Información sobre el sujeto:

For the last decade, responses from the EU to the increasing level of economic pressure affecting the labour market have revolved around the notion of ‘flexicurity’. Moreover, while the versatility of the term ‘flexicurity’ has contributed to its speculative success it has also opened up the possibility that a vast spectrum of different – and potentially opposing – labour market policies may fit the paradigm (Pulignano et al., 2015). One could conclude that in the literature there is a manifest lack of a universally accepted definition (Burroni and Keune, 2011). Meanwhile, at policy-making level, flexicurity is simply understood as a labour market condition in which flexibility and security do not oppose each other.

Due to this conceptual ambiguity, current research increasingly argues for a clearer account of the context in which the notion of flexicurity is deployed (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). In this regard, the distinction between the analytical and the programmatic definitions put forward by Burroni and Keune (2011) is significant:

…the flexicurity approach can be presented as an instrument to map and compare the state of play in specific cases by describing the occurrence and weight of the various types of flexibility and security and by disentangling their interplay. In programmatic terms, more clarity is required to reduce the ambivalence of the concept and to allow higher-quality policy debate. This requires that the ambitions of the flexicurity approach are downscaled and that its aspiration to be a guiding principle for the reform of any type of labour market situation should be abandoned (Burroni and Keune, 2011:87).

Sharing their methodological concern, this study has chosen to deploy flexicurity as a purely analytical tool that can be used to observe how issues of flexibility and security have developed (Madsen, P.K in Bieńkowski et al., 2008; Ibsen and Mailand, 2011). In so doing, it moves attention from the policy debate on labour markets, welfare state and their

interactions, to a different source of flexibility and security, namely, collective bargaining (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015).

In particular, this research adopts the analytical framework proposed by Madsen (2008) who depicts flexibility and security as multi-dimensional concepts. With reference to Wilthagen and Tros (2004), Madsen identifies four different forms of flexibility:

• External flexibility: the possibility of hiring and firing workers and the use of flexible forms of labour contracts.

• Working-time flexibility: the times and the shifts according to which employees begin and finish their working day and includes both overtime and part time work. • Wage flexibility: the ability to introduce variable pay based on performance or

results.

• Functional flexibility: the option to adapt the tasks carried out by employees to changes in demand, and is achieved through consistent investments in training. Turning to security, he identifies:

• Job security: the ability to retain a job with the same employer until retirement. • Employment security: the possibility to find employment as a result of policies that

enhance employability directly, such as active labour market policies, in-work training, and skills development.

• Income security: the certainty of receiving adequate and stable levels of income during transition in and out of employment status.

• Combination security: the ability of workers to combine work with other phases of life such as parenthood, education or care-taking.

According to Madsen (2008), these particular forms of flexibility and security can be linked to each other, allowing for sixteen potential combinations to occur. Such combinations go beyond an interpretation of flexicurity as a mere synthesis of potentially conflicting interests. Instead, the focus is on the possibility that a variety of flexibility and security combinations can be pursued in a coordinated way, that is through social dialogue and negotiations at different bargaining levels (Wilthagen, 1998). As observed by Wilthegen and Tros (2004):

Flexicurity is (1) a degree of job, employment, income and ‘combination’ security that facilitates the labour market career and biographics of workers with a relatively weak position and allows the enduring and high quality labour market participation and social inclusion, while at the same time providing (2) a degree of numerical (both external and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows for labour markets’ (and individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to changing conditions in order to maintain and enhance competitiveness and productivity (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004:170).

Collecting evidence of the degree of negotiated flexibility and the broad negotiation agendas that characterise the Netherlands and Denmark, Wilthagen and Tros (2004) argue that flexicurity policies can be analysed as types of trade-offs. According to them, the effective balance between flexibility and security achieved in these countries suggests that a link between collective bargaining and flexicurity may well exist. Thus, by extending the scope of collective bargaining, social partners would automatically increase the range of flexibility and security combinations to draw upon:

By negotiating not only about wages and working hours, security for employees need no longer be exclusively sought in income or job security, but also in the maintenance of a good position in the internal and external labour market (e.g. in terms of training, employability, flexible organisation of work, etc.). Adding the flexibilisation strategies of employers to the bargaining agenda and discussing them in an integrated manner along with security for the employees results in an increase in the acceptance of flexibilisation among employees. This encourages ‘positive coordination’, ‘integrative bargaining’, positive-sum games’, and negotiated flexibility’, enabling mutual gains to be achieved and a more optimal way of dealing with the double requirement of flexibility and security’ (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004:179).

Scholars have extensively debated the possibility that such flexibility and security trade-offs may neither signify nor contribute to flexicurity (Leschke et al., 2006; Ibsen and Mailand, 2011). It is apparent that the idea of trade-offs is subjected to a double interpretation. This is also consistent with Walton and McKersie’s (1965) notion of ‘distributive’ and ‘integrative’ bargaining. Indeed, the first focuses on the fact that, if flexibility is to be traded for security – and vice-versa – the positive contribution of one must come at the expense of the other (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011:165); for example, where severance payments – income security – are provided in exchange for higher external

flexibility. Ibsen and Mailand interpret this kind of trade-off in zero-sum terms – higher flexibility against lower security – which, in their opinion, is ‘logically not flexicurity’ (2011:165). Critically, the second interpretation stresses the fact that flexibility is no longer perceived as necessarily detrimental to employees’ protections thus, trade-offs between flexibility and security ‘can also reflect a mutually supportive or complementary relationship’ (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Madsen in Bieńkowski et al., 2008:37).

As Leschke (2006:3) effectively points out:

…there is not only a trade-off between flexibility and security. The flexibility gains of employers do not necessarily mean a loss of security among employees; similarly, security gains of employees do not necessarily have to go along with flexibility losses among employers. Therefore, the talk about a balance between flexibility and security – usually thought as a compromise between employers and employees – does unduly simplify the nexus.

Representing fundamental attempts to deploy the notion of flexicurity for analytical purposes, the mentioned studies can be used to develop a more integrated and systematic account of the factors that enable flexibility and security trade-offs to occur and, as a result, assess their nature (Pulignano et al., 2015). A potential way to do so is, first, to look back at Burroni and Keune’s (2011) definition of flexicurity and disentangle the interplay between the different types of flexibility and security injected through collective bargaining. The second step is to observe the whole spectrum of issues that are likely to influence the varying nature of flexibility and security trade-offs at different bargaining levels.

Hence, being interested in the variety of flexibility and security combinations produced by collective bargaining actors and institutions in different national context – more than the

quality of flexicurity achieved – the present research proposes an analytical approach that encompasses both notions of ‘balanced’ and ‘unbalanced’ trade-offs. This approach is drawn from the findings of Pulignano et al. (2015), suggesting that the character of interplay between issues of flexibility and security largely depends on specific circumstances, such as the strength of the social actors involved in the trading process; their understanding around these issues; as well as the market conditions in which actors interact.

In the main, the present study suggests that it is possible to identify two general categories of trade-offs:

1. Balanced: if as a result of collective bargaining involving flexibility and security both social partners gain – and/or lose – in equal measure; or if the share solution takes the form of a high benefit-low sacrifice compromise.

2. Unbalanced: if as a result of collective bargaining involving flexibility and security one social partner’s gains exceed those of the other party.

The distinction between balanced and unbalanced trade-offs recalls Walton and McKersie’s classical definitions of integrative and distributive concession bargaining (1965) according to which the outcomes of negotiations can either take the form of positive sum-games (win- win situations) or zero-sum game (win-lose situations). This framework has been recently adopted by Teague and Roche (2015) to examine the circumstances that influence the adoption of one mode of concession bargaining rather than another. Their findings suggest that institutional arrangements and micro-level patterns both constrain and facilitate the postures and the strategies of employers – and, at the same time, influence unions’ bargaining power – in responding to the pressures of economic crisis. Moreover, in line with the theoretical lens applied to this thesis, Walton and McKersie’s work reflects the main assumptions of actor-centred institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997:36; Campbell, 2004).

In their famous book ‘A Behavioural Theory of Labor Negotiations’ (1956:5-6) they argue:

a) Distributive bargaining is a hypothetical construct referring to the complex system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one party’s goals when they are in basic conflict with those of the other party…’’… fixed sum-games are the situations we have in mind: one person’s gain is a loss of the other;

b) Integrative bargaining refers to the system of activities which is instrumental to the attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict with those of the other party…’’… integrative potential exists when the nature of the problem permits solutions which benefits both parties, or at least when the gains of one party do not represent equal sacrifices by the other.

More importantly, when analysing the agenda items of integrative bargaining, these authors add (1965:127):

c) the concept [of integrative bargaining] covers more than the situation in which gains available to one necessarily allow corresponding and equal gains by the other. It is applied to situations in which the total payoff is varying sum in a significant way, even though both parties may not share equally in the joint gain, and indeed one may even suffer minor inconveniences in order to provide substantial gains for the other. Presumably, when the direct results of a problem solution are high benefit-low sacrifice, the slight inconvenienced party can receive some side payment or reciprocal treatment in another problem area.

The relevance of their framework to the conceptualisation of the notion of ‘unbalanced’ and ‘balanced’ trade-offs – both as a result of negotiations on individual items and package deals – is apparent and increases when it is applied to the outcomes of negotiations on issues of flexibility and security. By involving rights and obligations concerning both sides, it is exactly in items such as ‘individual job security’ and ‘management flexibility’ that Walton and McKersie (1965) identify inherent integrative potential. These are qualitative items that contain the possibility that management and unions’ interests may be coincidental and, as a result, a variable amount of value may be distributed in an integrative fashion – as for balanced trade-offs. More importantly, according to Walton and McKersie (1965:121) the extent to which social partners translate such potential into win-win and/or win-lose bargaining outcomes depends on a) the ‘institutional framework’, and b) the ‘actual situation’ in which negotiations take place.

With regard to the former, Ibsen and Mailand (2011) observe that institutional differences in sector level bargaining arrangements are likely to result in cross-country variation in the extent and the way in which items of flexibility and security feature in the bargaining agenda. Furthermore, they show that by setting limits on downward pressures on wages –

income security – and allowing for upward variations – wage flexibility – sector level collective bargaining is able to produce advantages for employers and employees alike. Similarly, negotiations on training are likely to boost functional flexibility for employers while increasing the value of employees in the labour market – employment security. Negotiations on social benefits and entitlements provide security for employees in exchange for different forms of flexibility, in particular, working-time flexibility. Further, Ibsen and Mailand (2011) argue that compromises between flexibility and security can also involve more than one single item, turning the collective agreement into a package deal. By implication, the present study suggests that any time that ‘losses of either flexibility or

security are compensated with endowments of flexibility and security’ – within the same agreement –a balanced trade-off may occur.

With regard to the ‘actual situation’ (Walton and McKersie, 1965) in which negotiations take place, Pulignano et al. (2015:8) confirm that there are other factors, in addition to institutions, that are likely to influence the nature of flexibility and security trade-offs. With an exclusive focus on the bargaining scenario within multinationals, they explain variations in collective bargaining outcomes over flexibility and security through the following variables: a) the ‘intensity of market competition’ that companies face and, b) their ‘level of vertical integration’. They propose, in particular, that there may be a correlation between firm-specific structural (non-institutional) factors and unions’ capability to compensate management’s demands for flexibility with long-term security. Relevant to the focus of the present analysis, these factors are shown to influence the nature of flexibility and security trade-offs in four different ways:

1. In the presence of relatively low market competition and high vertical integration – either in case of a homogenous product and low skills or in the case of differentiated products and high skills – companies are likely to undergo significant relocation threats. As a response, social partners at the local level use collective bargaining to exchange flexibility with long-term job security. The outcome may be a balanced trade-off between flexibility and security because even in the face of highly controversial matters, by negotiating, both parties are able to secure positive outcomes.

2. In the presence of high levels of market competition and high vertical integration, unions are able to establish forms of transnational coordination both at European and global level which provide them with the strength to negotiate a variety of protections for the overall workforce. These protections are often the result of ‘concession bargaining’ (Walton and McKersie, 1965) involving, for example, the exchange of internal and external forms of flexibility against job security. Hence the outcome may be a balanced trade-off as ‘flexibility (for the employer) comes along with an employment guarantee (job security) for the employees (Pulignano et al., 2015:19). 3. In the presence of high levels of market competition and little vertical integration,

companies involved with low-tech and homogeneous products are exposed to a great deal of uncertainty. Such uncertainty reduces unions’ bargaining power and impacts

on their ability to accommodate shocks in demands and protect jobs. As a result, unions are forced into negotiations where flexibility is conceded with no guarantees of long-term job security from the company. The result may be an unbalanced trade- off as management gains in flexibility exactly what employees lose in terms of security.

4. In the presence of relatively low levels of market competition and a low level of vertical integration, companies that differentiate their products and require highly- skilled employees are less subject to benchmarking and relocation threats. The context in which negotiations take place allows unions to leverage their bargaining power and to provide security independently of management’s demands for flexibility. This situation may lead to an unbalanced trade-off as employees’ contributions come at the ‘price’ of the employer accepting a negative outcome. In Pulignano et al. (2015) different examples of balanced and unbalanced trade-offs at the company level can be found. Balanced trade-offs can occur when in exchange for long shifts on weekends – working-time flexibility – and/or job rotation – functional flexibility – employers offer career development schemes and strong training programmes – job security

and employment security – to their employees (Pulignano et al., 2015). Conversely,

unbalanced trade-offs are likely to occur when firm level bargaining on pay ends up with union representatives accepting wage cuts – wage flexibility – as a measure to protect workers from temporary plant closures – short-term job security. A similar rationale may apply to negotiations on atypical work if the number of temporary employees – numerical flexibility – is increased to protect the level of job security and income security of the core employees. Also in these cases, negotiations lead to a ‘compromise’ between signatory actors. However, employers are likely to benefit from a higher share of the total payoff than the unions.

In conclusion, recent studies have thrown some light on the ‘institutional framework’

enabling/constraining flexibility and security trade-offs at the sector level (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015) as well as the ‘actual situation’

enabling/constraining flexibility and security trade-offs at firm level (Pulignano et al., 2015; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). Nevertheless, little is known about: a) the interaction between sector and company level actors and institutions; and b) the interaction between the institutional and the non-institutional dimensions and the role that these together play for the

agenda and outcomes of collective negotiations. Representing the core objectives of the present study, these two areas of investigation will be individually reviewed.