La política pública y su importancia en la transformación social.

Once a right-wing government had taken over in Munich, the ’battle* with Berlin took on a different complexion as the Bavarian Government, under von Kahr's leadership, sought to preserve its sovereignty against what it believed to be the encroachments of Berlin centralism. The target for Bavaria’s ’attack’ on the Berlin Government was Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution which feave the President of the Reich the right:

"zur Wiederherstellung der oeffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung die noetigen Massnahmen zu treffen,

erforderlichenfalls mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht einzuschreiten."(1)

Von Kahr’s cabinet rule generated an atmosphere of counter revolution in Bavaria which the Central Government attempted to combat by invok­ ing its emergency powers under Article 48, but with very little succ­ ess. Von Kahr was of the ’old school’ of Bismarckian civil servants and a resolute supporter of the old royal families in Bavaria, who would have welcomed a return to a monarchal form of government. The climate in Bavaria in the early nineteen-twenties was perfect for the growth of the plethora of bodies describing themselves as ’volkisch’

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or ’vaterlandisch’. A host of well-known nationalist figures had fled to Bavaria in the aftermath of the First World War, men like General Ludendorff, Admiral Tirpitz, officers Goering and Roehm, the

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author Dietrich Eckart, and, of course, Hitler himself. Relations between Bavaria and Berlin deteriorated rapidly as the Bavarians

came to despise Berliners almost as much as their former enemies.

"Whoever voiced an attack on the Berliners as;did, for example, a certain Adolf Hitler, could be assured of loving protection in Munich."(4)

As mentioned above, the aftermath of Erzberger’s assassination had also (5)

effected a sharp clash between Munich and Berlin. The Reich Chan­ cellor at that time was Josef Wirth, a left-wing Centrist who had formed a coalition government in April 1921 after the crisis over the

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reparations issue had brought down the previous government. . Wirth had presented a Presidential proclamation invoking Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution in an attempt to stem growing concern over right- wing attacks on the Republic. Von Kahr's government refused to ackr: nowledge the decree and allowed attacks on the Republic to continue,

such as during a ceremony to commemorate the victory at Sedan in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian war, when a leading figure in Bavaria and former army general bitterly attacked the Berlin Government as:

"the executors who are dispensing the profits they inherited from the world war..." (7)

and then publicly reviled the flag of the Republic with the charge that it contained:

"the yellow stripe of Jewry..."(8)

Von Kahr obviously overestimated the support he had in stubbornly refusing to acknowledge the Presidential proclamation and in urging Bavaria along its ’collision course’ with Berlin because the executive committee of the Bavarian Landtag refused to support him on this issue

and urged a compromise approach. Von Kahr refused, and without the support he needed, was forced to resign in favour of the more moderate

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approach of Count Lerchenfeld. In an atmosphere of right-wing resurgence, Count Lerschenfeld’s concilliatory.approach was soon att­ acked and discredited by the Right,and by November of the following year, 1923, he too had been forced to resign in favour of the right- wing Eugen von Knilling.

With this backdrop of right-wing resurgence, events in Coburg such as the "Blutsonnabend" of 3rd September in 1921 highlighted a crucial stage in political developments in C o b u r g P ^ As well as causing socialists to have second thoughts about the wisdom of supporting the move to enter into union with Bavaria in the 1919 referendum, the -

events of that Saturday in Coburg signalled the start of a move against the socialist - albeit mild form thereof - climate in Coburg. The fact that the Bavarian Government had been so involved in the decision to ban a march in Coburg, and in moving a substantial number of extra police into Coburg, signalled a determination to snuff out left-wing opposition where it existed within Bavaria*s borders. It was also

the signal for the resurgence of right-wing activity in Coburg itself.

In Coburg, as throughout the Reich, overt political activity on the side of right-wing parties had been subdued in the days immediately following the end of the First World War. It was initially amongst such groups as the many war verterans' associations and other para­ military bodies that anti-revolutionary and anti-republican sentiments were allowed to flourish unchecked. In Coburg, a ’Buergerwehr1, or civil guard, had been raised to maintain public order during those days of uncertainty in November 1918, and when Coburg joined Bavaria

this body was superseded by the Coburg branch of the 'Einwohnerwehr’. This organisation was controlled centrally from Munich with regional outposts and was to be used to police political demonstrations and strikes, and to perform security functions at»public buildings and

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