With regards to Plan Dalet, it is the Hebrew name of a plan formulated by the Haganah in Mandatory Palestine in March 1948. The Plan aimed at taking control of Mandatory Palestine, declaring a Jewish state and defending its borders and people,
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including the Jewish population outside of the borders. However, the Plan is controversial, because it aimed at expelling the population of conquered villages outside the borders of the Jewish state as set by the UN Partition Plan. Historians much debate the intentions of the Israeli state pursued with the Plan. One side claims that the Plan aimed at expulsion, sometimes called ethnic cleansing, on the grounds that this was an integral part of a planned state strategy (Pappe 2006, p. xii; Khalidi 1988, p. 4). A counter-argument questions this claim and argues that the Plan did not have pre-meditated intentions for ‘transfer’ (Morris 2004, pp. 5-6, 60). There is abundant historical research that tries to prove or refute the claim and its impact on the current state of affairs, especially on Israeli ambitions in the West Bank. However, it suffices to marshal a couple of historical facts that best characterize Israeli ideology with regards to the territorial aspect of the conflict and the possibility of conceding land for peace. In this respect, two Israeli new-historians analyzed Israel’s opposition to relinquishing territory, starting with Begin’s opposition to UNSC Resolution 242. Shlaim (2010) argued that Begin rejected the Resolution on the basis that a “re- division of the Land of Israel” and the recognition of the concept of a Palestinian people would imply their right to national sovereignty in the areas where they lived (Shalim 2010, p. 240). Morris (2004) claimed that “mainstream Zionist thought had always regarded a Jewish state from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River as its ultimate goal, and the vision of ‘Greater Israel’ as Zionism's ultimate objective did not end with the 1948 war” (Morris 2004, pp. 5-6). Israel’s acceptance of the Partition Plan at the time was seen as a tactical manoeuvre and was not the real objective of the Zionist movement. Accordingly, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) maintain that Ben Gurion’s ambition to abolish the Partition Plan and expand to the whole of Palestine after the formation of the state and a large army remained unchanged from 1937 since after Israel was founded in 1947-48 (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, p. 36). There are numerous examples of Israel’s position regarding its exclusive right to the land of Israel. Take as an example the Likud’s manifesto for the 1997 elections stating that the right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is eternal, and that it is an integral part of its right to security and peace that Judea and Samaria are not to be
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relinquished to foreign rule; between the sea and the Jordan river there will be Jewish sovereignty only (Shlaim 2010, p. 240).44
When it comes to the Allon Plan, most historical analysts point to the effects of the Plan on Israel’s settlement policy, especially in the West Bank in the aftermath of the June 1967 war. For instance, Shlaim (2001) noted: “On 26 July 1967, shortly after the war, Allon submitted the Plan to the Cabinet which called for incorporating in Israel large areas that it had captured during the war and that lie beyond the Armistice Lines”. Shlaim further elaborates that the Plan was designed to include as few Arabs as possible in the area claimed by Israel and envisaged permanent settlements and army bases in these areas, despite the fact that it called for negotiations with local leaders to turn the remaining parts of the West Bank into an autonomous region that would be economically linked to Israel. Moreover, “though the Cabinet neither adopted nor rejected it" (Shlaim 2001, pp. 80-99), the Plan became the basis of Yitzhak Rabin’s first settlement policy that still manifests itself in the current geography and demography of the West Bank (Gush Emunim n.d.). Moreover, Hanieh and Cook (2003) linked the Allon Plan to consecutive plans by the Likud Party in 1977; they rested on the basic concept of controlling the land but not taking direct responsibility for the population and were followed by the Sharon Plan (ECF 1977).45 The Sharon Plan is a geostrategic document on “A Vision of Israel at Century’s End” that called for a new belt of settlements in the West Bank in addition to the construction of major east-west highways across the West Bank to connect the new settlements with those in the Jordan Valley. Both plans established the basis for the Begin Plan adopted by the Israeli Knesset in 1977, which later became the foundation of autonomy agreed upon by Israel and Egypt in the 1978 Camp David Accords (EFC 1977).46 The Plan
44 Judea and Samaria are the biblical names for the West Bank. They indicate the name used by the Israeli
government to denote the area of the West Bank excluding Jerusalem (see Glanoor and Blander 2018, p. 184).
45 According to ECF (1977), “the Sharon Plan was partially based on the Allon Plan and entailed a major extension
of Jewish settlement in the West Bank. The plan was made up of four components that included the establishment of urban settlements on the Western reaches of the Samaria Mountains, an extension of Jewish settlement in the Jordan Valley, encircling East Jerusalem with a belt of Jewish settlements and building a network of roads to help secure the settlements”.
46 According to ECF (1977), “the plan laid out the principles for the establishment of Palestinian self-government
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and was formulated in light of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Initiative for Palestinian Autonomy as it was featured in the 1978 Camp David Accord. The plan included the abolition of Israeli military rule in the WBGS, an elected authority to be based in Bethlehem while security and public order would remain the responsibility of Israel. Residents of these areas would be given a choice to become citizens of either Jordan or Israel, including the right to participate in elections. A joint Israeli-Jordanian Palestinian committee would have the choice to become citizens of either Jordan or Israel, including the right to approve ‘reasonable’
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intended the creation of an administrative council elected by Palestinians who would take responsibility for internal Palestinian matters, while Israel would retain control over foreign policy, borders and the economy (Hanieh and Cook 2003). In a recent account of the 1978 Camp David Agreements, Anziska (2018) presented further evidence on the organic linkage between the Framework for Peace in the Middle East that dealt with the West Bank and Gaza sections and the nature and content of the interim self-governing authority of the 1993 Oslo Agreements; he points especially to the fact that both do not envisage Palestinian self-determination or sovereign statehood for that matter. Ironically, the underlying assumption of the Palestinian leadership has been that the Oslo Agreements presumably based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, provide the foundations for the establishment of a Palestinian state. To further our understanding of this assumption, the following section reviews the logic of the Oslo Agreements and its consequences for the Palestinian quest for statehood.
3.2. The Oslo Agreements
The Oslo Agreements cannot be understood without pointing to (a) the historical context within which they have been conceived, (b) the nature of the Agreements and (c) their cost-benefit to Palestinian efforts to achieve statehood given the ongoing Israeli policies and expanding matrix of control. With regards to the historical context, there is substantial agreement amongst historians and political analysts about the impact of the historical moment that led to the signing of what was considered “an agreement of necessity” (Participant 44, senior Palestinian official, Ministry of Interior, 2018). Many contend that a confluence of factors accelerated the need to resolve the decades-long conflict. On one side, there is no doubt that the first Palestinian Intifada was a decisive factor in elevating the West Bank and Gaza to the forefront of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Beitler 2004, p. xi). On the other side, its success in gaining the support of the international community for its peaceful spontaneity in confronting the Israeli military occupation prompted the PLO to change its strategy toward a peaceful solution (Shlaim 2000, p. 466). In parallel with the PLO’s position, there was a shift in the Israeli public and government attitude, realizing that the status quo of the Israeli occupation could not be sustained (Golan 1994, p. 63). Albeit, there were two
resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the question of sovereignty over these territories would remain open, with Israel retaining its claims.”
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further reasons that induced the PLO to engage in bilateral negotiations with Israel; first, there was the worsening of its political and financial position and the loss of its regional clout in the wake of its support for Saddam’s invasion of Iraq; and second, was the PLO’s concern of being replaced by local Palestinian interlocutors in the 1991 Madrid peace conference.47
With regards to the nature of the Agreements, three dimensions are significant: the political, legal and implementation modalities that when combined, can illustrate the actual meaning of the Agreements and their impact on the current state of affairs. When it comes to the political dimension, two issues are significant for understanding the logic of the Agreements: the reference to UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, and the notion of mutual recognition. Arguably, despite the explicit reference to UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 in the DoP and given the wide gap of interpretation of the conflict by both sides, it can be said that the reference was more of a political gesture to guide the negotiations and express good intentions from both sides rather than provide clarity on the modality of implementation. Israel’s understanding of this Resolution might have been guided by the classical claim that there is no foundation in international law for the idea of a second Arab Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and that it would be political and military folly for the West to force Israel to acquiesce to such a scheme (Rostow 1980, p. 169). Besides, its understanding of the UNSC Resolution 338 does not entail an acknowledgement of the Palestinian right of return as stated in UNGA Resolution 194 but instead accepts its calls for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel’s position regarding the issue of Palestinian refugees remained unchanged since the Lausanne Conference of 1949. The Lausanne Conference was convened by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) with representatives of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Arab Higher Committee to resolve disputes arising from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, in particular regarding the return of territories in connection with Resolutions 194 and 181 (Mattar 2005, p. 298). The Israeli stance in the conference explains its long-held position to accept the return of not more than
47 It is common historical fact that the US and Israel favoured the representation of local Palestinians (or what is
called the inside Palestinians) in the multilateral talks in Madrid. Historically, Israel has always attempted to replace the PLO with local leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, especially after the 1967 military occupation. Suffice to look at the example of the Village Leagues during the 1980s to replace the PLO and find solutions for autonomy (Sahliyeh 1986; Hirschfeld 2014).
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100,000 Palestinian refugees, which has been chronicled in both official and second track negotiations from 1993 to this date. The Oslo Accords reflect the power asymmetry between both sides, which have therefore influenced each side’s expectations of the Agreements. For, while the PLO understood the Oslo Agreements as a step toward state formation, Israel’s understanding has been otherwise, giving validation to sceptics of the assumption that UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 would ultimately lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
By the same token, there is a prevailing Palestinian view that the PLO leadership forsake the Palestinian right to self-determination only to gain recognition by Israel as the representative of the Palestinian people, and that the fact that it renounced terrorism implied that the Palestinian national liberation struggle was initially a terrorist act rather than an act legitimized by international law (UNGA Resolution 1982).48 This being said, even though the preamble of the DoP stated that “both parties recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights” it is not explicitly stated what these legitimate rights are. For, whereas the PLO recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist, Israel did not recognise the right of the Palestinians to self- determination or acknowledged the need to commence a process of ending the occupation. However, this view is challenged by negotiators of the Oslo Agreements who maintain that after all Israel’s recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people implies the existence of a Palestinian people long denied by the Zionist movement (Participant 3, Fatah leader, ex-Prime Minister and a key negotiator of the Oslo Agreements, 2018; Participant 39, veteran politician, PLO-central committee member, 2018).49 Ironically, as a result, Israel was given legitimacy even before ending its military occupation (Massad 2009, p. 1). Substantiation of this view can be found in the mutual recognition letters signed by Arafat and Rabin as well as that of the Norwegian Foreign Minister (UNISPAL 1993).50 Those letters summarize
48 This Resolution reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity,
national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle”.
49 The Zionist movement has held the famous slogan about Palestine that it is a land without people for a people
without land (cf. also Masalha 1997; Finkelstein 2003).
50 See the exchange of letters between the PLO and Israel on the eve of signing the Declaration of Independence.
United Nations. The Question of Palestine. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/israel-plo- recognition-exchange-of-letters-between-pm-rabin-and-chairman-arafat-arafat-letter-to-norwegian-fm-non- un-documents/ [Accessed 10 August 2018].
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the sine qua non of the Oslo Agreements and, hence, their ultimate effect on the prospects of Palestinian statehood.
From a legal dimension, it may be apt to highlight some of the shortcomings of the Oslo process present from the very beginning, which had an impact on the trajectory of the Palestinian quest for statehood to this date. Perhaps the most significant shortcomings have been the evident power asymmetry between both sides and two interlinked factors that include the PLO’s acceptance to enter into bilateral negotiations with the occupying state outside of the United Nations umbrella and the secretive nature of the negotiations. On one side, “the mere consent to enter into secret bilateral negotiation process over a deeply rooted UN problem has forfeited the application of international law with regards to Palestinian rights deemed universal, while from the other, it has weakened the Palestinian negotiating power. Entering into bilateral negotiation with the occupying state without reference to the imperatives of international law has transformed the position of the PLO from a national liberation movement calling for the end of occupation into a transitional self-governance authority negotiating its rights under the occupation” (Participant 41, civil society activist, expert in international law and international humanitarian law, 2018).
Moreover, instead of agreeing on the withdrawal arrangements of the occupation’s military forces, the PLO legitimized the settlements and became a party negotiating for a share of what Israel considers its own, such as water resources, airwaves, a territorial division of the West Bank, etc. On top of that, the Oslo Agreements have been in constant contradiction of international law and its principles, namely “jus cogens” or “compelling laws” which are non-negotiable fundamental principles from which no derogation is permitted” (Cornell Law School. n.d.). Hence, the Oslo Agreements are considered to be utterly flawed, because they have been conducted in contradiction with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention 1969), in particular Article 53 that considers that a “treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law” (Participant 41, civil society activist, expert in international law and international humanitarian law, 2018; Participant 32, legal expert, ex-official at the Palestinian Legislative Council, 2018).
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To better understand the gravity of the disregard for international legitimacy, not only the bilateral and secretive nature of the Oslo Agreements marginalized international law; the role of the United Nations as its guarantor was eventually neutralized and made the latter a party to the conflict. With the UN participating as a member in the Quartet (UN News 2002), it lost its superior moral and legal position in safeguarding Palestinian national rights and holding the occupying power accountable for its illegal occupation and ensuing policies. To indicate the contradicting role of the UN in the conflict, it suffices to compare between the UN’s position welcoming the Oslo Agreements in 1993 with its initial opposition to the Framework Agreement on Autonomy entailed in the 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel (UNGA 1979). At the time, not only did the UN reject the agreement based on its non- compliance with the Palestinian Right of Return and sovereignty, but most importantly, it adamantly called for its inclusion in negotiations about the Palestine question along with the PLO, on the basis that the Palestine question belongs to the United Nations (Participant 41, civil society activist, expert in international law and international humanitarian law, 2018).
When it comes to the Agreements and their implementation modalities, it is essential to highlight two issues. The first one is the perception that they would pave the way for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (McMahon 2010, pp. 5-6) and the second is the time lag between the signing of the Agreements and the unfolding reality to this date. In this respect, a careful reading of the Agreements immediately reveals their inherent limitations. To start with, the title of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) or Oslo I, i.e. “Principles of Palestinian Self-Government”, has framed the Israeli expectations of the role of the Palestinian Authority (Oslo Accords 1993). The future role of the self-governing autonomy has been more of a functional one carefully crafted to reflect the autonomy of the 1978 Camp David Accord. There are many similarities between the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DoP).
Accordingly, in the DoP, “Israel committed itself to only one form of expression: autonomy and this is where the story begins and perhaps ends” (Golan 1994, p. 65). What is worthwhile noting is that most of the official and unofficial track-two negotiations did not amount to the recognition of the Palestinian people’s right to self- determination and statehood. The crux of the matter is that the Israeli-desired
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Palestinian entity had always been “something that can be called a state, but that is less than a state, borderless, demilitarized and without Jerusalem”, as defined by Rabin in his speech to endorse the Oslo Agreements at the Knesset in October 1995 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995). In this respect, the following section highlights some of the conceptual controversies around the framework of the DoP and the ensuing Oslo II Agreement.51 It relates the aim of the Agreement to the nature of the