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CAPÍTULO II................................................................................................................ 16

5.7 CONSIDERACIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS DEL PROYECTO

5.7.1 Presupuesto general

- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service Commission of

adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.

- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC is the sole arbiter of

controversies relating to the civil service.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the responsibility of the

establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department agency with respect to these qualification standards and approving them.

- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution grants to the CSC

administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non- career service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the

university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and

members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a

- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the CSC has appellate

jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service

Law of 1975. The Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed directly

with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no “report, no release” policy

may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a general rule, are

governed by the Civil Service Law. But a distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be made. If the GOCC was established through an original charter (or special law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and SSS. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is excluded from the coverage of the civil service.

- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government refers to any of the

various units of the government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality or government-owned or controlled corporation or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and government-owned or controlled corporations,

- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in a GOCC, whether

regular or not, the civil service law applies. It is not true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor Code applies. Regardless of the nature of employment or claim, an employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the Civil Service Law.

- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) – the appointment to the

positions in the Career Executive Service may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys security of tenure.

- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent appointment can be issued

only to a “person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.” The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to “depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.

- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer of the officer,

resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.

- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by indirect method to

terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal.

- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 – In the area of religious exercise as a

preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party aggrieved by a decision,

ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001- The CSC is

expressly empowered by the Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) President declares the position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of of the CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily confidential.

PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino Operations Manager

is not primarily confidential.

- Funa vs Agra, GR 191644 Feb 19 2013-The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary

of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

- It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

- gra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.

- Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was “allowed by law or the primary functions of his

position.” To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.

- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There must intent to resign

and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. - To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997)

- Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman as board member of

GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the CSC, and for violating the rule against holding of multiple government positions as well as the concept ex-officio positions.

- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) – rule on double compensation not

applicable to pension. A retiree receiving pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached.

- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 – PCCG Chair Magdangal Elma

is prohibited under the Constitution from simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since the CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the general rule to hold more than one office is “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position”/

- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997- When an employee

is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back salaries.

- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 –The Supreme Court follows as a

precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no

backwages can be awarded in his favor .

- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil service officer or

employee, who has been found illegally dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be

reinstated and to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, and if at the time the decision of

exoneration is promulgated, he is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back wages but also to full retirement benefits.

- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 – The CSC as an aggrieved party, may appeal

the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a civil service employee of administrative charges.

- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of an act by petitioner

provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the service.

- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the Constitution and the Labor

Code are silent as to whether government employees may strike, they are prohibited from

striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.

COMELEC

- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,

2002- The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who has been appointed by

the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office which could be seven, five or three years. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.

- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.

- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The COMELEC

possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. - The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi- legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7

- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering

the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:

- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

- Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been committed – could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function.

- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi- judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.

- The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.

- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi- judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.10 When the

results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light

on the issue of whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.

- Grace Poe vs. COMELEC- The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation

case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

- The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"

different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the