enhanced their interaction in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, especially at the political level, which was regarded as remarkably successful (Hull 1984: 22; Mols 1990: 1966; Luhulima 1992: 317; Yeo 2009a: 47). They worked closely in coordinating and supporting each other’s position on a number of international matters – notably the issues of Cambodia and Afghanistan – in international fora such as the UN (AEMM 1985; Rüland 2001c: 12; Yeo 2009a: 47). A study of the votes of the UN General Assembly Resolution from 1979 to 1984 indicated that the EC and ASEAN voted as a bloc in support of the calls for the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and Vietnam from Cambodia (Robles 2004b: 34). The argument that invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan played a significant part in enhancing their cooperation is also supported by the responses to the survey undertaken by the author. When asked to express their views on the statement ‘the Soviet-backed Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1978 and the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 strengthened EC-ASEAN relations’, of the 21 responses, two indicated ‘completely agree’, 10 ‘agree’, five ‘neutral’ and four ‘disagree’. The significance of the political element of EC-ASEAN relations was also reflected in their dense network of dialogue.49 For instance, until the early 1990s, the high-ranking officials of the EC and its members were always present in the AEMMs as well as other meetings that ASEAN held with its major partners.50
49 In terms of institutional links, ASEAN had the most extensive contacts with the EC of any regional
grouping of developing countries (European Commission, DG for Information 1991: 14). The AEMM, held every 18 months, was the most important mechanism in their cooperation. The second type of high- level political exchange took place in the form of the ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference (PMC), which ASEAN organised annually with its international partners. The third significant link established by the CA was the JCC, made up of senior officials, met annually to discuss economic issues.
50
One of the ASEAN ambassadors to the EC in Brussels said, “[t]here is no other ASEAN relationship to match this in intensity” (quoted in Mols 1990: 67). However, as will be shown in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, in the post-Cold War period, compared to China, India, Japan and other major partners of ASEAN, the EU was much less involved in its region-to-region dialogue with ASEAN as well as other meetings that ASEAN held with its major partners.
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The achievement of their political relations laid a strong foundation for a closer cooperation in the economic area (Wannamethee 1989: 23). By the mid 1980s, both the EC and ASEAN realised that they needed to expand the scope of cooperation, especially in the economic-related areas.51 This is why at the fifth AEMM in January 1984, they agreed to organise a ministerial meeting to discuss economic matters (AEMM 1984), which was held nine months later in Bangkok (AEMM 1985).52 The desire for an enhanced partnership was reiterated at the eighth AEMM, during which the ministers agreed that “greater efforts should be made to enhance cooperation between the two regions” (AEMM 1990, point 2). Chief among these efforts was to review the CA (AEMM 1990, point 18). At the ninth AEMM in May 1991 they made clear that “the revision of the [1980] Agreement was now necessary and they decided that the new Agreement be broadened in scope to cover all domains of cooperation between the two regions so as to better reflect the new conditions and priorities in both regions” (AEMM 1991, point 37).53
By providing a summary of EC-ASEAN relations since 1972 to 1991, this section wants to underline three important points because they enable the thesis to explicate better their post-Cold War interaction – or more exactly, why and how their divergent normative factors affected their relationship since 1991.
This illustrates that by the late 1980s and the early 1990s, given the fact that “economic motivations feature strongly in the development” of their cooperation (Luhulima 1992: 313), the EC and ASEAN realised it was time to revise their cooperation framework.
From a modest beginning in the early 1970s, EC-ASEAN relations grew stronger in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Both regional organisations regarded each other as an important partner. While the EC’s link with ASEAN became a solid and, on the whole, a reliable element in its foreign relations, ASEAN considered its cooperation with the EC a successful enterprise that became an indispensible part of its international engagement (Mols 1990: 66). Coupled with other factors, e.g. ASEAN’s impressive
51 Another key factor that prompted the EC to seek to strengthen its economic cooperation was the high
economic growth of ASEAN countries in the 1970s and 1980. While during that period, ASEAN did not achieve a great deal in terms of its economic integration, individually five ASEAN economies enjoyed impressive growth, which was much bigger than the EC’s (see Appendix 11).
52 This first ever meeting of ASEAN-EC Economic Ministers, which was also the first the EC held with
any other regional groupings, “signifies the growing convergence of views and interests between the EC and ASEAN” (Wannamethee 1989: 23).
53 In his opening statement at the ASEAN PMC in July 1991, the European Commissioner for North-
South Relations Abel Matutes reiterated the need to modify the agreement taking into account the significant changes in both regions since 1980 (Manutes 1991). The statement was made available to the author by courtesy of Ms. Jocelyne Collonval, Historical Archives of the European Commission.
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economic growth, their political successful cooperation prompted them to enhance their economic cooperation by agreeing to revise the 1980 Cooperation Agreement in the late 1980s.
They managed to forge a strong political partnership because they had similar international outlooks. In his speech at the first AEMM, Genscher (1978: 112) said that both the EC and ASEAN “have many basic convictions and many interests in common”. A central and shared element, as the comment of Yeo quoted at the beginning of this section illustrates, is that both of them were fundamentally capitalist and anti-communist regional groups. While other factors, e.g. economic interests, brought them together, their shared Western capitalist and especially anti-communist character was the main reason for the success of their political cooperation.54 Their shared views were also clearly expressed in the 1980 Joint Statement on Political
Issues, in which they both emphasised the need for all states to observe strictly the
principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference others’ internal affairs (AEMM 1980b, point 1). As will be shown in Chapter 5, these principles are the core of the ASEAN way, strongly upheld by ASEAN and its members.55
Finally, until the late 1980s, the EC did not strong focus on the protection and promotion of democratic values, e.g. human rights and democracy, in its external activities in general and its relations with ASEAN. As will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, until the early 1990s, East Timor and Myanmar were not a concern in its dialogue with ASEAN even though gross human rights violations took place in East Timor since 1970s and Myanmar’s military regime widely abused human rights in the 1970s and the 1980s. Like ASEAN, in those years of the bipolar confrontation, the EC’s external relations and its security policy were mainly viewed and approached in a realist sense. In other words, it adopted a traditional security policy, which was based on defence of borders and the containment of threats. Consequently, it lent its support for authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asian countries as elsewhere, regardless of the consequences for
54 This was confirmed by the responses to the author’s survey. The respondents were asked to give their
views on the statement ‘the capitalist and anti-communist stance of the EC and ASEAN bonded the two regional organisations together and prompted them together and work closely in supporting each other position on the Afghanistan and Cambodian issues in the international fora, e.g. the UN, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s’. Of the 21 responses received, two indicated ‘completely agree’, 11 ‘agree’, six ‘neutral’ and only two ‘disagree’.
55
The EC’s recognition and emphasis of the core principles upheld by ASEAN as the fundamental principles of international relations strengthened ASEAN and its norms. In other words, as explained in Chapter 2, when ASEAN (i.e. the self) and its identity discourses were recognised and supported by the EC (i.e. the other), ASEAN felt more secure and confident in its dealing with external challenges, such as the Cambodia issue. This, in turn, enhanced their cooperation.
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people living in those countries. Overall, until the late 1980s, in terms of their way of viewing and conducting their external relations, the EC and ASEAN were largely similar and this why did have any major disagreements. The questions arise now are whether they can maintain a good partnership and whether they can successfully agree a new cooperation agreement in the 1990s as they planned and wished in the late 1980s. More importantly, what are the reasons for this success or failure? The next section as well as Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will look at these two questions.