This thesis argues that there is a need to highlight the state in its Westphalian- Weberian framework; the respective argument draws on the debate about Weber’s theory of the modern state during the past two decades with a particular focus on its adequacy and relevance for political reality. For example, sceptics question the adequacy of Weber’s modern state and the difficulty of interpreting his notion of territorial sovereignty as a constitutive element of the state as opposed to others who stress that a situation of shared sovereignty between internal and external actors is possible (Allan 2005, pp. 150-1; Dsuza 1989, p. 71; Jackson 1999a; Krasner 2005; Rotberg 2004). Cases in which it is difficult to have absolute sovereignty challenge the heuristic nature of Weber’s state and maintain that this renders flawed notions such as the monopoly use of violence and legitimacy (Beetham 1991, p. 34; Migdal 2001, pp. 14-5). On a similar note, new theories of government and governance juxtapose Weber’s notion of central authority with the transition from state-centric government to
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society-centric governance. They postulate that the concept of central authority that Weber’s theory posited does not apply to modern governance, which takes account of the influence of globalization, decentralization, accountability and legitimacy and the function of government as the provider of public goods and services, etc. (Bell & Hindmoor 2009, p. xiii).
Proponents of Weber’s theory of the state, however, believe that Weber’s characterization of the state continues to be relevant to modern state theory and remains significant and essential for our understanding of issues such as politics, bureaucracy and social stratification (Boix & Stokes 2009; Boix and Drechesler 2010, p. 94; Dubreuil 2010, p. 189; Olsen 2006, p. 1; Waters & Waters 2015, pp. 1-18). Others who reconstruct Weber’s theory of the modern state, such as Anter (2014), show that “Weber’s understanding of the state was more vibrant and somewhat more sophisticated than his famous and (short) definition might imply” (Neep 2016, p. 64; Anter 2014). In this respect, it is essential to note that Weber’s theory of the state has been widely analyzed and debated. It has also found entrance into the discussion of many new issue areas, especially in the form of theories of government and bureaucracy, institutionalism and neo-institutionalism.
Although it is not the intention of this research to point to competing theoretical perspectives of the state other than that of Max Weber, it is essential to highlight the most significant amongst them. As an example, Marxian perspectives of the state differ with regard to the meaning attributed to the ‘ruling class’; in Weber’s account, it is supposed to be neutral and loyal only to the ideal of the state. In contrast, Marxist state theorists maintain that “the ruling class uses the state as its instrument to dominate society by the interpersonal ties between state officials and economic elites; the bourgeoisie” (Miliband 1983).Of key interest to the contemporary understanding of the state is the Foucauldian concept of the ‘state’ as an abstraction that has become a vehicle of criticism of the modern political theory. Foucault, known as one of the most controversial philosophers of the post-World War II period, was concerned with the need to understand government, the way it thinks and acts—the ‘governmentality’ of the state rather than the abstract attributes of the state (Foucault 1991). Scokpol is known for her new theoretical focus on state autonomy or what has become known as new institutionalist accounts of the state, which maintain that “the state is an entity that is impervious to external social and economic influence and has interests of its own”
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(Sklair 2004, pp. 139-40). Most prominent thinkers in the neo-institutionalist tradition, such as Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, examined the influence of economics, sociology and political behaviour on institutions and their influence on ideas, society and government in a post-Durkheimian sociological interpretation (DiMaggio & Walter 1991, p. 1). On another note, neo-Weberianism has gained traction in the 1970s with the rise of ‘new-public-management’ and its focus on a private sector-oriented public sector (Lynn 2008, p. 17).
Notwithstanding, perhaps the new and more progressive interpretations of the state prove Weber’s point about the limitations in a situation of an ideal state. His understanding of the limitations of human nature and the complexity of governance within a dynamic, historically ever-evolving world of changing interests and different cultural experiences indicate the need to appreciate the imperfect nature of the state. In this respect, and based on Weber’s realization of what the state cannot be, this thesis builds its claim about the complexity of governance or state-building in the absence of one of the main constitutive elements of the state—namely, a defined and sovereign territory. In this sense, it can be said that the Westphalian-Weberian concept of the state can help to point at what is most lacking in a proper understanding of the nature of the current Palestinian entity. For, it can be assumed that a Westphalian- Weberian state can be looked at in a holistic manner by closely linking the notion of territorial sovereignty with state functions and state capacity; given this, it is best suited to reflect on the challenges facing governance without territorial sovereignty. Putting the aspect of territorial sovereignty at the forefront of the analysis of the state and what it is, in reality, is crucial in order to understand the extent to which its central government can effectively ensure the monopoly on the use of violence, acquire legitimacy and also have the capacity to nurture a collective sense of nationhood.
This thesis claims that looking at some aspects of the state or constituents of the state in a separate manner does not constitute a realistic understanding of what the state is in reality and what an ideal state ought to be. For instance, it is difficult to capture the impact of a state’s legitimacy without linking it firmly to the nature of the state’s territorial sovereignty within a defined geographic area. For, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which a state can be legitimate in the eyes of its citizens if it does not have the absolute territorial sovereignty over the geographic area where its citizens are. In this sense, it can be said that a state’s legitimacy is directly linked to
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what the state can or cannot do. This being said, the fact that both the Westphalian and Weberian states can be understood in a combined or separate manner indicates that the conceptualization of the state remains a challenge in contemporary thinking of the state and therefore remains at the centre of analysis in the contemporary theorizations of the state. For example, despite the preoccupation of the modern theory of the state with an account of why the “Western liberal model of the state is not working in new or post-conflict countries, there is a turn toward a new conceptualization of the state in the sense that there is a need to know more about what we are talking about. This new conceptualization becomes more of a necessity, especially to stateless societies and people aspiring for independence, identity, and equal representation in the international community” (Morris 2002, p. 195).
In fact, Morris’ insistence on the foundational understanding of the meaning of the state from a philosophical and historical perspective is very much in line with the aim of this research. The Palestinian phenomenon of state-building as a path to statehood entails a situation where the Palestinian Authority is in the process of transition from a condition of statelessness to a condition of being a state, in this sense, to statehood. The most critical aspect of the Palestinian state-building process would be the identification of its purpose in the first place. For this, it is difficult to assume that statehood can be achieved only by focusing on one aspect of the state and not based on the foundation of the state as a whole—namely territorial sovereignty as the pre-requisite of the state allowing the central government to establish rules over its population. As an example, when looking at the notion of Palestinian statehood, it is difficult to assume that a Palestinian state will come into being based only on one of the constituents of the state, such as government institutions. A state in the Westphalian-Weberian sense cannot only be based on its institutions and, hence, be taken to be a state, if it does not possess all constituents of a state—namely full sovereignty over a defined territorial area.
A Hegelian perspective of the state stresses that latter as being the actualization of an ideal. In this sense, it may be assumed that building upon a historical interpretation of statehood the ‘ideal’ would be a state that is sovereign and whose raison d’être is to serve and protect its people no matter who and where they are, and under all circumstances. However, establishing a ‘professed state’ under occupation is a concept that may be inherently self-contradicting. Hence, the intention
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of this research is to search for a deeper meaning of the underlying assumptions behind the relationship of the ‘idea’ of the Palestinian state and the reality on the ground. To realize this objective, there is a need to examine the Palestinian statehood experience in totality, while taking back the argument to the original standard model of the state—the Westphalian-Weberian model of the state—making a comparison between what a sovereign and independent state is in ideal terms, and where Palestine’s state-building project is today. In this sense, there is a need to return to the philosophical, political and legal framing of statehood so that a broader account of the dichotomy between the ideal state and the process of state-building under occupation can be established. In this respect, the new turn of contemporary state-building theories toward the Westphalian-Weberian model of the modern state is quite encouraging for an analysis of the Palestine case and its relevance to state-building theories.
To put things in perspective, it is essential to point to three developments in the discipline that can enhance our understanding of the complexity of state-building in the absence of territorial sovereignty. Firstly, the overwhelming part of the literature that has emerged during the past two decades about peacebuilding, state-building, liberal and neoliberal peacebuilding demonstrates the centrality of the state in political and international relations theory. Morris (2002) pointed out that a historical and philosophical understanding of the modern state “will help put things into perspective and guide the normative conceptualization of the state as ‘it is’ in comparison with the state as ‘it should be’” (Morris 2002, p. 3). This point substantiates the need to understand the contextual variations between the Western European modern state and non-European and post-conflict states undergoing a different historical and political experience of state formation. Indeed, this sets the stage for the need to build a deeper understanding of the influence and impact the local context has on the success or failure of contemporary state-building processes. In this respect, it is apt to point to the growing debate over the fitness of state-building models and their feasibility, especially in post-conflict countries.
Secondly, the renewed interest in the notion of sovereignty, especially when it comes to analyzing contemporary state-building experiences, is helpful in understanding the Palestine case. For example, in his article “Rethinking the state”, David Chandler traces the argument of sovereignty to its original foundations
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(Chandler 2010, p. 43). He tries to move the paradigm of international state-building vis-à-vis the contemporary non-rights-based framing of the postcolonial state to a broader, more classical conceptualization of the ‘notion of sovereignty’. He maintains, that “whereas sovereignty is understood in technical and functionalist terms of managing equilibrium of shared responsibilities between domestic and international state-builders, it becomes the product of international intervention rather than a pre- existing right of autonomy or formal statehood” (Chandler 2010, p. 64). The fact that Chandler revives the focus on sovereignty as a pre-existing right of autonomy or formal statehood is encouraging in the sense that it highlights the notion of what formal statehood can be.
And thirdly, revisiting the synergy between the Weberian elements of the state and those aspects state-building theory and practice focuses on shows the extent to which concepts have evolved over the past century, but are still valid and validated given what can and cannot be achieved. Lemay-Hebert, Onuf & Rakic (2013) have successfully juxtaposed concepts of the Weberian modern state with current state- building theory and practice, especially in countries undergoing a process of state- building. They compared ideal concepts of ‘states’ “strong states” and “weak states”, (Midgdal 1988, p. 10), state and violence with securitization, legitimacy and territoriality with the erosion of sovereignty and state modernity with the Western export model of governance. The following section reviews how the main concepts and features of state-building theory evolved and looks at its application in the Palestine case in general and the Fayyad Plan in particular.