Por una escuela de calidad. Programas dirigidos a conseguir una escuela  mejor

"Nuclear winter" is a scientific theory which tries to describe the worldwide meteorological and ecological consequences of a nuclear war. The main "Nuclear winter" is a scientific theory which tries to describe the worldwide meteorological and ecological consequences of a nuclear war. The main result of the theory is that the aftereffects of nuclear war may be as lethal for people and plants and animals in countries remote from the war as for the result of the theory is that the aftereffects of nuclear war may be as lethal for people and plants and animals in countries remote from the war as for the  pop

 popuullatatiionons of ths of the bele bellliiggereerennt ct couounntrtriies. Tes. Thhe phe phrasrase "e "nnuuclclear wear wiinnteter" r" ststanands fds for a comor a combibinnatatiion oon of f radradiioacoactitivve ane and chd chememiical cal polpollluutition oon of tf thhe atme atmosposphhereere with long-continued darkness and cold, destroying impartially the innocent and the guilty, the rain forest and the cornfield, the tiger and the rose.

with long-continued darkness and cold, destroying impartially the innocent and the guilty, the rain forest and the cornfield, the tiger and the rose.

When Carl Sagan and his colleagues began in 1983 to bring the possibilities of nuclear winter dramatically to the attention of the public, they put When Carl Sagan and his colleagues began in 1983 to bring the possibilities of nuclear winter dramatically to the attention of the public, they put  pro

 proffessessiiononal al sciscienentitiststs ls liike mke me ie innto to an an awawkwkwarard pd posiosititionon. On . On ththe one one he hanand, td, thhe pre profofessessiiononal al duduty ty of of a sca sciienentitist st conconffronronteted wd wiith th a na new ew anand exd excicititinng g ththeoreoryy is to try to prove it wrong. That is the way science works. That is the way science stays honest. Every new theory has to fight for its existence against is to try to prove it wrong. That is the way science works. That is the way science stays honest. Every new theory has to fight for its existence against intense and often bitter criticism. Most new theories turn out to be wrong, and the criticism is absolutely necessary to clear them away and make room intense and often bitter criticism. Most new theories turn out to be wrong, and the criticism is absolutely necessary to clear them away and make room for better

for better theories. The rare theories. The rare theory whitheory which survich survives the criticives the criticism ism is strengths strengthened and imened and improved proved by it, and then becoby it, and then becommes gradually es gradually {259} {259} inincorpcorporateoratedd into the growing body of scientific knowledge. So, when the theory of nuclear winter appeared on the scene, my instinctive reaction as a scientist was to into the growing body of scientific knowledge. So, when the theory of nuclear winter appeared on the scene, my instinctive reaction as a scientist was to  be

 be skeskeptptiicalcal, t, to lo look ook ffor or ththe we weak eak poipoinnts ts anand td try ry to to prprovove te thhe te thheoreory y wwronrongg. T. Thhat at iis ts thhe ne normormal al rereactactiion on to to a na new ew ththeoreoryy. W. We te try ry to to ririp ip it at aparpart at as rs rapiapidldlyy as

as possiblpossible.e.

On the other hand, nuclear winter is not just a theory. It is also a political statement with profound moral implications. If people believe that our  On the other hand, nuclear winter is not just a theory. It is also a political statement with profound moral implications. If people believe that our  nuclear weapons endanger not only our own existence and the existence of our enemies but also the existence of human societies all over the planet, this nuclear weapons endanger not only our own existence and the existence of our enemies but also the existence of human societies all over the planet, this  bel

 beliief wef wiilll hl havave prae practctiical cal conconseqsequuenencesces. It w. It wiilll ll lenend powd powerferfuul sl suuppopport trt to tho those vose voioices ices in aln all l coucounntrtriies wes whho oppoo oppose nse nuuclclear wear weapeapon don depleployoymmenentsts. It w. It wiillll increase the influence of those who consider nuclear weapons to be an abomination and demand radical changes in present policies. So my instinct as a increase the influence of those who consider nuclear weapons to be an abomination and demand radical changes in present policies. So my instinct as a scientist comes into sharp conflict with my instinct as a human being. As a scientist I want to rip the theory of nuclear winter apart, but as a human being I scientist comes into sharp conflict with my instinct as a human being. As a scientist I want to rip the theory of nuclear winter apart, but as a human being I want to believe it. This is one of the rare instances of a genuine conflict between the demands of science and the demands of humanity. As a scientist, I want to believe it. This is one of the rare instances of a genuine conflict between the demands of science and the demands of humanity. As a scientist, I  ju

 judgdge te thhe ne nuuclclear ear wwiinnteter tr thheoreory y to to be a be a slsloppoppy y pipiece ece of of wworkork, f, fuulll l of of ggaps aps anand ud unnjujuststiiffiied aed assssuummptptiionons. s. AAs a hs a huumman an beibeinngg, I h, I hope ope fferervvenentltly ty thhat at iit it is ris rigghht.t. Here is a real and uncomfortable dilemma. What does a scientist do when science and humanity pull in opposite directions?

Here is a real and uncomfortable dilemma. What does a scientist do when science and humanity pull in opposite directions?

There are three possible responses to the dilemma. One is to say, I am a scientist second and a human being first, so I will forget my scientific There are three possible responses to the dilemma. One is to say, I am a scientist second and a human being first, so I will forget my scientific misgivings and jump onto the nuclear winter bandwagon. I do not blame those of my scientific colleagues who have taken this course. Survival is after all misgivings and jump onto the nuclear winter bandwagon. I do not blame those of my scientific colleagues who have taken this course. Survival is after all more important than technical accuracy. The second response is to say with the poet Robinson Jeffers:

more important than technical accuracy. The second response is to say with the poet Robinson Jeffers: To seek the truth is better than good works, better 

To seek the truth is better than good works, better  than

than survival,survival, Holi

Holier than iner than innocence and highnocence and higher than love, er than love, {260}{260}

and since I am a scientist dedicated to truth, I will criticize nuclear winter as harshly as I would criticize any other half-baked scientific theory. and since I am a scientist dedicated to truth, I will criticize nuclear winter as harshly as I would criticize any other half-baked scientific theory.

Few of my scientific colleagues have had the courage to make this second response. I do not blame those who have muffled their criticisms. Few of my scientific colleagues have had the courage to make this second response. I do not blame those who have muffled their criticisms.  Nob

 Nobody ody wwanants tts to be po be puut put publbliiclcly iy in tn thhe pose posiitition on of of sasayyiinng g ththatat, af, afteter alr alll, n, nuuclclear ear wwar mar may ay nnot bot be so be so bad. Iad. It it is dis diffffiicucullt to t to cricrititicicizze ne nuuclclear wear wiinnteter pur publbliiclclyy without giving an appearance of moral insensitivity. The majority of scientists who have doubts about nuclear winter keep their doubts private. This is the without giving an appearance of moral insensitivity. The majority of scientists who have doubts about nuclear winter keep their doubts private. This is the third response to the dilemma, to say, it will not do us any good in the long run to believe a wrong theory, but it will not do us any good in the short run third response to the dilemma, to say, it will not do us any good in the long run to believe a wrong theory, but it will not do us any good in the short run to attack it publicly, so let us keep silent and reserve judgment until the facts become clear. I myself have chosen the third response. It is an unheroic to attack it publicly, so let us keep silent and reserve judgment until the facts become clear. I myself have chosen the third response. It is an unheroic compromise, but I prefer it to either of the simple alternatives. The dilemma is similar to the dilemmas which occur frequently in personal and family life, compromise, but I prefer it to either of the simple alternatives. The dilemma is similar to the dilemmas which occur frequently in personal and family life, when the demands of honesty and of friendship pull in opposite directions. It is good to be honest but it is often better to remain silent.

when the demands of honesty and of friendship pull in opposite directions. It is good to be honest but it is often better to remain silent.

There are political as well as scientific reasons for preferring a cautious response to nuclear winter. From a political point of view, it is dangerous to There are political as well as scientific reasons for preferring a cautious response to nuclear winter. From a political point of view, it is dangerous to  bas

 base a pue a publbliic camc campaipaiggn agn agaiainnst nst nuuclclear ear wweapeaponons us upon pon a teca techhnniical cal arargguummenent wt whhiich ch mmay ay llatater ter tuurn rn ouout to be wt to be wronrongg. T. Thhe nue nuclclear wear wiinnteter argr arguummenent cout coulldd  bac

 backfkfiire badlre badly agy agaiainnst thst the ae anntiti-nu-nuclclear mear movovememenent if tt if techechnniical cal wweakeaknnesesses arses are foue founnd in id in it. For a bat. For a backfckfiire efre efffect to occect to occuurr, , iit is nt is not neot necescessarsary thy that that thee nucl

nuclear ear winwinter ter theory be theory be proved proved flflatly wrongatly wrong. It . It could also happcould also happen that the theoren that the theory is y is proved proved to bto be right but that rather simple right but that rather simple changes in weapone changes in weapon deployments and targeting rules will be sufficient to make the major effects of nuclear winter disappear. The opposition to nuclear weapons would then deployments and targeting rules will be sufficient to make the major effects of nuclear winter disappear. The opposition to nuclear weapons would then suffer a serious setback if it had emphasized nuclear winter too much in stating its case. The case against nuclear weapons is surely strong enough, the suffer a serious setback if it had emphasized nuclear winter too much in stating its case. The case against nuclear weapons is surely strong enough, the eff

effects ects of nuclof nuclear ear {261} {261} war are war are catascatastrophic enough, the mtrophic enough, the massacassacre of innre of innocent pocent people is eople is abhorreabhorrent enougnt enough, so that a ph, so that a poliolitical mtical movemenovement againstt against nuclear weapons need not depend on the technical details of nuclear winter for its justification.

nuclear weapons need not depend on the technical details of nuclear winter for its justification.

There is perhaps a historical analogy between Linus Pauling in the 1950s and Carl Sagan in the 1980s. Linus Pauling was the great crusader against There is perhaps a historical analogy between Linus Pauling in the 1950s and Carl Sagan in the 1980s. Linus Pauling was the great crusader against  bom

 bomb tb testestiinng g iin n ththe 1e 1950950s. s. HHe re riichchlly y desdeserervved ed ththe Ne Nobeobel l PeaPeace ce PrPriizze we whhiich ch hhe we won on ffor or hhiis es effffortorts. s. HHe se suuccecceedeeded id in n mmobiobilliizziinng g pupublbliic oc opipinniion on alall l ovover er ththee world against the massive hydrogen-bomb tests which were then occurring regularly in the Pacific and in the Arctic. Unfortunately, he used as his main world against the massive hydrogen-bomb tests which were then occurring regularly in the Pacific and in the Arctic. Unfortunately, he used as his main argument a

argument against gainst bobomb testing the mmb testing the mededical and genetic daical and genetic damage caused mage caused by radby radioactioactive ive fallfallout resout resultiulting fng from the testsrom the tests. The public outrage which he. The public outrage which he mobilized was directed primarily against the fallout and not against the weapons. As a result, the outrage collapsed as soon as the Limited Test Ban mobilized was directed primarily against the fallout and not against the weapons. As a result, the outrage collapsed as soon as the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was signed and the bomb testing was hidden underground. The Limited Treaty stopped the fallout but did not stop the nuclear arms Treaty of 1963 was signed and the bomb testing was hidden underground. The Limited Treaty stopped the fallout but did not stop the nuclear arms race. Pauling himself had campaigned for a complete Test Ban which would stop all tests, but his overemphasis of the fallout issue prevented him from race. Pauling himself had campaigned for a complete Test Ban which would stop all tests, but his overemphasis of the fallout issue prevented him from reaching his objective. Since the public was concerned about fallout rather than about weapons, the public was satisfied with the Limited Test Ban, and reaching his objective. Since the public was concerned about fallout rather than about weapons, the public was satisfied with the Limited Test Ban, and the development of weapons continued almost unhindered.

the development of weapons continued almost unhindered.

It is easy to imagine a similar sequence of events arising out of Carl Sagan's nuclear winter campaign. Carl Sagan deserves enormous credit for  It is easy to imagine a similar sequence of events arising out of Carl Sagan's nuclear winter campaign. Carl Sagan deserves enormous credit for  raising the nuclear winter question and forcing us to think about it. He is as much a hero of our time as Pauling was the hero of the fifties. The nuclear  raising the nuclear winter question and forcing us to think about it. He is as much a hero of our time as Pauling was the hero of the fifties. The nuclear  winter question, like the fallout question in the fifties, gives hope and strength to everybody who is fighting the political battle against nuclear weapons. winter question, like the fallout question in the fifties, gives hope and strength to everybody who is fighting the political battle against nuclear weapons.  Nu

 Nuclclear ear wwiinnteter r iis a s a sisimmplple e anand d powpowererffuul l iidea dea aroarouunnd d wwhhiich ch oppopposiositition on to to nnuuclclear ear wweapeaponons cs can cryan cryststalallliizze. e. UUnnfforortutunnatatelelyy, , ththe e nnuuclclear ear wweapeapononss est

estabablishmlishment ent {26{262} 2} may may finfind the eqd the equivuivalent of a Limalent of a Limited Test Ban Tited Test Ban Treareaty, a simty, a simple ple tectechnihnical fix cal fix whiwhich would remove the dach would remove the danger of nuclear winter nger of nuclear winter  without removing the danger of nuclear war. I am not saying that this is easy, but we do not yet know enough to say that it is impossible. With this without removing the danger of nuclear war. I am not saying that this is easy, but we do not yet know enough to say that it is impossible. With this  pos

 possisibibilliity ty iin mn miinnd, I gd, I giivve me my bly blessessiinng tg to Caro Carl Sl Sagaganan's cam's campaipaiggn bun but ct conontitinnuue to fe to feel eel somsome ane anxxiietety aby abouout ht hiis tacs tactitics. Tcs. Thhe wae wavve of me of moraoral l ououtrtragage whe whiichch Sagan has created must be directed against the evil of nuclear war itself and not merely against its consequences.

Sagan has created must be directed against the evil of nuclear war itself and not merely against its consequences.

I do not wish here to get into a technical argument about the details of nuclear winter. I will merely summarize my own struggles with the technical I do not wish here to get into a technical argument about the details of nuclear winter. I will merely summarize my own struggles with the technical issues. I spent a few weeks in 1985 trying to make nuclear winter go away. The phrase "go away" here is used in the sense customary among scientists. issues. I spent a few weeks in 1985 trying to make nuclear winter go away. The phrase "go away" here is used in the sense customary among scientists.