipos de medidas de acción positiva

As can be observed from previous chapters, the tone and style of the MB’s discourse has had a powerful effect on sympathetic individuals. One activist remembered his first contact with the organization. “I was convinced by their [MB’s] ideas and their example…

by the completeness [shumuliyyah] of their conduct. They respect the minds [opinion] of others. Their way is not that of violence as it was not the way of the Prophet” (interview no. 8). Another activist (female) proclaimed that “The MB has the best Islamic thinking of

183 all Islamists, presenting Islam as a complete moral code to obey by” (interview no. 6).

These enthusiastic formulations reflect the high level of emotionality connected to what is perceived as organizational completeness of faith and practice.

If one spends time conversing and interacting with the MB activists it is easy to notice that the completeness argument is constantly interwoven throughout their narratives. The initial reaction is that there is something here which directly relates to individual motivations. What are the primary features of this connection? Firstly, one can clearly notice that the MB’s mobilization program appealed to a massive audience (sympathizers) which initially admired, if not shared, much of its general moral values – e.g. Islamic socio-political ideals. These of the other shared opinions, if not values, were usually manifested in shared perceptions of corruption and decadence of the authoritarian regime. Most importantly, however, many sympathizers (later activists) shared the MB’s socio-political ambitions for the middle-classes.

Secondly, much of the initially assumed similarity in attitudes between activists and sympathizers are manifested in an abstraction of the belief-emotion nexus and this supposedly emanates from personal beliefs/desires and emotions. Attitudes here include shared perceptions of grievances resulting from the apparent injustice and corruption of the regime. Furthermore, shared attitudes are produced as consequences of a similar middle-class environment (neighborhoods, workspaces, associations) where people of comparable living standards, level of education, and professional background interact through interpersonal communication – developing a sort of common class consciousness¹²³ (see Snow 2001). For instance, in my interview with Ibrahim Al-Houdaybi it was possible to discern that the MB’s ambition is to broaden their support base regardless if such supporters are members or not. This strategy was primarily manifested in the organization’s ambiguous rhetoric by which they have tried to appeal to the masses of primarily upwardly mobile middle-class. He emphasized that the regime is far more interested in creating polarized society than in unifying its citizens. “The regime does not want moderates. It is interested in extremism. The security apparatus (SSIS) is in charge of defining security threats and it want to label all enemies of the regime as

123 This explicitly Marxist notion fits well here, but it might be closer to Weber’s notion of “status group” where the focus on economic power/capital is widened to include other dimensions of group feeling and shared attitudes.

184 extremists. It is therefore in the interest of the MB to tone down controversial rhetoric and seek popularity among the Egyptians.”

Thirdly, the notion of shared beliefs is highly relevant here as the MB activists focus much of their time clarifying the deeper meanings of their beliefs to nonactivists primarily by exemplifying the “right” Islamic practices (e.g. viva voce tactics), emphasizing and focusing on common ideals and shared beliefs (e.g. culturally recognized and conservative understanding of Islam, demonstrating the moral superiority of a religious person, positive impact of a high-level of education (e.g. embracing moral responsibility to incite social change etc.).

Fourthly, the MB demonstrated a religiously based common identity perceived by many conservative observers as appealing and desirable – in as much as it combined modernity, tradition and political activism). As such, the MB’s Islamist identity has usually resonated with conservative middle-class and their socio-economic expectations. Furthermore, its identity was not only religious but also nationalist and inclusive enough to be easily adopted, in spite of the obvious threat of state coercion. Here, a gradual membership process by which sympathizers are eased into the organization’s internal structure and subsequent membership is crucial in shaping individuals’ conception of the in-group’s identity and its opponents (regime authorities). Nevertheless, the threshold where sympathizers cross over to membership is hard to pinpoint. One might assume that individually expressed interest in group-belonging indicates a person’s desire to transform him/her-self into a desired/imagined ideal, e.g. taking on the MB’s collective identity label. Data give additional support towards this argument. Activists who were interviewed frequently described their search for suitable groups through which they could express their grievances, or rather, their religious conviction and practice (interviews no. 2, 6, 7, 10, 24, 25; see section 4.5).

This leads us to consider the completeness argument linking it to general Islamist ideas and concepts as essential parts of the identification process. This process has often an amalgamating effect on an individual through which the proposed organizational framework is linked with personal experiences and perceptions. Moreover, close personal interaction and socialization (e.g. usrah activities) presents Islamism as an accommodating, egalitarian, pragmatic and morally superior alternative to the dominant

185 reality (perceived dystopian social order). Herein, it is important to note that the moderation argument expressed by the interviewees is directly linked with the organizational learning process through which the activists disassociate themselves from violent (or nowadays puritan salafi) Islamist groups. So, it is possible to claim that the MB’s activists are keen observers who often react to the slightest sign of interest in the MB (usually) by their peers and thereafter connect to this person in most suitable way.

It becomes rather clear that Islamism as an ideological framework is a secondary motivational factor compared to the identity argument, wherein the identification process precedes ideological justification. An overwhelming number of activists described Islamism in the interviews as a post hoc explanation for mobilizing. Added to this, the MB’s Islamist ideological framework functions as explicitly identity-shaping (transforming) wherein an individual can (and should) adapt to a specific set of behavioral conventions. These conventions are usually the adoption of a certain dress-code, observing daily prayers, regular attendance of usrah-study circles, commitment to a set of principles, taking responsibility for assigned duties etc.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the activist narratives overwhelmingly highlighted the MB’s perceived solidarity and sense of purpose as the primary features of its attraction (interviews no. 1-10, 16-21).

The MB activists are fairly easily recognizable as dissidents (at least, to a trained eye) and thereby categorized, often by sympathizers, as commendable social actors. Sympathizing spectators have been familiarized into believing and considering the social movement activists as a social force for good in their society, an attitude sometimes translated into

“relational characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, practices” (Bourdieu 1998, 8).

We can consider the MB as representing the desired shumuliyyah, completeness, of Islamic beliefs and practices through which particular individual Muslims can understand, come close to, and practice their religious beliefs in a context that is assumed to be corrupt and morally decayed. The shumuliyyah concept, hence, represents an evolved expression of the

124 The MB’s style of activism is, in many ways, comprehensive including lifestyle dimensions pertaining to a particular style of dress, pursuit of higher levels of education, particular consumer patterns, living in a particular neighborhood, choice of professions, every-day religious practices, visiting carefully chosen mosques, attending the study cycles, attending religious talks, prayers, etc. These and other activist attributes as well as the organization’s public actions: demonstrations, propaganda efforts, parliamentary motions etc.

186 culture of resistance where Islamist claims-making is systematized. Again, the concept is deeply connected to the collective identity of the MB as a complete way of life. This, in turn, includes religiously based (inspired) political opposition to authoritarian rule. The proponents of such identity have demonstrated a capacity to sustain mobilization despite intense coercion, which presumably indicates their moral and organizational superiority (interview no. 2, 12). As a consequence of continuous repression, a large number of youth activists, despite their wide-ranging diversity of opinions, have developed a deep sense of solidarity, commonality and attachment to the MB’s ideals supposedly based on a belief that the organization represents a far better alternative than the deeply resented authoritarian regime.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, this chapter presented some of the initial findings of the study.

Firstly, motivations are explained as a product of individual agents’ deeply held values, perceptions, and understandings of their social environment. Motivations can be viewed through social agents’ attitudes in relation to a specific object, in this case, an object of discontent and grievance. Individually held beliefs play an important role and guide an individual towards what is perceived as a positive feeling of fulfillment and steer them away from what is perceived as negative feelings.

In this case study, it has been demonstrated that state repression through coercion of dissent has had a negative impact on the overall mobilization of opposition. On the individual level, the impact of repression is divided into two parts. The coercion of activists has a negative impact on the recruitment of new activists rendering such processes much slower. The second part is that repression measures applied to Islamists has a generally galvanizing effect on these activists. Repression simply reinforces their commitment to activism. On the organizational level, the regime forced the MB to continuously rearrange both its ideological and operational agenda in order to primarily circumvent the judicial obstacles set up by the authoritarian regime. These tactical adjustments of Islamist priorities have partially resulted in internal frictions reflected primarily in generational squabbles.

187 These tensions were noticeable already in the early 1980s. Initially, disputes depended to an extent on the regime’s irregular levels of repression and activists’ disagreements over how to respond to shifting political opportunities. These divisions of opinion and strategic vision are more visible and outspoken at the grassroots level. Nevertheless, it can be demonstrated that prior to the fall of the Mubarak regime, the MB as an organization seems to have had largely successful internal mechanisms to handle such tensions without allowing factionalism to escalate to the point of organizational breakdown.

Concerning motivation among the MB’s sympathizers it can be argued that the gradual membership process is an important mechanism. It allows activists to develop an emotional attachment to both the ideas of the organization, and, more importantly, to other activists who, in the eyes of the relevant sympathizers, embody organizational principles of correct moral conduct. The MB offers activists a particular environment (usrah etc.), where certain morals and pre-determined codes of conduct have had a strong impact on social interaction, and thus on the individual activists’ decision-making processes. As a result, the motivation behind the decision to join the MB is constructed in a communal environment which allows individuals to cope with their own internal socio—psychological tensions by sharing experiences and thoughts with their peers.

Grievances they have experienced and personal ambitions combine in the pursuit of self-realization in a complex socio-cultural context (see chapter 1).

During such a process, the SMO provides a shared foundation on which activists (or rather sympathizers on the way to becoming activists) shape their behavior based on

“social practices, values and traditions that sustain symbols, rituals, institutions and social relations” (Neuman 1998, 318). It is in this interactive social space that an individual’s sense of agency and his perception of the surrounding socio-political structure merges into a specific type (organization based) of identity and social practice (i.e. the particular style of activism). This understanding of the outcome of social interaction within an SMO largely corresponds to what Bourdieu conceptualizes as “[t]he habitus [which] is this generative and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, practices” (1998, 8).

188 Analyzing the different aspects of the MB, one can find all of the necessary constructs that enable individual activists to engage a superior adversary, express their grievances (e.g.

vent emotional tensions) and the need for social affiliation through robust identity affiliation etc. Individuals assumingly perceive the particular SMO as a legitimate mechanism through which they can make claims of others (e.g. the state, other social actors, communities etc.) (see Steinberg 2002, 200 ff).

What is more, this claims-making process, as presented above, is guided both by the pre-existing social movement organization’s traditional mechanisms, in this case the MB, and its members who interact and constantly re-invent both their long- and short-term claims-making techniques (i.e. mobilization strategies). Consequently, this process can be considered to represent a culture of resistance. Moreover, the culture of resistance is not only an internal process of negotiation between the specific organization and its members, but very much a dynamic practice affected by the influences and pressures from external opponents. As presented above, the antagonistic relation between the Mubarak regime and the MB as its opponent presented continuous strategic and operational challenges that needed to be overcome. If we yet again consider the authoritarian state authorities as an obstacle to mobilization for intimidated sympathizers it is possible to understand that a gradual process of persuasion (qawaafil) and inter-personal communication becomes even more important than in other cases.

Sympathizers develop an emotional attachment to the ideas of other activists and start to interpret their dissident through already familiar religious rhetoric. Later, a particular sympathizer deepens his personal association with a particular activist, often by attending tarbiyyah places (i.e. study group and other informal activities), whereby they become acquainted with everyday practices of the activists and the MB’s ideas and goals.

Subsequently, the sympathizer, recognizing state repression as a threat, overcomes their fear through the consideration of a particular (moral) duty (section 4.6) and becomes an activist. State repression tactics, described by the interviewed activists, seem to only strengthen the commitment of fully-fledged activists as they have been warned and mentally trained for such experiences and therefore taught to expect such state actions.

The next chapter discusses activist constructions of agency by analyzing their narratives through expressed beliefs, emotions and their sense of collective identity.

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