Principios y prácticas contables

At the heart of these broad social changes has been the consolidation of a ‘new        knowledge economy’. In simple terms, a knowledge economy is characterised by the        increasing importance of knowledge intensive activities in the production of goods        and services ( Powell and Snellman 2004 ). In contrast to previous eras, knowledge        itself is said to have become the primary source of competitive advantage over other        economic inputs, such as land, labour and capital ( OECD 1996 ;  Audretsch and        Thurik 2001 ;  Smith 2002 ). Thus, in a knowledge economy, ‘intangible capital’        underpins an increasing share of gross domestic product ( Abramovitz and David        1996 ;  Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013 ). Some concrete forms of ‘knowledge capital’        are visible through indicators such as the growth in patent applications ( Smith 2002 ;        Powell and Snellman 2004 ). However, as knowledge creation processes continue to        intensify, the relative value of stocks of knowledge, such as existing patents, are        thought to diminish compared to the value of knowledge flows, or the creation and       

19 _{Frank­Walter Steinmeier was Germany’s Foreign Minister in 2014 when he wrote this} 

diffusion of new forms of knowing ( Machlup 1984 ;  Al­Laham et al. 2011 ;  Hagel et al.        2012 ). 

The increasing competitive value of new knowledge brings to the foreground three        interrelated concepts,  creativity ,  innovation and  learning ( Scott 2014 ). Learning is the        act of modifying existing or acquiring new knowledge or skills; creativity the        generation of novelty that is useful and innovation the translation of this novelty into        practical outcomes that add value to an activity. These three processes overlap and        interact in complex adaptive iterations between codified (‘know­what’ and        ‘know­why’) and tacit knowledge (‘know­how’) ( Garud 1997 ;  Gertler 2001 ), circulating        through social networks and embedded in particular, local places ( Gertler 2003 ;  Neff        2005 ;  Faulconbridge 2006 ). The non­linear nature of knowledge development,        especially when working in concert with new technology, has begun to outstrip the        capacity of education institutions to formalise and disseminate it. Actors in        knowledge intensive contexts therefore face pressure to continually ‘learn by doing’,        and to regularly engage in knowledge producing activities that foster learning,        creativity and innovation ( OECD 1996 ;  Gratton 2011 ;  Ito and Howe 2016 ).  

We have established that a knowledge economy is one in which knowledge plays the        leading role, but what is ‘new’ about claims of a ‘new knowledge economy’? Although        the term ‘knowledge worker’ has been used since the 1950s ( Drucker 1959 ),        knowledge producing processes have intensified in recent years ( Dunning 1997 ;        Hagel et al. 2012). One of the most salient features of this intensification is the        ongoing ‘digitisation of the economy’ ­ the penetration of internet­mediated digital        technology into everyday social and economic life. An extensive array of research        offers empirical examples and theoretical models demonstrating how this        ‘digitisation’ is fundamentally reordering socioeconomic relations, causing patterns of        organisation and behaviour that are distinct from, rather than a mere extension, of        the past ( Castells 2002 ;  2010 ;  Moriset and Malecki 2009 ;  Botsman and Rogers        2010 ;  Kostakis and Bauwens 2014 ;  Citron and Pasquale 2014 ;  Keen 2015 ).        Consequently, there are a variety of different conceptual descriptions that emphasise        particular features of the new knowledge economy. Authors employ terms like ‘digital       

capitalism’ ( Schiller 1999 ), ‘cognitive capitalism’ ( Rinderman 2012 ;  Moulier­Boutang        2012 ) ‘cognitive­cultural capitalism’ ( Storper and Scott 2009 ;  Scott 2014 ), the        ‘network economy’ ( Castells 2011 ), the ‘collaborative economy’ ( Botsman and        Rogers 2010 ) and even ‘netarchical capitalism’  (Bauwens 2006 ;  2009 ;  Kostakis and        Bauwens 2014 ) to make sense of these emerging phenomena.  

Two enterprises that are emblematic of the tensions these debates evoke are the        Californian ‘based’ companies Airbnb and Uber. Both have taken advantage of near        ubiquitous smartphone penetration in high density urban contexts to facilitate new        forms of ‘sharing’ resources that were previously considered private goods. The        ingenuity of their algorithms enable them to profit merely by linking buyers and        sellers of accommodation and transport services in new ways. They do this without        owning the physical capital required to operate their services, and both ventures are        globally ‘disrupting’ their local extant industry competitors, short term accommodation        industries in Airbnb’s case ( Guttentag 2015 ;  Zervas et al. 2017 ) and local taxi        industries in Uber’s case ( Rogers 2015 ;  Cramer and Krueger 2016 ).   

The astonishingly rapid ‘success’ of such companies, and the larger movement they        are claimed to represent, have been widely discussed, initially celebrated (for        example by  Gansky 2010 ;  Botsman and Rogers 2010 ;  Belk 2014 ) but more recently        criticised ( Greenfield 2015 ;  Pick and Dreher 2015 ;  Dreyer et al. 2017 ;  Murillo et al.        2017 ; Arcidiacono et al. 2018). Certainly such globally mobile, ‘peer­to­peer’        innovations pose new challenges for local regulators ( Sundararajan 2014 ;  Pasquale        2015 ). However a large portion of these critiques stems from a growing concern that        the ‘new knowledge economy’ is witnessing a dramatic recalculation of the        relationship between labour inputs, productivity and profitability, where high wages        for skills in demand, such as software engineering, exist alongside persistently high        unemployment and low wages for low demand skills, resulting in troubling inequality        ( Audretsch and Thurik 2001 ;  Powell 2004 ;  Credit Suisse 2014 ;  Piketty 2014 ). The        concerns with ‘new economy’ luminaries like Airbnb, Uber and a host of other        startups eager to ‘disrupt the status quo’ are not only that their operating models may        exacerbate inequality, but that their ‘platform ambitions’ are often alarmingly       

monopolistic ( Srnicek 2016 ), and are furthering the divide between the small cohort        of investors, owners and designers of these platform services and the vast numbers        that merely ‘use’ them .  20

Accordingly, social theorists have been advancing new conceptual classes of workers        that better represent contemporary work relations. Not simply ‘knowledge workers’        and ‘service workers’ ( Drucker 1994 ), but a privileged ‘creative class’ ( Florida 2002 ;        Storper and Scott 2009 ), served by a vulnerable ‘precariat class’ ( Standing 2011 ).        Others describe an innovating ‘hacker class’ creating new content on media platforms        owned by a ‘vectoralist class’ ( Wark 2004 ). Finally, in addition to questions of        economic inequality, many view the emerging ‘new economy’ as an opportunity to        evolve the economic arena to accommodate a wider sphere of ethical concerns, such        as how to better align productive activity with the ecological constraints of the planet        ( Kallis et al. 2012 ;  Marglin 2013 ). 

These diverse aspects ­ the disruptive role of digital technology on economic activity,        the rising social inequality between the winners and losers of such disruptions, and        the pressures on growing urban populations to more effectively pool resources and        acknowledge ecological constraints ­ are all key features of the new knowledge        economy as it is used in this thesis. But it is not simply the accelerated production of        knowledge that is channeling resources towards new actors with remarkable alacrity, it       

20  _{Concerns about the link between digital disruption and social inequality have been cited as}  one of the factors in recent political upheavals such as ‘Brexit’ and the election of President  Trump. Although ultimately unsuccessful, even the ‘mainstream’ US presidential candidate  Hillary Clinton acknowledged the ambivalence such innovations can provoke during the  campaign:   

“Meanwhile, many Americans are making extra money renting out a small                      room, designing websites, selling products they design themselves at                  home, or even driving their own car. This on demand, or so­called gig                          economy is creating exciting economies and unleashing innovation. But is                    is also raising hard questions about workplace protections and what a                      good job will look like in the future”  

is the translation and commercialisation of this new knowledge into  entrepreneurial        activity . This is why the new economy can be understood more fundamentally as an        ‘entrepreneurial’ knowledge economy, in contrast to the older ‘managed industrial        economy’ ( Audretsch and Thurik 2001 ). What is rewarded is not just the creation, but        the  commercialisation of new knowledge . It is this ‘entrepreneurial’ dimension of the        21        new knowledge economy that is of critical relevance to this thesis, not simply as a        frame for economic analysis, but as a broader discursive field that shapes social        relations, especially during the empirical examination of Coworking practices as early        expressions of a growing ‘entrepreneurial society’ ( Audretsch 2009 ;  Weiers 2014 ).        Whether welcomed or maligned, few argue that this ‘Schumpeterian wave’ of creative        destruction is subsiding, and many make the case that such cycles will only intensify        in the future ( Perez 2010         ;   Rifkin 2014 ;  Eichhorst 2015 ;  CEDA 2015 ;  Ismael et al.        2014).