It would appear that we can definitively put to rest the idea of a global original po- sition. Some liberal cosmopolitans, however, might remind us that even if we can- not construct a global original position, there remains the substantive problem of distributive justice. The global order, they claim, is much like a domestic basic struc- ture; it determines how the burdens and benefits of global cooperation are distributed and profoundly affects the life prospects of individuals. This position has found pop- ularity among cosmopolitan liberals, perhaps the paradigmatic statement of this point of view being Charles Beitz’s Political Theory and International Relations (1979/1999), with similar accounts in works by Allen Buchanan (2000) and Thomas Pogge (1989; 1994). The main idea shared by these writers is, at heart, rather simple: if there is a global basic structure, then we need a global conception of distributive justice in order to assess its effects on the life of individuals worldwide. But Rawls fails to com- mit to the idea that there is a global basic structure, and thus fails to acknowledge that LP or any international theory developed from within Justice as Fairness requires a conception of global distributive justice. not only that, but since Rawls’ preferred solution to the problem of distributive justice at home includes the difference prin- ciple, one could further imagine that even at the global level, given the existence of a global basic structure, a global difference principle is the most appropriate response to the problem in hand.
Is the idea of a global basic structure sufficient to contend that Rawls should have prescribed a global difference principle? I think not, but the reasons that can lead us to this conclusion should not, in my view, be focused on empirical debates con- cerning the relevance of global institutional structures. Part of the intellectual dis- pute between those who have argued for and against a globalized difference prin- ciple has focused on whether there is a global basic structure in the first place (see Freeman, 2007b; heath, 2002; Meckled-Garcia, 2008). Unfortunately for those who are more sympathetic to Rawls’ position, not even conclusive proof that there is no such thing as a global basic structure would be enough to put liberal cosmopolitan critics to rest. And for one essential reason: a basic structure cannot be an existence condition for a conception of distributive justice. As writers such as Arash Abizadeh (2007) and Miriam Ronzoni (2009) have shown, the idea that principles of distributive justice require a basic structure to be applicable is not sustainable. The fact that we
need a basic structure to trigger obligations of distributive justice exposes the very idea of justice to a status-quo bias. Problems of distributive justice arise whether or not we have a basic structure in place: how to distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation is a meaningful question even if we do not have the same type of institutional structure described by Rawls in his domestic theory. In fact, the best reply to the (hypothetical) observation that there is no global basic structure is sim- ply that we should create one, and ensure it is organized according to the correct prin- ciples of distributive justice.
Does this mean that those sympathetic to Rawls’ LP have no argument against the liberal cosmopolitan idea that we should accept a globalized difference princi- ple? not quite. The difficulty of the liberal cosmopolitan position can be grasped if we return to Rawls’ political turn. I have claimed above that the idea of a basic struc- ture cannot be considered as an existence condition for principles of distributive jus- tice. So, even if we can demonstrate that there is no global basic structure, liberal cosmopolitans can always claim that there should be one and that it should be or- ganized according to their preferred conception of global distributive justice – for example, a globalized difference principle. yet what this reply does not seem to ap- preciate is the problematic nature of creating a global basic structure in the first place. It is not enough to simply state that we should create ‘a’ global basic structure if we lack one. Those who seem to favour this solution will also have to tell us how they imagine such a structure. Furthermore they will also have to explain why, once this newly created global basic structure is in place, it should feature a globalized ver- sion of the difference principle. These two issues cannot be simply resolved by main- taining that a global basic structure and its associated conception of global distributive justice would have to mirror what we normally see as justified within liberal democ- racies. The difference principle is part of a liberal political conception of justice. And as we have seen in the previous chapter, the content of liberal political conceptions of justice is something that is appropriate for liberal democracies, not for political systems generally.
More broadly, liberal cosmopolitans, perhaps inspired by Rawls’ political turn, should also consider that the philosophical task of Rawlsian liberalism is not exhausted by simply proposing a principle of distributive justice. One has also to examine its stability and whether its enforcement could be legitimate. And on neither count would a global liberal conception of justice containing a global difference principle fare well. For Rawls, in any political domain, stability is always stability for the right reasons. A society, of whatever kind, can never be a just society if its members are simply co- erced into obedience. But reasonable pluralism makes an achievement of this sta- bility very difficult. Rawls addresses the issue of stability first in a liberal democratic society. he assumes that such society is closed and self-contained. his solution, for a liberal society, to the problem of stability is to develop the idea of a political con- ception of justice. A political conception of justice has three main characteristics: a) it is a conception for the basic structure of society; b) it is freestanding; and c) its main ideas are drawn from the public political culture of the society. All three features, as we have seen in the previous chapter, serve the purpose of narrowing the terms
of disagreement between persons when it comes to the conception of right that will structure their society. Once a political conception of justice is developed, we then ask: Can it support an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines? If an overlapping consensus is at least possible, then the idea that society is stable for the right reasons is at least possible. In other words, given favourable conditions, the idea of stability for the right reasons is not a self-defeating one.
The first task of those who wish to extend the content of Rawls’ ideas concern- ing distributive justice to global politics, then, is to elaborate the content of a polit- ical conception of justice so that the latter can be presented in a global original po- sition as one of the available options for representatives of the parties. (here I leave aside the aforementioned difficulties in even imagining a global original position.) A crucial component of a political conception of justice, in order to be properly po- litical, is that it must draw from ideas that are implicit in the public political culture of society. But here we face a startling problem: which society? We cannot simply assume that the liberal political tradition is better than all others. We cannot sim- ply maintain that the appropriate political tradition, by reference to which we must construct a political conception of justice, is a liberal one. And how can a political conception of global justice taken from ideas that are implicit in a type of public po- litical culture that represents only a subset of the persons of the world be the focus of a global overlapping consensus?
Looking at the same issue from the perspective of legitimacy, the problems faced by a cosmopolitan conception of global distributive justice are analogous. Accord- ing to Rawls, the idea of legitimacy is linked to the idea of the proper use of coer- cive political power. The question for Rawls is always: how can we use political pow- er in a way that is reasonably acceptable by those on the receiving end? however, as we have seen in the previous chapter, reasonable acceptability is not a descrip- tion of perfectly impartial and impersonal reasons whose content is completely in- dependent from the persons that are addressed. So, as with justice, we face the same problem here: what types of agents are we addressing when constructing a conception of the proper use of political power at the global level? Can a liberal conception of the use of political power between citizens of a liberal democracy be appropriate? how are we to satisfy the criterion of reasonable acceptability? Rawls is clear that justice and legitimacy share the same building blocks: their content must make ref- erence to ideas that are implicit in the public political culture of society. But then, once again, we face the same problem: Which society? Which public political cul- ture?
The point is not that these questions have no definite answers. Ultimately one could simply say: ‘global society’, the ‘global public political culture’. But, while cor- rect, this reply obscures the type of problem we are highlighting here: even if we ap- pealed to a ‘global society’ and to a ‘global public political culture’ their contents would not plausibly be considered to incorporate or perfectly mirror liberal ideas. The glob- al public political culture does not seem to feature an idea of persons as free and equal citizens, nor an idea of the world as a single fair scheme of social cooperation. Fur- thermore, when we look at the relationships between persons and the institutions
that they live in, the global public political culture will not be plausibly based on some version of democratic equality. But these are precisely the elements that seem to mo- tivate the adoption of the difference principle domestically. Therefore, even if we ap- ply the same method that Rawls seems to recommend to deal with reasonable plu- ralism domestically, we are unlikely to get to the same conclusions in the global con- text.