La bipolaridad del poder: reino y gobierno

2.3.1. Ecological, social and internal processes

In their studies, Kowert and Legro (1996: 470-82) identify three processes that lead political actors to generate, maintain and change their norms, namely ecological, social and internal. With regard the first process, norms derive from the pattern of relations between actors and their environment. These patterned interactions may occur in two major forms. The first form takes place when actors confront a rapidly (or dramatically) changing environment (Kowert and Legro 1996: 470-4). For example, historic events in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 910). This form is evident in the EU because as will be shown in Chapters 4 and 6 the end of the bipolar system led it to transform from the EC to the EU and this transformation brought with it a new identity and mission that strongly focused on the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy. The second form, which addresses the problem of norm and identity maintenance rather than their emergence, stresses that the continuity in the environment strengthens norms (Kowert and Legro 1996: 472). This is the true in the case of ASEAN’s norms because even though the end of the Cold War somehow affected international relations in Southeast Asia and the economic situation of the region’s countries may have changed, the overall regional context, especially at the security level, has not changed much (Katsumata 2003). Consequently, the core norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non- interference, which ASEAN adopted when it was established in 1967, remain unchanged. They were all reiterated in the ASEAN Charter, which was signed in 2007.

Concerning the second, norms stem from the relations between actors themselves, i.e. through social processes, and these take place in two forms. Norms are spread through a process of interaction between members within a community, i.e. the in-group interaction (Kowert and Legro 1996: 474). This form of norm building and spreading is underlined in many works on security communities (Deutsch 1957; 1961; Barnett 1995; Wendt 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; Adler 1997; Ericson 2000). Norms also emerge from a process of in-group/out-group interaction (Kowert and Legro 1996: 475). This in- group/out-group interaction in the formation of collective identity is underlined by a

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number of scholars, such as Diez (2004; 2005), Neumann (1996; 1998; 1999) and Campbell (1992; 2998). Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1 and will be shown in Chapter 7, interregional relations, e.g. Asia-Europe Meeting, enable the participant regional organisations to form and reinforce their norms and identities (Gilson 1999; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2005; Higgott 2000; Gilson and Yeo 2004). However, as will be shown in the last section of this chapter, the norms that emerge from these two forms of the social processes are the two facets of the same process.

Finally, norms spring from the internal characteristics of actors, i.e. through the internal processes. Kowert and Legro (1996: 478-82) identify three different arguments relating to how norms emerge within political actors. The first regards the construction of norms as a psychological process. This argument, which is closely related to one of the social process examined, pretends that norms emerge because of people’s need for identity in social relations, i.e. their need to invent an in-group identity to differentiate with an out-group identity. The second argument maintains that norms and identities emerge from cognitive miserliness, which mainly focuses on ‘Who am I?’ or ‘Who are we?’. As will be shown later, these two internal processes play a key role in the norm- building/spreading of both the EU and ASEAN. However, as the two forms of the social processes mentioned earlier, they are in fact two facets of a single process because we cannot define ‘who we are’ unless we differentiate ourselves from other(s) as Diez (2004: 321-2) rightly maintains. The third argument of the internal process focuses on the linguistic role, i.e. the use and interpretation of langue, in norm construction. As already mentioned in the methodological issues in Chapter 1, the processes and multiple levels of speech, e.g. speech events, phrases, sentences and texts of (the officials and institutions) of the EU and ASEAN also form an important source of their respective norms.

2.3.2. Other causal factors and forces

The three processes are very useful in explaining why political actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, promote their preferred norms and/or why their normative premises differ from each other. Nevertheless, there are other important factors that define their normative foundation and differentiation, which are either ignored or under-developed by Kowert and Legro (1996). One of these is their own historical backgrounds. According to Tocci and Manners (2008: 311-2), historical conditions and philosophical traditions are a defining reason behind the normative dissimilarities of the US, the EU,

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China, India and Russia. For Manners (2002: 240), the historical context of Europe is a key factor that shapes the EU’s normative distinction. The role of history in ASEAN’s construction of its ASEAN way is also very influential (Katsumata 2003). The striking difference is that European integration in general and the EU’s norms are aimed at overcoming Europe’ past disastrous wars (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009b: 1) caused by ultranationalism (Yeo 2009b: 195) whereas ASEAN and its norms are shaped by Southeast Asia’s colonial legacy. This historical difference is the defining reason why the EU and ASEAN espouse two differing normative frameworks as well as follows two models of regionalism with one being inclined to supranationalism and the other tends towards intergovernmentalism mentioned earlier. Regarding the philosophical or cultural traditions, Tocci and Manners (2008: 311) maintain that the emphasis of the EU – and by extension the US – on individual rights and freedoms is also unmistakably linked to the legacy of Enlightenment. Chapter 5 will consider whether there exist some cultural elements in the so-called Asian values advocated by some ASEAN leaders.

Tocci and Manners (2008: 312-4) also identify two other factors that define political actors’ normative preferences and differences. One is related to their background, location and perspective of powers in question. A case in point is that the EU upholds and promotes liberal cosmopolitan norms partly because its members are established democracies. In contrast, for decades ASEAN ignored those norms because its members were not democratic countries. Currently, despite their agreement to include human rights and democracy in their Charter and their decision establish a regional human rights body, ASEAN states still prioritise national sovereign and non- interference over human rights and democracy because some ASEAN members’ regimes remain authoritarian. In responding to the EU’s insistence on the inclusion of the human rights clause in a new cooperation framework the EU and ASEAN intended to negotiate in the early 1990s, ASEAN argued that in developing countries, there were other rights and concerns, which were far more important than civil and political rights (Tay and Goh 1999: 43). The second is related to “the power political configuration in which an actor finds itself in the international system” (Tocci and Manners 2008: 312- 3). According to this, the stronger an international actor it within the international system the more likely it seeks to promote and protect its desired norms. For instance, as they regarded the collapse of the communist bloc as their victory over their Eastern adversaries, in the 1990s, the West in general and the EU sought to impose their preferred values on the non-Western world. Similarly, given their countries’ impressive

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economic growth before the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asian leaders became confident in their economic model. Consequently, as will be shown in Chapter 6, they were more assertive and willing to oppose the EU’s assertion on the protection and promotion of human rights.

In his own study, Manners (2002: 240) highlights two particular factors that make the EU’s norms different, namely the EU’s hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution. Regard to the first, he maintains that the EU has developed into a hybrid of international form of governance that transcends Westphalian norms. Indeed, this makes the EU radically differ from ASEAN, whose existence is intended to strengthen Westphalian norms. Concerning the EU’s political-legal constitution, Manners (2002: 241) maintains that the EU is a political entity that “has largely occurred as an elite- driven, treaty based order. For this reason its constitutional norms represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity”. This can be applied to ASEAN because even though being less legally based, it is an elite-driven organisation, whose current key norms have been adopted and maintained since its foundation and enshrined in its key documents.

Briefly, the processes and factors examined affect, to a greater or lesser degree, the normative preferences and differences of the EU and ASEAN and, consequently, the thesis takes them to explain their normative foundation and differentiation. Yet, though they are identified separately by different scholars, they are related to each other and some of them even overlap. For instance, Kowert and Legro (1996) argue that norms are formed through a process of social interaction and they name the common heritage of actors (within a community, e.g. the EU and ASEAN) as the facilitating factor for norm building. This common heritage can include historical backgrounds and philosophical traditions, which are the elements identified by Tocci and Manners (2008: 311-2). For this reason, while using these factors and processes, the inquiry regroups them into two major ones and takes them as the key typologies to explain the normative foundation and differentiation of the EU and ASEAN. The first is related to the ‘we- group’ elements, e.g. the international,35

35 _{A reason for the inclusion of the ecological or international factor in this group is that while the end of}

the Cold War, which was regarded as a defining event, it affected the EU and ASEAN differently.

regional and domestic/national factors shared by the members of each regional organisation, and the interaction within the ‘we- group’. The second is about the ‘they-group’ factors and the interaction between the ‘we-group’, i.e. the EU and ASEAN, and their respective constitutive ‘they-group’ or

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‘they-groups’. Their relations with each other are a form of this ‘we-group’/‘they- group’ interaction. Another major reason for its rearrangement is that it can explain more adequately the reasons why the normative factors can be both cooperative and conflictual. This leads to the last and most important section of the chapter.