PLAN OPERATIVO DEL PROYECTO

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to

enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may

be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE – Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs. Ermita,

ed al., October 18, 2005 – the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate

Presi`ent and the certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

- A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the

Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the Senate to propose amendments, it cal propose its own version

even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court recognizes

the long standing legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment

in the nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of

both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 – Under the 1973

and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the words “used exclusively” without doing violence to the Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively

ARTICLE VII

(PRESIDENT)

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting president

- It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure (Lozada v. Arroyo, 670 SCRA

545; Estrada v. Disierto, 356 SCRA 108).

- Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office.

There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative.

- Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the immunity of the

President extends to the end of the term to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only

with his tenure (representing the period during which the incumbent actually holds office)

and not his term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).

- Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity applied only

during the incumbency of a President.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 – It is not proper to implead President

Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

- Former President cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield himself/herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of a person (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84).

- Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been

established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be

applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

- Doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in amparo proceedings.

The president, as commander-‐-in-‐-chief of the military, can be held responsible

or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a. the existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about

to be or had been committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof (Ibid). Commanders may therefore be impleaded – not actually on the basis of command responsibility – but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability (Balao v. Macapagal-‐- Arroyo, 662 SCRA 312).

- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL- Lopez

vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an

election contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers, charged with the

ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos,

253 SCRA 559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v. De

Castro, February 12, 2008.

- Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain reading of Article VII,

Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

- It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time,

the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions contemplated in Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution are post election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The word “contest” means that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and proclamation of the President or Vice-President – there can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed.

- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988, August 31, 2010)-

Estrada was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on the second election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case.

- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs. Desierto,

March 2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The

question whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is a political question beyond the Supreme Court’s power of review. The decision that President Arroyo is the dejure

President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE) – Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the

President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent or

alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:

Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance.

- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista

vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the

constitution by increasing those officers who need prior confirmation by the CA.

- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments)GR No. 191002, De Castro v. JBC; GR

No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010, April 20, 2010)-

the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal. “Although

Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot

be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.“ Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.

- Province of Aurora vs. Marco, GR 202331 April 22, 2015-The prohibition under

Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments, and not to those made by local executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.

- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- An ad interim

appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no

longer be withdrawn by the President once an appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is

effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew the ad-interim appointment.

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005-

The law allows the President to make such acting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to

fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. It may be extended any time there is vacancy, given while Congress is in session.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21¬ 2006- Under Section 16, Article

VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a

fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards . xxx The President

appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the

law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.

- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of department

manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not a third level position and does not require presidential appointment.

- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple positions and

receiving compensation therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.

- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB

vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a

public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.

- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010-

The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.

- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP)

vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007 – The President has the authority to carry out a

reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This

authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution. The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees