At the beginning of chapter two it was stated: “Berdiaev‟s vision is that all individuals possess a rudimentary form of freedom. This freedom will either develop through
communion with God and others, resulting in personhood and creative acts, or it will deteriorate through egocentricity, resulting in objectification and slavery.”1
It has been demonstrated that this „vision‟ relies on specific theological principles for its framework. As we have seen, the central theological principles are:
i. Freedom can only develop in relation with God and others.
ii. Freedom is dependent upon a triune God – a Father who out of love and desire for the „other‟ creates, a Son (God-man) who redeems, and the Holy Spirit who enlivens and makes freedom possible.
iii. Creativity, which is a result of freedom, is ultimately grounded in creating with God.
iv. Berdiaev‟s view of freedom has as its horizon the coming reality of God‟s kingdom.
So, while Berdiaev does place a substantial emphasis on a „philosophical‟
understanding of the person as an autonomous, self-determining subject whose freedom is attributable, in part, to the Ungrund, his vision of freedom is also dependent upon theological principles for its formulation and development. Therefore, as we discussed in chapter 1, although Berdiaev considers himself to be an existentialist and his work, by extension, to be an existentialist philosophy of freedom and creativity, his vision of freedom is a „theological‟ work as well. This is evident in the fact that Berdiaev‟s view draws significantly from
theology, and his ultimate concern – person, community, and God freely existing in communion – is obviously theological.
It is accepted that Berdiaev would most likely object strenuously to his work being classified as theology since he did not hold theology in high regard.2 Wernham aptly
1 Chapter 2, 2.
2 Berdiaev maintained that “Divinity cannot be rationally determined and remains outside the scope of logical concepts.” FS, 64. Since „Divinity‟ cannot be determined rationally and he believes that most theology is „rationalist and anti-symbolic‟ (FS, 68), theology can never truly understand the Divine. His favorite targets are the theologies of Aquinas, which is „a form of rationalism‟ (FS, 293) and Barth, where Barth‟s „dialectic theology is the dehumanization of Christianity‟. FMW, 31-32. Although Moltmann does not share Berdiaev‟s
134 describes Berdiaev‟s position, noting Berdiaev‟s forthrightness: “I am not a theologian, and my approach to and formulation of these problems are not theological. Rather, I speak with the voice of free religious thought.”3 However, Wernham goes on to rightly question whether Berdiaev‟s protests are enough to prevent his work from being seen as „theology‟. Wernham: “Yet it is not idle to raise the question whether Berdyaev‟s own judgment on the matter can be allowed to stand.”4
Berdiaev was wary of theology not only because he considered it to be „rational‟ but, as Wernham points out, also because Berdiaev was convinced that theology was constrained by the Church, whereas philosophy was a „free‟ enterprise. Theology must answer to the “organized collective, which is invariably the source of orthodoxy”5
and therefore is
hindered, in Berdiaev‟s outlook, from seeking the truth that is revealed to individual persons. This view, which Wernham correctly describes as a “limited and inadequate conception”6 of theology, demonstrates Berdiaev‟s narrow perspective of theology, which we need not accept.
Regardless of Berdiaev‟s biases,7
in a contemporary context his thought does fit within the broad enterprise of what is today considered „theological‟. Whether one considers his work to be religious philosophy, a theology, or some type of hybrid, what is clear is that his vision of freedom is theological.
To assess the theological tenability of his thought we will use the work of Jürgen Moltmann, a theologian who has devoted considerable thought to the issue of freedom, and who has also dialogued with Berdiaev‟s work. In examining Moltmann‟s theology of
freedom we will encounter similarities of thought as well as important differences that will be used to critique Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom. From this critique it will be shown that while Berdiaev‟s existential-mystical approach has discernible flaws, the basic content of his
narrow view of theology, nor Berdiaev‟s interpretation of these theologians, there is some congruence with Berdiaev‟s concern. Early in his career Moltmann observes, “Many believe that Christian theology has become irrelevant. It has become introvert, orthodox, traditionalist, or personalistic. Occupied only with itself, it has lost contact with reality.” RRF, 200. From this critique of contemporary theology, he will propose that there needs to be a “reorganization of the theological system itself and a reorientation of the entire theological endeavor.” RRF, 200. In a more recent work, he writes, “There are theological systems which do not merely aim to be free of contradictions in themselves, but which aspire to remain uncontroverted from outside too. In these systems, theology becomes a strategy of self-immunization.” ET, xx. There is obvious similarity here between the two authors regarding a theology that places a high value on reason and systemization.
3 DR, 177, as quoted in Wernham, Two Russian Thinkers, 3. For Wernham‟s argument on Berdiaev as a theologian see pp. 3-11.
4 Wernham, Two Russian Thinkers, 3. 5 Ibid., 4.
6
Ibid., 10.
7 Berdiaev‟s bias is certainly shaped by his idea of philosophy suffering under the “tortures and persecutions” of religious authorities. See SS, 4-5.
135 thought – what freedom means for God and the person – remains distinctly relevant for theology today.