Relevo de la actriz protagonista femenina

I use the state-centrist approach of power (Skocpol 1979; Parsa 2000; Goodwin 2001) coupled with Tilly’s (1978) revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes discussed thoroughly in the theoretical framework of this dissertation to explain the differences of Georgian, Ukrainian, Kyrgyz, Azeri and Armenian movements and revolutions, focusing specifically on the repressive capacity of the government/state. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the differences of repressive (in)capacity of the governments of the compared countries will be studied through the degree of their state militarization.

76Here, one can argue that Georgia has passed through privatization and had a war, but is contrasted to Armenia in this study as a case with less social exclusion. The counterargument is the following: 1) While Armenia’s war (1991-1994) was against external enemy Azerbaijan, Georgia’s wars of 1988-1992 and 1992-1993 are

considered as civil wars consisting of inter-ethnic and intra-national conflicts in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; 2) While both these ethnic conflicts in Georgia occurred before 2008, the Georgian -Russian war of 2008 falls out of this research time span. If it occurred during the period covered in this dissertation, I assume research could find evidence that Georgia would become a similar case to Armenia and Azerbaijan in regards to state militarization and social exclusion. Perhaps, further research can focus on whether the consequences of this war (against Russia as an external enemy), such as, for instance increased military budgets and military participation ratios have changed or will soon be changing power relations domestically in Georgia

126 Figure 6.1: Opposition Mobilization in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, 1992-2006

Source: Lucan Way, CDDRL Working Paper, June 2006, page 10.

Comparing Armenia, Ukraine and Georgia on the above figure of opposition mobilization during 1992-2006 among the post-Soviet countries (Figure 6.1), we see that Armenia has had the most mobilized opposition(Way 2006).⁷⁷ Kyrgyz opposition

demonstrations are not illustrated in the figure, but the reason for this could be the fact that it did not include a big number of demonstrators. Sources mention about tens of thousands of Kyrgyz opposition demonstrators. Mcglinchey (2003) mentions of some 5000-10000 crowds.

The Azeri protests are not displayed either, but sources mention of 20,000 -25,000 people.

Military power of the states, first of all, stemming from the traditional definitions of state militarization, is compared based on their military budgets.⁷⁸Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s time series on military expenditure for the years of 1988 to 2006 shows that, as expected, Armenia’s military budget as a share % of GDP is very stable and

77 Based on Figure 6.1, between 1992 and 2006, the occurrence of demonstrations was more frequent in Armenia than in any of the selected countries in the figure. Even in absolute terms, Armenia has had the mo st mobilized opposition. Per capita number of demonstrators is the most in Armenia (Way 2006).

78The SIPRI definition of military expenditure is as follows and where possible, SIPRI military expenditures include all current and capital expenditure on:

 the armed forces, including peace keeping forces

 defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects

 paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations

 military space activities

127 higher in most years than in Ukraine, Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, which similar to Armenia, have faced prolonged oppositions towards their ruling elites (Figure 6.2).⁷⁹The average military expenditures in Armenia for the observed years are 3.1%, in Georgia they are 1.3%, in Kyrgyzstan 2.6%, in Ukraine 2.8%, and in Azerbaijan 2.7%.

Table 6.1: Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP: Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, 1992-2007

Azerbaijan^a Armenia^b Georgia^c Kyrgyzstan Ukraine^d

1992 [2.5] 2.2 .. 1.6 ..

a Azerbaijan changed or redenominated its currency during the period; all current price local currency figures have been converted to the latest currency.

b Figures for Armenia do not include military pensions. For 2004-2006 these amounted to 9979, 1113 and 12440 b. drams respectively.

c Figures for Georgia from 2002 are for the budgeted expenditure. The budget figure for 2003 is believed to be an underestimation of actual spending because of the political turmoil during the ye ar.

dFigures for Ukraine are for the adopted budget for the Ministry of Defense, military pensions and paramilitary forces. Actual expenditure was reportedly 95-99% of that budgeted for 1996-99.

Note:US$ m. = Million US dollars; - = Empty cell; ... = Data not available or not applicable; ( ) = Uncertain figure; [ ] = SIPRI estimate

Source:Updated from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Another source comparing only the South Caucasus three republics’ public spending confirms that in the year of 2000, Armenia’s military spending is the highest.

79 Pay attention to the fact that figures for Armenian expenditures do not even include military pensions.

128 Table 6.2: Public Spending (education, health and military) in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 1995-2000

1.3 Public Spending Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

Public expenditures

Education (% of GNP), 1985-1987 .. 5.8 ..

Education (% of GNP), 1995-1997 2 3 5.2^I

Health (% of GNP), 1990 .. 2.7 3

Health (% of GNP), 1999 4 1 0.8

Military (% of GDP), 1990 .. .. ..

Military (% of GDP), 2000 4.4 2.7 0.9

Total debt service (% of DGP), 1990 .. .. ..

Total debt service (% of DGP), 2000 2.2 3.4 3.9

Notes: ^I Data refer to a year or period other than that specified

Source: United Nations, “Republic of Armenia: Public Administration Country Profile”, January 2004.

As a percentage of GDP Armenian military spending is 4.4, while Azerbaijan’s is 2.7 (the opponent country that similarly needs strong military in case of war to restart with Armenia) and Georgia’s is 0.9. Not only is the Armenian military spending highest among the three republics, it is also highest as compared to other public expenditures within the country, such as health and education.

The World Bank’s indicators on Defense and Arms (Figure 6.2 - Figure 6.6) also show that average armed forces personnel as the percentage of total labor force is highest in Armenia for the observed years.⁸⁰ Azerbaijan follows. In Armenia it is 2.6%, in Azerbaijan it is 2%, in Georgia it is 1.4-1.5%, in Kyrgyzstan it is 1%, and in Ukraine it is 0.9%.

80 Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control sugges t they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.

Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labor Organization's definition of the economically active population.

129 Figure 6.2: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Armenia, 1992-2008

Figure 6.3: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Azerbaijan, 1992-2008

Figure 6.4: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Georgia, 1992-2008

Figure 6.5: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Kyrgyzstan, 1992-2008

130 Figure 6.6: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Ukraine, 1992-2008

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/armenia/armed-forces-personnel-total-wb-data.html