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The Australian government has been in the vanguard of calls for Japan to play a larger role on regional security issues. These calls reflect a belief that Japan's central role in the global economy should be supplemented by a greater political role in maintaining stability and influencing strategic issues. So far, these calls have been ambiguous on the exact role Japan should play, although former Prime Minister Hawke did suggest that Australia would accept and "understand any decision by

Japan to do more" . 1

They have also occurred as the postwar security architecture underwritten by the US has been called into question due to the end of the Cold War, US economic problems and the prospect of a US strategic retrenchment of some sort. This changing strategic picture, plus the diminution of regional and domestic constraints, have resulted in the recent development of an embryonic defence relationship between Australia and Japan.

In terms of the current trends in Japanese security policy, Japan is unlikely to develop a more assertive military posture, and future defence contacts between Australia and Japan will display continuity rather than dramatic growth. However, different conclusions are reached when the future of Japanese security policy is assessed against the post-Cold security architecture of the Asia-Pacific.

Paradoxically, of the three visions of the future Asia- Pacific security order, only that which is most inimical to Australia's overall security interests - characterised as "Bleak Horizons" - offers the possibility to greatly expand bilateral "defence" contacts between Australia and Japan. This is so as it is the only scenario which posits an expanded military role for Japan. If this occurred concurrent with a US withdrawal into isolationism, then Australian security planners could perceive it as vital to engage Japan in some form of security pact. The alternative to an alliance-based defence, namely a continental defence might be viable in strictly military

Former Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, in response to a Question without Notice, in the House of Representatives, 10 October, 1990.

terms, but it would not provide Australia's political and economic diplomacy with the bargaining leverage claimed by alliance advocates. Japan might appear as the latest of Australia's "great and powerful friends".

However, the prospect for a closer defence relationship would not offset the manifold risks to Australia posed by arms racing between regional countries only recently divided by the Cold War. Nor would it compensate for the collateral damage to the liberal trading regime as a US- Japan trade crisis, or US dominated trade bloc engaged in "economic war-fighting" with a Japanese-dominated Asia trade bloc, created a new protectionist environment. What is more, in such a volatile environment, Japanese defence planners may seek to concentrate on their immediate sphere of interest, Northeast Asia, avoiding any arrangement which might upset Southeast Asian fears of Japan. Any Australian overtures of closer defence ties with Japan might not only come to naught, they could also backfire on Australia's regional interests.

The "status quo" vision with the potential for increased Japanese involvement in peace-keeping, and in limited maritime confidence and security building measures such as maritime surveillance, could offer opportunity for increased defence contact. However, as with the pessimistic scenario outlined above, Australia would need to carefully balance any interest in developing further contact with Japan against other regional relationships. While there has been acceptance in the region of Japan's increased role in Asia-Pacific security, this does not extend - nor is it likely to do so - to the development by Japan of an independent, offensively configured, defence posture. To the extent Japan remains a defensively orientated, major economic power, Australia and Japan could only expand defence contacts on a narrow functional basis taking regional sensitivities into account.

It is the neo-liberal vision which offers the greatest relative potential for expansion of the overall Australia- Japan relationship. With its growing emphasis on economic, as opposed to military, dimensions of security, and

development of multilateral regional security

institutions, it would offer more scope for

multidimensional security cooperation. Indeed the multilateral framework, by locking Japan into a regional "grid", could enable Australia to undertake enhanced

"security" cooperation with Japan without upsetting either regional or domestic sentiment. This would conform to the historically economic driven nature of the relationship.

The conclusion to be reached from the above is that any security perspective on what Australia sees as a desirable role for Japan must take into account regional perspectives of what role Japan should play. Memories of Japan's past excesses still colour perpsectives of Japan in the region. These concerns have in the past been assuaged by the US-Japan relationship. Now that this relationship is appearing increasingly fragile, efforts need to be made towards creating some other sort of structure which would take account of Japan's new influence and regional concerns in case the US-Japan relationship were to unravel. In turn, Japan's own security concerns would need to be catered for. The region itself would have to take seriously the option of "non­ offensive" force structures - an option that would not only reinforce Japan's security posture but might provide an element of "crisis stability" for the region as a whole. This all suggests that Australian policy makers need to address the "Japan issue" not on a bilateral basis, but in the broader context of a region-wide policy.

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