Hungary’s Head of State is the President of the Republic who represents the unity of the nation, and monitors the democratic operation of the State;
The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Armed Forces.129
These are the principal roles of the President of the Republic of Hungary as defined in the current Constitution. As these clauses indicate, the main tasks of the head of state can be largely divided into three functions: assuming representative, ceremonial or symbolic roles; overseeing the democratic functioning of state institutions involved; acting as the Commander-in-Chief. While the practical meanings of performing these functions are open to debates, according to the legal status of the President, the head of state appears to have some executive authority. For example, leading the Hungarian army implies that the President may be able to decide over the mobilisation and de-mobilisation of armed forces. However, if one examines the other constitutional powers vested in the President, particularly in relation to the President’s power over the government, it becomes evident that the head of state exercises only nominal or minimal powers. The main constitutional powers granted to the President are as follows:
▪ Accredit and receive ambassadors and envoys; ▪ Grant individual pardons;
▪ Conclude international treaties in the name of the Republic of Hungary; if the
subject of the treaty falls within its legislative competence, prior ratification by the Parliament is necessary for the conclusion of the treaty;
▪ Confer titles, orders, awards and decorations specified by law;
▪Appoint and dismiss State Secretaries in accordance with regulations specified
in a separate law;
▪ Appoint and dismiss the President and Vice-presidents of the National Bank
of Hungary... and university rectors... upon the recommendation of persons or organisations specified in a separate law;
▪ By the suggestion of the Prime Minister (after listening to the open hearing of
the Parliament’s Cultural and Press Affairs Committee), the President of the Republic appoints and dismisses the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of Hungarian radio and television, as well as the director of the Hungarian News Agency;
▪ In order to exercise the [above] right, the President is required to have a
counter-signature from the Prime Minister.
Adapted from: Ács (2000: 57); Sükösd (1996: 361); ('The Law No. LVII of 1990 on the Appointment Procedure of the Heads of the Public Media').130
The first two rights noted above apparently suggest that they are realms of the President’s independent authority, whereas the remainder refers to circumscribed presidential powers. Evidence demonstrating the limitation of presidential powers is found in stipulations where the President is required to consider separate or specific laws for the exercise of each legal power. For example, the right to nominate to state apparatus and the conclusion of
international agreements indicate that the President is obliged to have prior approval from the branch of powers responsible for that area of governance. In contrast, there are no additional conditions restricting the President’s rights to receive ambassadors and issue individual pardons. However, it should be noted that all of the legal powers stated above must be approved by the counter-signatures of the Prime Minister or responsible ministers. As McGregor notes, the system of co-signature of the Prime Minister or ministers is one of 'the sources of presidential weakness' (McGregor, 1994: 30). The only exceptional case which may not need co-signatories from other political organs is in an extraordinary situation where the President is required to activate his or her 'reserve' (tartalék) function (this refers to additional powers afforded to the President in a state of emergency). 131 However, given that the President’s extraordinary powers are even shared by others – the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House and the President of the Constitutional Court – the extent to which the President is able to make an independent decision without seeking a consensus is unclear (Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 560), which is highly indicative of the fact that the presidential powers over government are minimal. In practice, this means that the President does have some de jure powers, but he or she cannot take independent action without the endorsement of the government (Halmai, 1991).
Concerning subsequent constitutional amendments, particularly with respect to the presidential powers listed above, until the present day there have been changes on two occasions. According to Law XXXI of 1989, the President was initially able to appoint and dismiss State Secretaries upon the suggestion of the Prime Minister, but Act XL of 1990 brought about a change in the stipulation, as stated above.132 In terms of the range of presidential powers, however, this change of wording does not make any difference, as the President is still unable to decide without reference to the Premier or Parliament. Thereafter, Act LIV of 2006, once again altered the relevant stipulation, yet this amendment did not lead to any change of presidential powers either, because it remains undecided as a gap in the current Constitution.133 Therefore, despite several attempts to alter the scope of constitutional powers, the weakness of the Presidency has remained, as the President is still obliged to have a co-signature to validate his or her actions.
This raises important questions. Why does the Constitution grant such limited power to the President? It is also questionable whether the Constitution does grant discretionary power to the President in any capacity. According to Hungarian legal experts, the President’s lack of political responsibility is primarily responsible for the weakness of the Presidency (Ács, 2000: 61; Báldy, 2003: 391; Sükösd, 1996: 354-55). According to Article 31/A which
specified the President’s legal status in terms of potential prosecution, the head of state is not held accountable for his political actions, not least because his jurisdictional independence is guaranteed (Petrétei, 2001: 90; Magyar Hírlap, 25 May 1992). The only exception is applicable to a case where the President has consciously violated the Constitution or other laws (Ács, 2000: 61; Báldy, 2003: 391; Petrétei, 2001: 100). In reality, however, calling the President to account is very challenging, due to legal requirements which demand the overriding of the rule of party discipline. According to Article 31/A, in order to launch impeachment proceedings, a two-thirds majority vote by MPs is required. If the vast majority of MPs (including those who come from the same party as the President) voted against the President, the case would be forwarded to the Constitutional Court to decide whether the President has violated the Constitution. Yet, in the event that MPs from the President’s party vote according to their party line, the chance of meeting the necessary quorum is slim indeed. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, Göncz served out his term largely due to this complex procedure, even though he took very controversial political decisions and may have overstepped the limits of his constitutional role.
Concerning the discretionary powers of the President, despite the fact that the President’s room for manoeuvre is significantly circumscribed by the cross-signatory system, the Constitution does grant some flexibility nonetheless:
▪ The right to participate and speak in the plenary session of Parliament;
▪ The right to announce parliamentary and municipal elections and mayoral
elections as well as the dates of the European Parliamentary elections and national referenda;134
▪ The right to propose bills to Parliament;
▪ The right to veto legislation proposed by Parliament; ▪ The right to make a political statement;
Adapted from: Ács (2000: 54-56); Sükösd (1996: 356-60); Körösényi, Tóth and Török (2003: 561).
In general, the President’s power over Parliament is relatively more wide-ranging and flexible than his or her power over the government. In order to exercise the above rights, the President is not required to have a counter-signature from any other political organ. For example, the right to propose a bill suggests that not only the Legislature, but the President him- or herself is entitled to act as an initiator of legislation. Furthermore, the right of veto underscores the fact that the Constitution does vest the President with some discretionary powers. The activation of these powers is possible through the 'constitutional or political veto',135 even though both types of veto cannot be exercised by the President at one and the same time. The former is exercised by the President when he or she has a reservation
regarding the constitutionality of a given piece of legislation (Article 26. §4). If the President’s concerns about legislation are legally grounded, he or she refers it to the Constitutional Court for judicial review. In the event that the Court finds the legislation is unconstitutional, the President returns it to Parliament. In the opposite case - if the Court upholds the legality of legislation - the President must sign the contested legislation into law and promulgate it within five days (Körösényi and Tóth and Török, 2003: 561). In the strictest sense, however, the constitutional veto cannot be understood as a powerful political tool for the exercise of presidential influence, as the final decision falls under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. As Petréti notes, use of the constitutional veto means that the President acts as an initiator to facilitate the creation of laws, which conform to the principle of constitutionality (Petréti, 2005: 134).
The political veto is exercised by the President when he or she disagrees on adopted legislation or any part of it, prior to its promulgation to the public (Article 26. §2). In this case, as an expression of disagreement, with or without comments, the President returns the law to Parliament for reconsideration. Since the President’s reservation with regard to signing the law is not legally grounded (but instead based on any other reasons), this may be interpreted as an influential political tool at the President’s disposal. However, the use of a political veto only has a restricted impact in terms of changing the adopted legislation. Parliament does not need to follow the President’s instruction, this is due no small part to the simple procedure by which the political veto can be overriden; in reality, the President’s influence on politics through the political veto channel is marginal. As a former judge of the Constitutional Court, Géza Kilényi argues, a simple majority vote is sufficient to void the political veto:
Ferenc Mádl [Göncz’s successor] returned an adopted bill to [Parliament] for reconsideration. On the same day, the same number of MPs once again voted for the bill. But Mádl was not called into Parliament. Some MPs did not even know that the extraordinary parliamentary session was held at 9 pm in the evening... They were in Brussels at the time... The rank of the President’s veto should be raised to the extent that MPs are not allowed to override it with a simple majority (Interview with Kilényi, 9 May 2007).
Ultimately, this means that if Parliament once again votes to the challenged legislation with the majority votes that MPs have cast, the President must sign the law that has been returned (Rose-Ackerman, 2005: 63). The only impact that the President could have on politics through the political veto over Parliament is the deferment of the promulgation of the law for the period of time that it takes for Parliament to decide to amend or re-adopt the challenged legislation (because of this effect, the political veto is also called as the
'suspensory veto'). In this regard, if one strictly judges the scope of the President’s discretionary powers, the political veto cannot be interpreted as a genuinely powerful tool of presidential authority. Thus, the President’s power under Hungary’s parliamentarianism is minimal; weakness persists as the defining feature of the institution of the Presidency.
This, however, does not suggest that the President always follows the will of Parliament or moves within narrowly defined constitutional boundaries. 'Institutions do matter' as 'they create incentives and disincentives for political actors... establish the context in which policy-making occurs, and help or hinder in the construction of democratic regimes' (Ishiyama and Velten, 1998: 217). However, as Ishiyama and Velten neatly point out, political actors do not all respond and act in the same way according to the given 'institutional incentives' (Ishiyama and Velten, 1998: 231); it cannot simply be said that institutions themselves determine the strength of presidencies. For example, other than constitutionally defined formal powers, there are numerous informal sources or channels which the President is capable of translating into an expansion of actual influence. Holmes aptly maintains that:
It is perfectly normal, too, that informal resources help determine the real powers of a sitting President: a well-organised staff, a strategic use of appointment powers to build up a dense network of collaborators, sheer popularity and access to the media, agility at playing off some parties against the others, personal involvement in negotiating cabinet coalitions, and the ability to bully Parliament by threatening convincingly to "appeal to the street"... Where legislatures are fragmented, coalition cabinets are unstable, and courts are inexperienced, even a modestly powerful President can wield decisive influence (Holmes, 1993: 36).
In inexperienced democracies, therefore, there is considerable leeway for even constitutionally weak Presidents to convert these informal resources into their real powers. The characteristics of the Presidency would be, then, shaped by and reflected through the presidential actions, such as how they interpret the scope of presidential powers and interact with other political players. Some ambitious Presidents may capitalise on vaguely defined constitutional powers and also use informal resources to maximise political influences for the purpose of achieving the goals that they set themselves. The question of this will be addressed in the next chapter, in which the main characteristics of Göncz’s Presidency are examined in-depth. The most important instances and examples of Göncz’s proactive engagement in politics will be placed under scrutiny. In particular, the chapter will ask how Göncz’s own liberal and democratic political values were reflected through and embodied in his engagement with important transitional political and socio-economic issues. Ultimately, I will ask what Göncz sought to achieve in pursuing his liberal and