RESULTADOS PRINCIPLAES

Facts Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in

the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.[5] _{It built and opened Victoria Court in}

Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.[6] _{On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary}

Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order[7] _{(RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as}

defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.[8]

Enacted by the City Council[9] _{on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993,}

49 | P a g e AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA- MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors 2. Massage Parlors 3. Karaoke Bars 4. Beerhouses 5. Night Clubs 6. Day Clubs 7. Super Clubs 8. Discotheques 9. Cabarets 10. Dance Halls 11. Motels 12. Inns

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC‘s Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for ―amusement‖ or ―entertainment‖ and they were not ―services or facilities for entertainment,‖ nor did they use women as ―tools for entertainment,‖ and neither did they ―disturb the community,‖ ―annoy the inhabitants‖ or ―adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.‖

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power. Ruling :It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable

regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community‘s social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses ―allowed‖ under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person‘s fundamental right to liberty and property.

Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes.

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel‘s premises¾be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.[72] _{Adults have a right to}

50 | P a g e dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice.[73] _{Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their}

conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom¾it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

30.

Star Paper Corp., vs. Simbol G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

Facts:Petitioner Star Paper Corporation is a corporation engaged in trading – principally of paper products.

Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. Respondents Simbol, Comia and Estrella are regular employees of the company. Simbol met Alma, Comia met Howard and Estrella got pregnant by Zunga. All of their partners are employed on the same company. Prior to the marriage of each respective couple, Ongsitco advised each of them that should they decide to get married, one of either partner should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Thus, Simbol, Comia and Estrella resigned. Respondents signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement which states that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature.

However, the respondents, thereafter, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attornery‘s fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Art. 136 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner, on the other hand, claims it does not violate Art 136 as it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for relatives- within-the-third-degree policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of management.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint claiming that such company policy was a management prerogative. On appeal to the NLRC, the commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its appeal via petition for Certiorari, CA reversed the NLRC decision stating that the dismissal of respondents were illegal.

Issue: Whether the 1995 policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company

violates the rights of the employees under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is it a valid exercise of management prerogative?

Ruling: The finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an employer's no-spouse rule, the

exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

51 | P a g e Though it is noted that the questioned policy may not facially violate Art. 136 of the Labor Code but it create a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect.

Thus, in the case at bar, there is no reasonable business necessity due to petitioner‘s failure to present undisputed marital discrimination. Thus, the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative

AFFIRMED.

Other Related Provisions:

Two types of employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).

In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No- spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class

31.

Del Monte Phils vs. Velasco G.R. No. 153477, March 6, 2007

Facts: Lolita Velasco was hired by Del Monte as seasonal employee and was subsequently regularized

by Del Monte. On June 1987, petitioner warned Velasco of its absences and was repeatedly reminded that her absence without permission may result to forfeiture of her vacation leave.

Another warning was sent due to her absences without permission which eventually led to the forfeiture of her vacation entitlement. On September 1994, a notice of hearing was sent to Velasco informing her of the charges filed against her for violating the Absence without leave rule. On January 1995, after the hearing, Del Monte terminated the services of Velasco due to excessive absence without leave. Feeling aggrieved, Velasco filed a case for illegal dismissal. She asserted that she was absent since she was suffering urinary tract infection and she was pregnant.

She sent an application for leave to the supervisor. Upon check up of the company doctor, Velasco was advised to rest. On the following check-ups, she was again advised to rest where this time, she was not able to get secure a leave.

The Labor Arbiter rendered decision that she was an incorrigible absentee. Respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC vacated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It decided that respondent was illegally dismissed and was entitled to reinstatement. Petitioner appealed to CA where it dismissed its claim and affirmed NLRC. Thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal was illegal?

Ruling: Yes. In this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is controlling is the finding of the

NLRC and the CA that respondent was pregnant and suffered from related ailments. It would be unreasonable to isolate such condition strictly to the dates stated in the Medical Certificate or the Discharge Summary. It can be safely assumed that the absences that are not covered by, but which nonetheless

52 | P a g e approximate, the dates stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate, are due to the continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and, hence, are justified absences.

The termination was illegal since it comes within the purview of the prohibited acts provided in Article 137 of the Labor Code. Based on Art. 137, it shall be unlawful for any employer (1) to deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code; (2) to discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, or while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy; and (3) to discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her work for fear that she may again be pregnant. The respondent was illegally dismissed by the petitioner on account of her pregnancy. The act of the employer is unlawful, it being contrary to law.

32.

Yrasuegui vs. Phil Air Lines G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

Petitioner Yrasuegui, an international flight steward of Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL), was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

In consequence thereof, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL before the Labor Arbiter(LA) contending that his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; that the continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and that he was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. It also issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of the petitioner without loss of seniority and other benefits, and also the payment of backwages.

Respondent PAL appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the LA‘s decision. Respondent PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the NLRC case. Facts:

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the petitioner valid.

Ruling: The Court upheld the legality of the petitioner‘s dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:

53 | P a g e x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere ―orders‖ of the employer; they were the ―prescribed weights‖ that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for

and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that

establish continuing qualifications for an employee‘s position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer‘s qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) – the ―other causes analogous to the foregoing.‖

By its nature, these ―qualifying standards‖ are norms that apply prior to and

after an employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the

standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after

hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in

order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer ―qualifies‖ for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner‘s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that ―[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.

True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him ―a lot of expenses. However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL. He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.

The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282 (e) of the Labor Code. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary.

Art 82. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following

causes.

a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

―Voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Art. 282, whether they be in nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Art. 282 (a), (c), and (d).

54 | P a g e II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).

In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise.

A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its