RESULTADOS PRINCIPALES: 1. Arqueo de Fondos

Facts: The petitioner engaged the services of Lancer to provide reliever services to its business, which

involves the manufacture and sale of commercial and industrial corrugated boxes. According to petitioner, the respondents were engaged for four (4) months from February to June 1998 and their tasks included loading, unloading and segregation of corrugated boxes.

Thereafter, respondents filed complaint against the petitioner and President, Cesar Luz (Luz), for underpayment of wages, non-payment of premium pay for worked rest, overtime pay and non-payment of salary. Upon receipt Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted an inspection of the petitioner‘s premises and found several violations, to wit:

(1) Non-presentation of payrolls and daily time records; (2) Non-submission of annual report of safety organization; (3) Medical and accident/illness reports;

(4) Non-registration of establishment under Rule 1020 of Occupational and Health Standards; and (5) No trained first aide.ll.

Due to the petitioner‘s failure to appear in the summary investigations conducted by the DOLE, an Order was issued on June 18, 2003 finding in favor of the respondents and adopting the computation of the claims submitted. Petitioner and Luz were ordered, among others, to pay respondents their total claims in the amount of Eight Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Three Pesos and 38/100 (P 840,463.38).

106 | P a g e Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that respondents are not its employees but of Lancer and that they pay Lancer in lump sum for the services rendered. The DOLE, however, denied its motion because petitioner failed to support its claim that the respondents are not its employees, and even assuming that they were employed by Lancer, the petitioner still cannot escape liability as Section 13 of the Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997, makes a principal jointly and severally liable with the contractor to contractual employees to the extent of the work performed when the contractor fails to pay its employees wages.

Their appeal to the Secretary of DOLE was dismissed thus, l petitioner and Luz filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).

On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed the Secretary of DOLEs orders, with the modification in that Luz was absolved of any personal liability under the award.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not DOLE has authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship? Whether Superior Packaging Corporation may be held solidarily liable with Lancer Staffing & Services Network, Inc. (Lancer) for respondents unpaid money claims?

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.

The DOLE clearly acted within its authority when it determined the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondents as it falls within the purview of its visitorial and enforcement power under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected.

With regard to the contention that there is no evidence to support the finding that the respondents rendered overtime work and that they worked on their rest day, the resolution of this argument requires a review of the factual findings and the evidence presented, Court said that it is not a trier of facts and it applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence, where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding to Supreme Court. It was the consistent conclusion of the DOLE and the CA that Lancer was not an independent contractor but was engaged in "labor-only contracting"; hence, the petitioner was considered an indirect employer of respondents and liable to the latter for their unpaid money claims.

At the time of the respondents employment in 1998, the applicable regulation was DOLE Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997. Under said Department Order, labor-only contracting was defined as follows: Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shall be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person:

(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials; and

(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.

Labor-only contracting is prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as an

agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

According to the CA, the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of this case point to such conclusion that Lancer was, indeed, a labor-only contractor. Aside from these is the undisputed fact that the petitioner failed to produce any written service contract that might serve as proof of its alleged agreement with Lancer.

Finally, a finding that a contractor is a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and the "labor only" contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer. The former becomes solidarily liable for all the rightful claims of the employees.

107 | P a g e Petitioner therefore, being the principal employer and Lancer, being the labor-only contractor, are solidarily liable for respondents unpaid money claims.

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Wage

Protection

Provisions and

Prohibitions

Regarding

Wages

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63.

Gaa vs. CA

G.R. No. L-44169; December 3, 1985

FACTS: Rosario Gaa is occupying a managerial/ supervisory position in El Grande Hotel. A Notice of

Garnishment upon El Grande Hotel, where petitioner was then employed, garnishing her "salary, commission and/or remuneration." Petitioner then filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion to lift said garnishment on the ground that her "salaries, commission and, or remuneration are exempted from execution under Article 1708 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the renumeration of Gaa are exempted from execution or attachment pursuant to Art. 1708 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

SC held that, ―We do not think that the legislature intended the exemption in Article 1708 of the New Civil Code to operate in favor of any but those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their work is manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any others. Petitioner Rosario A. Gaa is definitely not within thatclass.

64.

Nestle Phils. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 85197 March 18, 1991

FACTS: The private respondents were employed by the petitioner either as sales representatives or

medical representatives. By reason of the nature of their work they were each allowed to avail of the company's car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. All of the private respondents availed of the petitioner's car loan policy.

Respondents were dismissed from service because of their participation in the strike/ certain irregularities. As such, they filed a case of illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In the Notices of Dismissal, they were asked by the Company to settle the accounts payable of their car loans or return the car for proper disposition. The Company filed a civil suit to recover possession of the cars. Private respondents sought a temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortizations pending the final resolution of their appeals in the illegal dismissal case. NLRC granted the TRO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NLRC is correct in granting the TRO in favor of the respondents pending the case of illegal dismissal.

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RULING:

Nestlé's demand for payment of the private respondents' amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor- creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

65.

Five J Taxi vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FACTS: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi

drivers. Aside from the daily "boundary", they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the car wash payment is an illegal deduction as contemplated in the Labor Code.

RULING:

SC held that the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law. Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00.Car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

66.

Phil. Veterans Bank vs. NLRC G.R. No. 130439 October 26, 1999

FACTS: Due to financial losses, the Philippine Veterans Bank was placed in receivership pursuant to the

order of the Central Bank of the Philippines. Consequently, its employees, including private respondent Dr. Jose Teodorico V. Molina, were terminated from work and given their respective separation pay and other benefits. Dr. Molina filed a complaint before NLRC. He demanded the implementation of the Wage Orders No. 1 and 2. Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC granted the petition of Molina.

111 | P a g e Whether or not Molina is entitled to the increase of his salary pursuant to Wage Orders No. 1 and 2.

RULING:

SC held that Molina‘s salary is within the coverage of the said wage orders. W.O. 1 expressly states that employees having a monthly salary of not more than P3,802.08 are entitled to receive the mandated wage increase. Undeniably, MOLINA was receiving a monthly salary of P3,754.60. This fact alone leaves no doubt that he should benefit from said wage order. On the other hand, W.O. 2 raised the ceiling for entitlement to the wage increase. If MOLINA was covered by the earlier wage order, with more reason should the later wage order apply to him.

67.

Philippine Appliances Corp. vs. CA G.R. No. 149434; June 3, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing refrigerators,

freezers and washing machines. Respondent United Philacor Workers Union-NAFLU is the duly elected collective bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner. During the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner and respondent union in 1997 (for the last two years of the collective bargaining agreement covering the period of July 1, 1997 to August 31, 1999), petitioner offered the amount of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) to each employee as an "early conclusion bonus". Upon conclusion of the CBA negotiations, petitioner accordingly gave this early signing bonus. After the expiration of the CBA, both parties negotiated for a new CBA. However, it resulted to a deadlock. The respondent union filed before the NCMB a notice of strike due to bargaining deadlock. The Department of Labor and Employment took cognizance of the case and ordered, among other things, herein petitioner to award signing bonus. Petitioner argued that the award of the signing bonus was patently erroneous since it was not part of the employees‘ salaries or benefits or of the collective bargaining agreement. It is not demandable or enforceable since it is in the nature of an incentive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award of a signing bonus by the Secretary of Labor is correct.

RULING:

SC held that the signing bonus must not be awarded.

The CBA negotiation between petitioner and respondent union failed notwithstanding the intervention of the NCMB. Respondent union went on strike for eleven days and blocked the ingress to and egress from petitioner‘s two work plants. The labor dispute had to be referred to the Secretary of Labor and Employment because neither of the parties was willing to compromise their respective positions regarding the four remaining items which stood unresolved. While we do not fault any one party for the failure of the negotiations, it is apparent that there was no more goodwill between the parties and that the CBA was clearly not signed through their mutual efforts alone. Hence, the payment of the signing bonus is no longer justified and to order such payment would be unfair and unreasonable for petitioner.

Furthermore, we have consistently ruled that a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation.

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AGABON VS NLRC