I immediately plunged into a series of conferences with my COs and my staff. I asked my Commanding Officers (COs) to give me their frank opinion about what they thought of their tasks and whether their battalions were capable of carrying out these tasks. The CO of an Indian infantry battalion is the most important individual in our military set-up. He is the only one who knows the true state of his unit’s readiness for war. The denigration of this vital appointment in the years preceding the Sino-Indian War of 1962 played a major part in much that went wrong in those days. Yes-men, masquerading as commanding Officers, will land the Army in the same straits in which we found ourselves in 1962. I have deliberately included this aside to bring out that the true state of affairs pertaining to the shortcomings of the Towang Garrison was well known to the COs. I gave them full freedom to express their opinions and I based my own judgement on their advice. I worked on the old Army principle that no CO would lightly admit that his unit is not ready for the ordained military task. When he does admit this unpleasant fact, he should be admired and not damned. In 1962 forthright GOs were not easy to come by. I was fortunate as both Lt.-Col. B. S. Ahluwalia and Lt.-
Col. Master were not yes-men.
After consulting my COs, I studied the Divisional Operation Order and the appreciations of my predecessors. This is not only sensible but courteous to boot, as only fools try to imply that they have to undo the work of all those who preceded them. I got an invaluable insight into the problems of Kameng Frontier Division by studying the views of Brigadiers Palit and Ranbir Singh, both experienced and decorated commanders. Brigadier Palit Is the well-known Indian military author and critic whose books have been widely read throughout the world.
The tasks given to 7 Infantry Brigade were to: (a) defend Towang-the primary role;
(b) prevent any penetration of the McMahon Line; (c) establish Assam Rifles post; and
(d) assist Assam Rifles posts.
It was at once obvious that the planning 'seemed to be a little haywire and was based on invalid assumptions. The area of responsibility Was abnormal for a brigade. The plans were vague and academic. There were convenient gaps in the administrative paragraphs of the Divisional Operation Order that could hamstring operational aspirations.
The best operational plans can only be implemented by infantry units who are equipped and trained for their roles. For a new Brigade Commander the battle worthiness of his battalions becomes the first and foremost item for investigation.
The advice of my COs and an impartial assessment of the factual position revealed that there were insurmountable obstacles in the fulfilment of our operational tasks. I shall go into these in some detail as they will explain what went wrong in September-October 1962.
I found that my men were employed in building a helipad; collecting logs of wood for the construction of shelters and manning the dropping zone. The helipad absorbed 1,200 men a day for over three months — a job which two or three bulldozers could have completed in a few days. Moreover, there was a good helipad in Towang proper, but this was not acceptable to the Air Force who demanded a helipad at an elevation under 7,000 feet. In those days the system was that “if the bloody Army want helicopters, they can bloody well produce a helipad”. The Air Force was doing the Army a “favour”. It is interesting that after the Chinese intruded into our territory in September 1962 and when all this inter-service bickering was shed, the Air Force used the same helipad that they had rejected on “technical grounds”. In the event, 1,200 men a day were used to clear an entire hill. They had to go down 2,500 feet, work the whole day and climb back to their unit lines. This senseless and wasteful effort could have been sorted out by a joint commander, who would have been serving the Nation and not the Army or Air Force.
The Border Roads Organisation could not help with the loan of earth-moving equipment due to “accounting and other procedural difficulties”. They belonged to another Ministry and sundry preliminary sanctions would have to be obtained. One day the Indian Government is going to be asphyxiated by its own procedures! The Commander of the Border Roads was an old Staff College colleague of mine. I appealed for his help when I saw this waste of first-class Infantrymen, as labourers on an improper task, at the expense of training. The trade union of staff officers in the Army is very strong, and Brigadier Mani ordered up some earth-moving equipment. He requested me not to disclose the fact, as he was “wangling” the expenditure on some other task. This was an inexcusable state of affairs. An expensive Border Roads Organisation for “developing border communications” was operating in the area and the commander was willing to help, provided the procedural difficulties were sorted out. Helipads are covered by the term “communications”, and should logically have been accorded priority in the Border Roads programme.
The remainder of the garrisofT was sent to collect wooden beams from Pankentang, at a height of 14,000 feet, for constructing shelters. This project was accorded operational immediate priority, as the work had to be completed by a given day to avoid audit objections and the lapse of funds. The training of units was secondary. I found that units had not trained for some time; 1/9 Gorkhas not since they were inducted in 1960. No annual classification or field firing had been possible due to lack of ranges. The mortar crews had not fired a bomb for a long time. The Civil authorities were finding it difficult to “acquire” a range as the locals were not agreeable to handing over the sites selected by us to meet technical and safety standards.
All units were under-posted. They had been heavily milked of NCOs and JCOs for new raisings in their groups. There was a constant shortage of officers, which was unacceptable in forward formations where the demand for extraneous duties is heavy e.g. to man the Line of Communication, for rear parties, long-range reconnaissances, for the establishment of Assam Rifles posts under Operation ONKAR and so on.
1/9 Gorkha Rifles was a first-class infantry battalion with an impressive war record. They had distinguished themselves in Italy in the battle of Cassino in 1943. They had fought gallantly at Poonch in the Kashmir War in 1948. In March 1962 they were a tired and listless unit which had suffered incredible hardships for two years. They were due to be relieved in June 1962 and were looking forward to a spell of peace and to rejoin their families.
9 Punjab (my second battalion) was another first-rate unit. It was to fight with great elan and determination in the war of September-October 1962. It too had had a gruelling time, being inducted at the height of winter, without adequate shelters in Towang. No one to this day knows who ordered their move.
My third battalion, 1 Sikhs, was, as we know, at Dirang Dzong as it could not be maintained in Towang.
In spite of the operational tasks, the garrison at Towang was subject to a manpower ceiling of 1,700 up to November 1961 and 2,400 from November 1961 to September 1962; the remainder being located at Misamari. The full fighting complement of an Infantry Brigade exceeds 3,500 men, but the size and constitution of 7 Infantry Brigade was dictated entirely by the availability of air effort and supply-dropping equipment; the operational requirement was secondary. The composition of the garrison at Towang was laid down by HQ, 4 Division, and catered for the requirements of large numbers of Pioneers and Construction Companies to assist in building accommodation, and two Animal Transport Companies to return the supply-dropping equipment retrieved by forward troops. These animals used up most of the air-drops allotted to the Brigade for their own bulky rations.
There were serious shortcomings in our ability to fulfil the operational tasks laid down by Division. The first was that although a sizeable portion of 7 Brigade could not be located in Towang, no warning period had been laid down for the concentration of the remainder, before the Brigade was committed to battle. There were no clear-cut concentration plans or arrangements for organising and controlling moves. Although Border Roads had built a fair-weather one-ton road to Towang, no staging facilities had been provided on grounds of economy, and this burden too devolved on 7 Brigade. This Brigade was also responsible for manning Gauhati Airfield (for non-ASC) despatches and the entire Line of Communication from Misamari to Towang. This system inevitably broke down during the emergency of September-October 1962. Further ad hoc measures were resorted to, in that the CO of 4 Division’s Medium Machine-Gun Battalion was given this task. As anticipated, the concentration of troops was haphazard, slow and uncertain. The troops were put to avoidable hardships and reached the battlefield exhausted. One battalion had to abandon their vehicles at Dirang and walk over the Sela Pass, as there were no petrol dumps at Dirang to fill up the vehicles. Planners sitting in Lucknow and Delhi did not appreciate the administrative problem and entertained rash hopes of quickly concentrating large forces.
The second major factor was that there were no reserve stocks at Towang to issue to troops that would have to be inducted in an emergency. Even the laid down, normal stocking policy had not been achieved. My appeals to locate stocks in Towang were not heeded. I was called a dreamer. How could India, a poor country, afford to tie up stocks for an emergency, when it was barely possible to maintain existing garrisons? I had failed both as a staff officer and as a commander to convince my superiors of the imperative need to build, up reserves close to possible areas of operations.
7 Infantry Brigade troops left behind in rear areas, would not be acclimatised for operations at altitudes over 15,000 feet. A minimum of six weeks had been laid down by the medical authorities.
There would have to be a guarantee of a long enough warning period to move and acclimatise troops. Units were poorly trained and equipped. They had a strength of only 400 bayonets per battalion instead of 800, the remainder being on leave, training courses, or left behind in Misamari. The two battalions in Towang had the battle strength of only one!
The road to Towang was only a fair-weather one-ton road. Its capacity was limited even under ideal conditions, and was negligible during and after the monsoons.
There were other operational considerations which had a major bearing on our plans. I was not satisfied with some of the assumptions made, as they appeared to be based on invalid factors. All our plans were based on the assumption, presumably an Intelligence appreciation, that the maximum strength that the Chinese would deploy was one regiment which is equivalent to our brigade. In the event, the Chinese used two divisions in 1962. Now what was the basis for the categorical assumption that the Chinese were limited to just one regiment? The answer is very simple. Since our air-lift would not permit us to deploy more than one brigade, then it was axiomatic that the Chinese also should not exceed our strength, or how else would senior commanders answer awkward questions from forward troops and commanders ? Most average generals plan to counter the worst the enemy can do. We believed in planning for the best case, and limited the enemy’s potential to suit us.
7 Brigade was required to guard three approaches, with no laterals. In fact nothing more than a string of outposts, with regular troops at intervals could be deployed.
Assam Rifles posts were deployed non-tactically and they were ill-armed and even worse equipped than the Regular Army. At best, they could only function as border check-posts and yet their task was “to fight to the last man and the last round” - a high-sounding slogan coined by someone far in the rear, and one that is more easy to issue than to obey. Although they were under the operational command of 7 Infantry Brigade, their administration was under the Inspector General of the Assam Rifles in Shillong. This system cut across all accepted canons of military organisation.
There were no inter-communication facilities/ arrangements between Assam Rifles’ posts and the nearest Army sub-unit. This was in spite of the fact that the Army was “responsible for assisting” these posts in the event of trouble. The standard explanation was that there was “a general shortage of wireless sets in the country”.
The Assam Rifles were a separate private army of the External Affairs Ministry. And who would dare to bell the cat about this extraordinary command system ?
The last major deficiency that was transparent was the lack of any worthwhile Intelligence. There was no overall appreciation of Chinese intentions and preparations. We were totally dependent on the local civilian Intelligence Bureau representative and information given was useless for rational planning purposes. Not one Intelligence appreciation was received from Army HQ. I do not know if
Army HQ ever got any assessment from the Joint Intelligence Committee. If they did, they certainly never considered it worthwhile passing on any information to commanders in the front line. Lacking Intelligence, we kept on basing our actions on what we were able to do, and not to counter the worst the Chinese could do. We were like bad chess players who make moves without anticipating the opponent’s moves, or expecting him to counter our moves.
I decided to carry out a personal reconnaissance of the main areas of my responsibility before making any representation to Divisional HQ. My first destination was Khenzemane on the McMahon Line, in the Thagla Ridge area. I left within 20 days of reaching Towang, although it is normally wiser to allow a longer period for acclimatisation. The urgency was necessitated by the impending establishment of Dhola Post in the area.
The aims of the reconnaissance were to study the state of the tracks and bridges; as well as the stages required to move troops to “assist” the Assam Rifles posts located on this axis. I would also have the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of the main tactical features, availability of dropping zones and availability of porters.
In mountainous terrain it is important for commanders at all levels to have a clear idea of the ground over which their troops may have to operate; as it is otherwise impossible to appreciate the problems of mobility in terms of time and space. In the Indian Army of 1962, the need was even greater. Many key officers had served only in the plains of the Punjab or on static picquet duty in Kashmir. Many senior commanders and staff officers had not commanded in an operational area and practically none in mountain formations. This is not a criticism but a statement of a well-known fact. After the Chinese incursion in September 1962, these officers suddenly found themselves ordering the moves of units over steep paths and severe gradients, in appalling weather conditions. Everybody kept yelling at everybody else to “get a move on”. Instead of pre-planning, harmony and mutual understanding, we had the sad spectacle of junior officers cursing their seniors and saying “why the hell don’t these staff and backroom experts come and see what it is like out here”. Senior officers cannot always walk over every piece of ground in their area of responsibility. They are at least expected to fly over the country to get an idea of what their troops are facing and to issue realistic orders. It is a tragic fact that no one of importance had visited, or flown over the Nyamjang Chu Valley. Some had not even seen Towang. These officers made rash promises of concentrating forces by given dates that could not be implemented. Orders, counter-orders and frequent postponement of promised dates resulted in recriminations and accusations and threats of sacking those who were not achieving the miracles that were being ordained from above.
I was accompanied by Lt. Col. Ahluwalia of the Gorkhas, who was responsible for this sector and who knew the area well. The Political Officer at Towang very kindly deputed an officer from his
department to assist us. I was also given an interpreter. Unfortunately I was also given the sturdiest pony in Towang, owned by an even sturdier Tibetan woman. This was extremely embarrassing as I could not very well ride while a lady led my riding pony, I decided to forego the comfort of the ride and walk the whole way. There was little rumpus after the first day’s march, when the lady complained that I had insulted her and her pony by refusing to ride. Her deduction was simple-that I considered the pony unworthy to carry a brigadier. To please her I was forced to sit on the sure- footed beast for at least the last 200 yards before entering the main village. Everybody was satisfied with this solution. I saved pride in my manhood and she kept her pride in her horse.
The first stage was an easy one of about 10 miles, to a large village called Thonglen. The idea Was to meet the Headman (Gaonbura) and the villagers; as well as get acclimatised in easy stages. In the hill areas, it is an important function of commanders to gain the good-will of the local inhabitants, as this has a vital bearing on porterage and thus the mobility of the force. Indeed, day-to-day maintenance would be very difficult without the help of the lovable and simple Monpas of Kameng Frontier Division. We were greeted by the whole village who had obviously taken a day off from their arduous daily chores. I went through the usual ceremony of exchanging scarves with the headman and drinking the local brew - a rice beer which was surprisingly tasty and nourishing. The villagers were extremely friendly and hospitable. They are always happy to receive visitors.
Throughout my tour of the villages along the Nyamjang Chu, I found the Monpas an intelligent people with a well organised agricultural system. Despite the harshness of nature they have terraced fields and grow a variety of cereals, vegetables and fruits. They are incredibly hardy and both men and women can carry heavy loads over long marches. They work long hours in their fields or in the