RESULTADOS PRINCIPALES: + Niveles de captura

DEMANDED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT BY THE RESPONDENT UNDER THE 1999 CBA, in that:

a) Issue not averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; and

b) The Rules of Statutory Construction, in relation to Article 1370 and 1374 of the New Civil Code, as well as Section 11 of the Rules of Court, requires that contract must be read in its entirety and the various stipulations in a contract must be read together to give effect to all.

II. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INCREASES PROVIDED FOR UNDER WAGE ORDER NO. 8 CANNOT BE DEMANDED BY THE RESPONDENT UNION AS A MATTER OF PRACTICE.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. We rule that petitioner is not obliged to grant the wage increase under Wage Order No. NCR-08 either by virtue of the CBA, or as a matter of company practice.

On the procedural issue, well-settled is the rule, also applicable in labor cases, that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by the reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule. We now come to the core of this case. Is [petitioner] under an obligation to grant wage increase to its workers under W.O. No. NCR-08 as a matter of practice? It is submitted that employers (unless exempt) in

73 | P a g e Metro Manila (including the [petitioner]) are mandated to implement the said wage order but limited to those entitled thereto. There is no legal basis to implement the same across-the-board. A perusal of the record shows that the lowest paid employee before the implementation of Wage Order #8 is P250.00/day and none was receiving belowP223.50 minimum. This could only mean that the union can no longer demand for any wage distortion adjustment. Neither could they insist for an adjustment of P26.50 increase under Wage Order #8. The provision of wage order #8 and its implementing rules are very clear as to who are entitled to the P26.50/day increase, i.e., "private sector workers and employees in the National Capital Region receiving the prescribed daily minimum wage rate ofP223.50 shall receive an increase of Twenty-Six Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P26.50) per day," and since the lowest paid is P250.00/day the company is not obliged to adjust the wages of the workers.

With the above narration of facts and with the union not having effectively controverted the same, we find no merit to the complainant‘s assertion of such a company practice in the grant of wage order increase applied across-the-board. The fact that it was shown the increases granted under the Wage Orders were obtained thru request and negotiations because of the existence of wage distortion and not as company practice as what the union would want.

Neither do we find merit in the argument that under the CBA, such increase should be implemented across- the-board. The provision in the CBA that "Any Wage Order to be implemented by the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board shall be in addition to the wage increase adverted above" cannot be interpreted in support of an across-the-board increase. If such were the intentions of this provision, then the company could have simply accepted the original demand of the union for such across-the-board implementation, as set forth in their original proposal (Annex "2" union[‗]s counsel proposal). The fact that the company rejected this proposal can only mean that it was never its intention to agree, to such across- the-board implementation. Thus, the union will have to be contented with the increase of P30.00 under the CBA which is due on July 31, 2001 barely a month from now.

We agree with petitioner‘s contention that the rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a written agreement, does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties. Such evidence may be received regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement. As the Court ruled in United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union, et al. v. Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc.:

A CBA is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. It covers the whole employment relationship and prescribes the rights and duties of the parties. It is a system of industrial self-government with the grievance machinery at the very heart of the system. The parties solve their problems by molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties.

If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. However, if, in a CBA, the parties stipulate that the hirees must be presumed of employment qualification standards but fail to state such qualification standards in said CBA, the VA may resort to evidence extrinsic of the CBA to determine the full agreement intended by the parties. When a CBA may be expected to speak on a matter, but does not, its sentence imports ambiguity on that subject. The VA is not merely to rely on the cold and cryptic words on the face of the CBA but is mandated to discover the intention of the parties. Recognizing the inability of the parties to anticipate or address all future problems, gaps may be left to be filled in by reference to the practices of the industry, and the step which is equally a part of the CBA although not expressed in it. In order to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. The VA

74 | P a g e may also consider and rely upon negotiating and contractual history of the parties, evidence of past practices interpreting ambiguous provisions. The VA has to examine such practices to determine the scope of their agreement, as where the provision of the CBA has been loosely formulated. Moreover, the CBA must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically and the Court must place a practical and realistic construction upon it.

However, just like any other fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of conduct must be proved..

In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances. It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations.

As petitioner explains, a wage distortion occurred as a result of granting the increase to those employees who were receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage. The wage distortion necessitated the upward adjustment of the salaries of the other employees and not because it was a matter of company practice or usage. The situation of the employees before Wage Order No. NCR-08, however, was different. Not one of the members of respondent Union was then receiving less than P250.00 per day, the minimum wage requirement in said wage order.

Moreover, to ripen into a company practice that is demandable as a matter of right, the giving of the increase should not be by reason of a strict legal or contractual obligation, but by reason of an act of liberality on the part of the employer. Hence, even if the company continuously grants a wage increase as mandated by a wage order or pursuant to a CBA, the same would not automatically ripen into a company practice. In this case, petitioner granted the increase under Wage Order No. NCR-07 on its belief that it was obliged to do so under the CBA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 65171 and Resolution dated January 11, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

45.

Metropolitan Bank vs. NWPC G.R. No. 144322; February 6, 2007

FACTS: On October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, Region II,

Tuguegarao, Cagayan (RTWPB), by virtue of Republic Act No. 6727 (R.A. No. 6727), otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act, issued Wage Order No. R02-03 (Wage Order), as follows: Section 1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all employees/workers in the private sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of employment are granted an across-the-board increase of P15.00 daily.

The Wage Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December 2, 1995 and took effect on January 1, 1996. Its Implementing Rules were approved on February 14, 1996. Per Section 13 of the Wage Order, any party aggrieved by the Wage Order may file an appeal with the National Wages

75 | P a g e and Productivity Commission (NWPC) through the RTWPB within 10 calendar days from the publication of the Wage Order.

Banker‘s Council in a letter inquiry to NWPC requested for ruling to seek exemption from coverage of the wage order since the members bank are paying more than the regular wage. NWPC replied that the member banks are covered by the wage order and does not fall with the exemptible categories.

In another letter inquiry, Metrobank asked for the interpretation of the applicability of the wage order. NWPC referred it to RTWPB. RTWPB in return clarified that establishments in Region 2 are covered by the wage order. Petitioner filed a petition with the CA and denied the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wage order is void thus it has no legal effect and the RTWPB acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

The Court finds that Section 1, Wage Order No. R02-03 is void insofar as it grants a wage increase to employees earning more than the minimum wage rate; and pursuant to the separability clause of the Wage Order, Section 1 is declared valid with respect to employees earning the prevailing minimum wage rate.

The powers of NWPC are enumerated in ART. 121. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: (d) To review regional wage levels set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to determine if these are in accordance with prescribed guidelines and national development plans; (f) To review plans and programs of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to determine whether these are consistent with national development plans; (g) To exercise technical and administrative supervision over the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards.

R.A. No. 6727 declared it a policy of the State to rationalize the fixing of minimum wages and to promote productivity-improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of production; to enhance employment generation in the countryside through industrial dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and growth.

In line with its declared policy, R.A. No. 6727 created the NWPC, vested with the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional, provincial or industry levels; and authorized the RTWPB to determine and fix the minimum wage rates applicable in their respective regions, provinces, or industries therein and issue the corresponding wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC. Pursuant to its wage fixing authority, the RTWPB may issue wage orders which set the daily minimum wage rates, based on the standards or criteria set by Article 124 of the Labor Code.

The Court declared that there are two ways of fixing the minimum wage: the "floor-wage" method and the "salary-ceiling" method. The "floor-wage" method involves the fixing of a determinate amount to be added to the prevailing statutory minimum wage rates. On the other hand, in the "salary-ceiling" method, the wage adjustment was to be applied to employees receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling. In other words, workers already being paid more than the existing minimum wage (up to a certain amount stated in the Wage Order) are also to be given a wage increase.

76 | P a g e In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage rate by the "floor-wage method" or the "salary-ceiling method" in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range to which a wage adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-the-board wage increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the coverage of the Wage Order to wage earners receiving more than the prevailing minimum wage rate, without a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Wage Order granted additional benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.

46.

Equitable Bank vs. Sadac

G.R. No. 164772; June 8, 2006

FACTS: Ricardo Sadac was appointed Vice President of the Legal Department of petitioner Bank effective 1

August 1981, and subsequently General Counsel thereof on 8 December 1981. On June 1989, nine lawyers of petitioner Bank‘s Legal Department, in a letter-petition to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, accused respondent Sadac of abusive conduct and ultimately, petitioned for a change in leadership of the department. On the ground of lack of confidence in Sadac, under the rules of client and lawyer relationship, petitioner Bank instructed respondent Sadac to deliver all materials in his custody in all cases in which the latter was appearing as its counsel of record. In reaction thereto, Sadac requested for a full hearing and formal investigation but the same remained unheeded. On 9 November 1989, respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against petitioner Bank and individual members of the Board of Directors thereof. After learning of the filing of the complaint, petitioner Bank terminated the services of respondent Sadac. Finally, on 10 August 1989, Sadac was removed from his office

Labor Arbiter rendered decision that Sadac‘s termination was illegal and entitled to reinstatement and payment of full back wages. NLRC affirmed the decision upon appeal by the Bank. Sadac filed for execution of judgment where it gave its computation which amounted to P 6.03 M representing his back wages and the increases he should have received during the time he was illegally dismissed. The Bank opposed to Sadac‘s computation. The Labor Arbiter favor Sadac‘s computation. NLRC, upon appeal by the bank, reversed the decision. CA reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the computation of back wages shall include the general increases.

RULING:

To resolve the issue, the court revisits its pronouncements on the interpretation of the term backwages. Backwages in general are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal. It is not private compensation or damages but is awarded in furtherance and effectuation of the public objective of the Labor Code. Nor is it a redress of a private right but rather in the nature of a command to the employer to make public reparation for dismissing an employee either due to the former‘s unlawful act or bad faith.

In the case of Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission, It said that the Court deems it appropriate to reconsider such earlier ruling on the computation of back wages by now holding that conformably with the evident legislative intent as expressed in Rep. Act No. 6715, back wages to be

77 | P a g e awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal.

There is no vested right to salary increases. Sadac may have received salary increases in the past only proves fact of receipt but does not establish a degree of assuredness that is inherent in backwages. The conclusion is that Sadac‘s computation of his full backwages which includes his prospective salary increases cannot be permitted.

47.

S.I.P FOOD HOUSE ET. AL VS. BATOLINA