Plan operativo de seguimiento y monitoreo

- COA’S AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. Tantuico-

Corporations covered by the COA’s auditing powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are required to submit to post audit.

- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private auditors may audit

government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive

power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were

fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government- controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.

- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing to a public officer

may not, without his consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.

- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by himself, has

no authority to render or promulgate a decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.

- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COA’s power

over the settlement of accounts is different from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is within the ambit of judicial power.

- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the proper officer to

withhold a municipal treasurer’s salary and other emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still being litigated.

- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the approval of excess or

- DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7, 2012]- There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre- audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.

- Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly

enlarged by this Court.

- GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The appointment of members

of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional; the appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;

- Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);

- Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission;

- A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chair. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioners and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Char resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment; and that

- Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

- Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits

officials and employees of COA from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.

ARTICLE X

(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)

- Local Autonomy- Local Autonomy means that local governments have certain

powers granted by the Constitution which may not be curtailed by the National government, but that outside of these, local governments may not enact ordinances contrary to statutes (Bernas, 1987 Philippine Constitution, Reviewer, 2011).

- Veloso, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 16, 2011- LGUs, though

granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

- In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.

- Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide. The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin[16] as follows:

- "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable.

- Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not

completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political

subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly

responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.

- Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014- At any rate, LGUs

must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does not completely severe them from the national government or turn them into impenetrable states. Autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state. Notwithstanding the local fiscal

autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President

and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws. “Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

- Pimentel vs. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012- While

the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the

functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision

provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally funded projects, facilities, programs and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. xxxThe national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in

the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view — like the extension of the elective term— is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover — whichever way it is viewed — is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmeña.

- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:

- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.

- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. (Emphasis ours.)

- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates vs.

COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-

does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the

term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009- The

preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.

- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss of the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009- Bolos was serving

his third term as punong barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation of said office.

- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall election

cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.

- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of a term does

not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule to apply, the

local official concerned must serve three consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.

- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office constitutes, for Francis

Ong, “service for the full term”, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term

in contemplation of the three-term rule, notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of

his proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land area requirement

shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of