Sistema Educativo Peruano

Certainly it is true that human creativity always contains, perhaps more than

anywhere else, the most powerful stimulus to hybris, to Prometheanism. Creativity is,

104 at one and the same time, the possibility of man‟s humiliation and sin, and also of his exaltation and glory. 25

Tinsley‟s observation is relevant when considering Berdiaev‟s approach. Arguing for the creative abilities of the human could be seen as a Promethean argument. Yet in Berdiaev‟s thought on the imago Dei we see that his view of creativity is not trying to supplant the Creator, nor does the imago Dei signify mastery or dominion over creation. The imago Dei, for Berdiaev, means that humanity has the potential to create.

So sublime and so beautiful is the divine idea of man that creative freedom, the free power to reveal himself in creative action, is placed within man as a seal and sign of his likeness to God, as a mark of the Creator‟s image.26

Consequently, one characteristic of the imago Dei is the capacity within the person to create.27 Although this conception of the imago Dei is equivocal, Berdiaev interprets the imago to be the person‟s capacity and predisposition for creativity.

The divine-human religion predicates man‟s activity. If God created man in his own image and likeness, and if the Son of God is absolute Man, this means that man as a son of God is predestined to be a free creator, like his Father-Creator. Christ, the Son of God, Saviour and Redeemer, restores man‟s creative powers, which had been undermined and weakened.28

Hence a distinctive property of what it means to be human, according to Berdiaev, is to create. This is reflected in the original Genesis „myth‟, where the human is not only created by God, but is created in God‟s image, i.e., the image of the Creator.29

Based on this understanding, Berdiaev refers to the imago Dei as the „genius‟ within the person.

Creativeness by its very nature implies genius. In his creative aspect man is endowed with genius; it is the image of God the Creator in him. This does not mean that every man has an outstanding talent for painting pictures, writing poems, novels or

philosophical books, ruling the state, or making inventions and discoveries. The presence of genius in man has to do with his inner creativeness and not with the

25 _{E. J. Tinsley, “The Incarnation, Art, and the Communication of the Gospel,” in Art and Religion as} Communication, eds. James Waddell and F. W. Dillistone (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1974), 57. See also Lampert, The New Middle Ages, 48.

26 _{MCA, 99.}

27 _{Berdiaev‟s conception of the imago Dei is a multi-layered concept that has several functions within} his thought. See chapter 4 for how the imago Dei is equated with grace.

28

MCA, 137.

29 _{Cf. John Zizioulas, “We can see this [personhood being equated with the imago Dei] by considering} one of the most important capacities of human personhood, namely creating: man is capable of creating, of bringing things into being.” John Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological

Exploration of Personhood,” Scottish Journal of Theology 28:5 (October 1975), 411. Robert Slesinski traces the Slavophile influence through Berdiaev, among others, to present day theologians such as Zizioulas. Robert F. Slesinski, “Postmodernity and the resources of the Christian East,” Communio 17 (Summer 1990): 220-237.

105 external realization of it. It is a characteristic of human personality as a whole and not a specific gift, and it indicates that man is capable of breaking through to the primary source of his life and that his spiritual activity is truly original and not determined by social influences.30

Berdiaev‟s use of the word „genius‟ is problematic. This is due to the fact that the word „genius‟ is often understood as denoting a distinctive and unique talent or ability. Berdiaev‟s application of the word diffuses this meaning; if everyone is blessed with „genius‟ (as all humans have the imago Dei) then there is nothing exceptional.

Berdiaev seeks to overcome this difficulty by claiming that genius is first and foremost an inner potential. „Inner‟ in this sense connotes the person‟s spiritual abilities. Thus, each individual possesses an „inner genius‟. To distinguish „inner genius‟ from a more traditional understanding of the term „genius‟ (what he refers to as „outer genius‟) he factors in the specific talents or skills of the individual. Thus „inner‟ genius plus talent “makes a man a genius in the usual sense of the term.”31 This concept will become modified as his thought develops. In a later publication he alters the term, proposing the term „geniality‟ as opposed to „genius‟.32

Equating the imago Dei with geniality reflects a tendency already noted in Berdiaev‟s thought, the blurring of terminology concerning core concepts. As already discussed,

Berdiaev equates the imago Dei with grace and theandric freedom.33 The imago Dei now not only encompasses grace and theandric freedom, it also includes geniality. It is accepted that Berdiaev would have been better served if he had exercised greater discipline in delineating these concepts, yet the merit of his thought remains. Berdiaev is not arguing that these terms are interchangeable per se, rather that they are interconnected in such a way that one cannot use one concept without referencing the other.

Because creativity is dependent upon the geniality God has instilled in the person, Berdiaev regards true creativity as „divine-human‟.34

In one sense creativity is divine-human because it is dependent upon the human actively developing the „divine‟ gifts given by God. In a second sense, creativity is divine-human because true creative acts are acts accomplished in union with God, what Berdiaev calls „theurgy‟.35

“True creativeness is theurgy, God-

30 _{DM, 166.} 31

DM, 167.

32 _{SF, 57. See also Vallon, Apostle of Freedom, 248.}

33 _{See chapter 4. Berdiaev: “Grace is not a power acting from without: grace is the revelation of the} divine in man.” RSRC, 44.

34

BE, 178.

35 _{As with his vision of freedom, Berdiaev‟s work on creativity did not develop in a cultural or} intellectual vacuum. Creativity was a prominent topic in the Silver Age, with a number of writers addressing its

106 activity, activity together with God.”36

Consequently, when the person engages in creative activity based on theandric freedom, she reveals the divine nature within herself. This is because creativity, in its highest sense, will only occur in relation to God – a relationship that requires the person to recognize the divine nature (imago Dei) within her.37

For Berdiaev, the person‟s ability to create is a “gift from God”38

that does not elevate the human to equal status with God or replace God with the person as the center of creation (the very thing that Berdiaev faults the later Renaissance period as doing). Rather, the person‟s creative ability and actions follow God‟s design for the person and substantiate the person‟s status as being made in God‟s image and likeness.

So, the following observations may be made concerning the imago Dei and the person‟s creative ability:

i. The imago Dei is central in understanding how the person creates.

ii. The imago Dei is a form of grace, since it is a divine element (an element that cannot be attributed to the natural world) bestowed upon the human.

iii. The imago Dei is not only a form of grace but it also means that the person is predisposed to act in certain ways (to create), and in this way the imago Dei can be said to be a type of „inner genius‟ or geniality.

iv. Theandric freedom is central to his thought since the grace that Christ offers (which illuminates the dimmed imago Dei) and the actuation of geniality (which precipitates creativity) can only occur through the person freely responding to God.

We can thus see that Berdiaev is making a theological assertion regarding the creative act. In his thought, the imago Dei is foundational as to how creativity is possible for the individual. This leads to the Orthodox-influenced position that the beginning point of a theological anthropology should not be the person‟s fallen nature; rather it should begin with the latent qualities of freedom and the imago Dei within the person.39 Consequently, an significance, with „free theurgy‟ being a foundational idea. See Shein, “Solov‟ev‟s Epistemology,” 16. Also, Evtuhov, The Cross and the Sickle, 9.

36 _{MCA, 126.} 37 _{MCA, 99.} 38 _{DR, 213.} 39

DM, 65. John Hick writes, “However, the basic Irenaean conception of man as a creature made initially in the „image‟ of God and gradually being brought through his own free responses into the divine „likeness‟, this creative process being interrupted by the fall and set right again by the incarnation, has continued to operate in the minds of theologians of the Orthodox Church down to the present day. A developmental or teleological view of man is evident, for example, in the work of the Orthodox thinker whose writings are most familiar to the West, Nicholas Berdyaev.” John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 4th _{ed. (Great Britain:}

Macmillan and Co Ltd., 1975), 223-224. Although Berdiaev would reject that his view is teleological, since he believes that teleological arguments impinge upon the person‟s free engagement with the world, he would most likely accept the term „developmental‟. DM, 185. Berdiaev does not make the distinction, common to

Orthodox thought, between the „image‟ and the „likeness‟ of God, but his thought does follow the same trajectory, as Hick correctly points out.

107 individual who believes he is self-sufficient, recognizing nothing greater than himself, and denies the imago Dei, severely impairs his creative ability.40