De la gloria al consenso

To sum up, this thesis adopts social constructivism and normative theory (of IR) to examine the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism. In doing so, it proposes the three following fundamental hypotheses.

• First, actors in world politics, e.g. the EU, ASEAN and their respective norms, are always shaped by their own temporal and spatial (or historical, cultural and geopolitical) conditions.

• Second, normative factors, e.g. norms, values and principles, are influential in world politics and their relevance is manifested in two particular manners: (1) they constitute actors’ identities, inform their interests and define their ways of perceiving and conducting their internal and external affairs; and (2) they influence both cooperation and conflict in world politics.

• Third, the creation and building of a community or a regional organisation, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, is a dual process, which always entails a ‘we-group’, i.e. a sense of collective identity within a community, and a sense of difference with outsiders, i.e. a ‘they-group’ or many ‘they-groups’. If a sense of collective identity generates conditions for cooperation within the community, a sense of difference engenders conditions for tension or conflict in the external relations of the community.

Anchoring its arguments on these three primary premises, the thesis puts forward the following key and related propositions:

(1) Normative factors are crucial to the EU and ASEAN. These two organisations generate norms not only to guide their regional and international relations but also to seek to persuade others to adopt their preferred norms. In other words, norm entrepreneurship is a defining and influential component of their regional actorness. Yet, while they are both norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, the norms, on which they are founded and which they advocate, radically differ from

defining reason behind the normative differences of the two organisations. However, as illustrated, it is only one of many important factors. For this reason, though very useful, the domestic salience as a criterion cannot fully explain the normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN and their implications to their relations.

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each other. The EU upholds a set of predominantly individual-oriented values whereas ASEAN promotes a set of primarily state-centred principles.

(2) The EU, ASEAN and their normative premises are different from each other because the ‘we-group’ factors, e.g. historical experience and cultural traditions, as well as the ‘they-group’ actors, e.g. external powers and forces, that shape their respective collective identity and normative underpinnings, diverge from each other.

(3) Their normative differences are the reason behind their disagreements over a number of important issues and these tensions significantly hinder their economic, political and security cooperation in the post-Cold War period. These are manifested in the following forms and ways.

a. Their normative differences tend to be conflictual firstly because the natures of their norms or their normative identity differ. As it upholds a set of liberal cosmopolitan norms, the EU has the tendency to push for the rights of individuals to the point of being willing to interfere into others’ internal affairs to make sure that its cherished norms are respected. In contrast, as ASEAN is premised on a set of traditional communitarian principles, it explicitly discourages any external interference into its internal affairs in any form or manifestation. This means EU-ASEAN relations are inclined to be conflictual not because of what either organisation does or not does but because of what the EU and ASEAN are.

b. Their normative differences become a major obstruction in their cooperation when one regional organisation firmly upholds and keenly promotes its core norms and the other defies or violates them. More precisely, when the EU ardently defends and spreads the liberal and democratic values that make up its normative identity and ASEAN refuses to accept those values, it is certain that their relations become conflictual. Similarly, when ASEAN insists on the respect of its cherished norms and the EU ignores or violates them, their interaction probably faces tensions and standstills.

c. Their normative differences are also likely to lead to disruptions in their cooperation when one regional organisation disconnects or disassociates with the other and its preferred norms.

d. In contrast, whenever they try to limit, avoid or accommodate their normative differences their tensions are significantly decreased and this paves the way for

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some cooperation. Yet, as long as their normative differences exist, while they may not clash, they still find it difficult to meaningfully to cooperate with each other.

e. Not only the lack of actorness, notably the institutional and materials dimensions, of the EU and ASEAN, but also their normative differences considerably impede their post-Cold War cooperation. This thesis mainly examines why and when their normative differences are conducive to preventing cooperation.

f. Finally, not only does the EU-ASEAN relationship form and reinforce the collective identity and normative features of the EU and ASEAN as most of literature on interregionalism maintains. Their normative constituents also play determine (the shape, content and outcomes) of their interregional interaction. Again, the thesis mainly focuses on the latter aspect of this proposition.

The above propositions are the main ones that this thesis takes to address its three principal questions that were raised in Chapter 1. The (1) supposition is aimed at tackling the first question, which looks at the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them differ from each other. The (2) is formulated to address the second question, which examines the sources of their normative differences. Chapters 4 and 5 will explore in-depth these two first issues, which are also further illustrated by the three chapters on the case studies. The hypotheses proposed in the (3) are primarily aimed at addressing the third question, i.e. why their normative differences become a conflictual and obstructive factor in their relations. The two first case studies, i.e. the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem, are examined to demonstrate the (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) propositions whereas the Aceh matter is aimed at illustrating the (3d), (3e) and (3f) ones. These three case studies are intended to offer further evidence to the (1) and (2) hypotheses.

To provide a historical background of EU-ASEAN relations and of the three case studies and especially to facilitate the thesis to explain and illustrate these key propositions, the next chapter gives an overview of this interregional relationship.

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