In contrast with the thoroughness of the Chinese preparations, India was completely unprepared in every way for hostilities. In fact, there was an air of unreality and complacency that would have damned any Government. The possibility of a Chinese attack having been ignored, we did not have an organised war plan.
We have already laboured the point about India’s defective National and Strategic Aims. The cornerstone of our planning was that there would be no war with China in Mr. Nehru’s lifetime. We were prepared only for Galwan type border incidents and to counter limited Chinese incursions. The broad strategy was that troops would be ordered to stand fast, despite being invested, and supplies and reinforcements would be sent. Thereafter brave words would be mouthed by everyone. The Chinese would be warned to desist from further aggressive activities; protest notes would be exchanged; and the Indian Cabinet could settle down to sorting out the next crisis on its agenda.
weaknesses and lack of allies tempted the Chinese to teach us a lesson without inviting retaliation. There were no strategic dispositions. Neither XXXIII Corps nor Eastern Command had any reserve formations to deploy in an emergency. The nearest troops were in the west, in the Punjab. This was a grave error on the part of the General Staff. Presumably because we did not expect to fight and capture any prisoners, there were no interpreters in Chinese anywhere in Assam.
It is well to remember some startling facts about the absence of most of the key persons responsible for conducting operations against the Chinese. This fact has not received the attention it merits. Mr. Nehru was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London when the Chinese first intruded into the Thagla area. He did not deem it necessary to return and take charge of the situation as the head of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Presumably he was not advised correctly by our Intelligence, who did not appear to have any idea of the nature and scope of the Chinese threat. It has been said that Mr. Menon, who was dealing with the situation and taking fer- reaching decisions from the outset, minimised the seriousness of the developments and did not think it worthwhile to advise the Prime Minister to cut short his foreign tour. . With his known conceit, and possibly having faith in Marshal Chen Yi’s assurance, he probably thought that he could handle the Chinese incursion on his own and add another martial achievement to his Goa success. Mr. Nehru’s absence was a grave handicap in the sphere of the Higher Direction of War. Mr. Nehru proceeded to Lagos, Nigeria, from London and returned home only on 2nd October. By then the decision to evict the Chinese had already been taken, and there was little that he could do to reverse the trend of events, as public opinion had been allowed to get out of hand. After taking the unfortunate decision to appoint Kaul to command a non-existent task force, Nehru gaily left for Colombo, Ceylon, on 12th October, returning on the 15th. This second trip at the height of the crisis proves that he was not unduly perturbed over the border situation. In fact before emplaning he grandiloquently informed the Press that he had ordered the Army to evict the Chinese intruders. In retrospect it seems to have been an amazing dereliction of duty on the part of the executive head of Government, his advisers and the Intelligence set-up. Mr. Nehru’s claim that he was stabbed in .the back by the Chinese, or that he was surprised by events cannot be sustained by history. He chose to absent himself from the helm of affairs, where he should have been from the very beginning. The nation did not take kindly to his international peregrinations at a time when he should have been leading the country.
Mr. Krishna Menon was partly preoccupied with his forthcoming visit to the U.N. for the annual General Assembly Meeting, in mid-September. For years he had been the de facto Deputy Foreign Minister. He appeared to be anxious to dispose of this petty, irritating border situation and move to the larger international arena, which he loved so dearly. It has been said that he deliberately underplayed the whole Thagla Affair to avoid being asked to stay back in Delhi in the absence of the
Prime Minister.
Mr. Morarji Desai, the Finance Minister, had accompanied the Prime Minister to the London Conference. He subsequently left for Washington to attend a World Bank meeting.
Let the Nation be told how the Defence Committee of the Cabinet functioned in the absence of the three key members of this body. How was Civil Supremacy exercised? Was the all-embracing authority of this Committee delegated to the Ministry of Defence?
The Army was equally guilty in the matter of absence from duty at a critical juncture. The Chief of the General Staff, General Kaul, was holidaying in Srinagar and did not return till 2nd October. The CGS is in charge of Intelligence. What was he doing on leave ? Obviously he did not anticipate war despite his recent claim that he forecast a Chinese clash in the autumn of 1962. Chiefs of the General Staff do not normally take leave when war is impending. Even so, why did he not return to duty as soon as the Thagla incident started and his prediction was proved right? He should at least have been recalled when Government decided to stop further incursions and to evict the Chinese. Such a decision was taken as early as mid-September. All responsible officers are expected to be at their posts when serious operations are envisaged. Obviously Army HQ, did not anticipate a major war.
HQ, 4 Infantry Division was busy with the annual celebration of the famous Battle of Sidi Barrani. Since they had been told that there was no threat of war till the railway line to Lhasa was completed, preparations were in full swing for this great day. All units had sent their athletes and teams for the various tournaments. Large numbers of officers and men were on leave. There was an air of peace and calm and prospects of a quiet, normal winter where the main enemies would be the cold and boredom.
As Commander 7 Infantry Brigade, and the senior-most officer in direct command of Kameng, I was on leave on the fateful day of 8th September when the Chinese first intruded into our territory at Thagla. Fortunately I was still in Tezpur and had not left for my leave station. Now leave for brigadiers in command is strictly controlled by HQ, Commands, and is personally approved by the Army Commander. There is a very sound reason for tins arrangement, as HQ, Commands are in the best position to know when a senior commander can be spared without detriment to operational commitments. The sanctioning of my leave, at this particular period, is the clearest possible proof that Command did not anticipate war in September 1962. The stipulated state of readiness is laid down by Army HQs General Staff Branch; Command was therefore not correctly advised or warned. This is mysterious as the CGS, Kaul, claims that he anticipated a clash.
Lt. Col. Manohar Singh, the GSO I of 4 Division, and the senior staff officer was sent on the Senior Officers’ Course at the Infantry School, Mhow. The nominations for this particular course are made directly by Army HQ, subject to representations on operational grounds. The fact that Manohar was
made available implies that Division had not been placed in a state of operational readiness. 4 Division did not expect a war. He was later recalled, after the Thagla Affair had got out of hand.
From the foregoing, it is evident that our deployment along the northern borders, since 1960, was designed to stake our claims and not to fight a major campaign against a first-class enemy, at short notice. The numerous limitations and shortcomings were well known, and accepted at all levels. Had they been remembered, as they should have been, the Nation might not have been committed to the resolute and irrevocable decision to drive out the Chinese, inviting retaliation all along the Sino- Indian border, to which we had no military response. If the odds had been calculated, then senior Cabinet members would surely have been at their posts.
With the advantage of hind-sight, Mr. Menon is reported to have said in 1967, that “Yet the time had come when there was nothing else to do but fight. A war which is avoidable at one stage becomes unavoidable at another stage”. He adds, “The war with China became unavoidable as we could not refrain from defending ourselves. In undertaking defensive operations a country can never consider the odds. If we are attacked we have to defend ourselves, even if we are defeated”. The time had been coming for many years, and yet risks were taken in not organising and administering our forward troops, on the untenable assumption that the Chinese would not take military counter-measures, whatever our own publicised actions may be. This theory was strongly propounded and lulled everyone into a false sense of security.
The overall situation was ripe for a military disaster. In classic conformation to military principles, the Chinese High Command selected the remote and disputed Thagla Ridge area to provide the casus belli for a war on which they were bent, and for which they had made perfect preparations. As the aggressor, China had the added advantages of choosing the time and place for their feint. They were able to achieve maximum surprise and concentration of forces. They knew the f^tal Indian weakness of wide dispersion along the entire border, in small detachments. Knowing the Indian penchant for hasty, ill-advised and rash reactions to border incidents, they selected a place away from our main defences thereby further stretching our Line of Communication and denuding the defences of Towang. A disputed area also gave them the opportunity to stall for time by pretending to want talks, and to restrict our military response to the low key of a border dispute. (That is why there were . no strategic arrangements in the rear of Thagla.)
We fell for the trap; and without a pause for clear thinking, despatched the nearest available troops to “forestall the Chinese at Thagla”. We accepted a possible war in an area for which we had made no preparations. It is criminal to fight ad-hoc battles. Man-pack columns, without heavy^weapons and ammunition, were rushed to confront the Chinese with pouch ammunition. Imagine trying to fight the largest and one of the most powerful land forces in the world, with only pouch ammunition. Disaster
was inevitable and should have surprised no one who had been dealing with the China problem from the beginning. The most deplorable part was the subsequent attempt to shift the blame to the Army. Individual politicians are expendable, but a country’s Army is a permanent institution. The good name of the Army and its tested formations are infinitely more important than the political reputation of any individual, whatever his temporary stature and importance.
In one fateful month our Government tried to make up for its tardiness and wrong policies by embarking on a last desperate gamble which did not come off. Then to save the skins of those who had been forced to redeem their boastful pledges of fighting the Chinese, it became fashionable to blame pressure of political events and public opinion. As we shall see, the Thagla Affair was given undue prominence and importance even before the first commander reached the spot to assess the situation. Public opinion was allowed to get out of hand instead of being moulded to face harsh military realities. Even if we concede Menon’s claim that war had become inevitable by September 1962, was it necessary to fight on the worse possible terms? Was it necessary to ignore all the principles of war? Is the word fight synonymous with suicide?
Instead of gracefully accepting responsibility for erroneous policies, the guilty men sought alibis and scapegoats. In any developed democracy the Government would have been replaced, instead of being allowed to continue in office and sit in judgement on their subordinates.
The moral of all this is that never again must the fate and destiny of India be placed in the hands of any one or two men. We must also learn that a democracy has no room for proven failures. This is not a matter of sentiment. Mr. Chamberlain was removed after Hitler invaded France in May 1940 with Cromwell’s classic plea, “For God’s sake, go”. Mr, Anthony Eden was forced out of office after the disastrous Suez adventure of 1956. History records many instances where heads of elected Governments had the courage to resign, or who were forced to resign by public indignation and angry legislators.
We shall now follow the tragic events from 8th September to 20th October 1962. The basically faulty National Policy was rendered even more disastrous by faulty decisions, taken cm a day-to-day basis. We moved inexorably and inevitably to a major military defeat; and there was no one with insight or force of character to stem the tide; or save us from the plunge into certain disaster.