Apart from pride, dignity, tact, respect and (self-)esteem, the concept of honour is the one most often referred to in face-related discussions. Honour is the concept most often identified with face.
[...] notions of face naturally link up to some of the most fundamental cultural ideas about the nature of the social persona, honour and virtue, shame and redemption [...] (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 13).
The close connection between the two concepts becomes clear if one compares their dictionary definitions. Honour is defined as:
•
(honour) high respect, esteem, or reverence, accorded to exalted worth or rank, deferential admiration or approbation, [or as] received, gained, held, or enjoyed: glory, renown, fame, credit, reputation, good name (OED),•
(honor) poczucie godności osobistej, dobre imię, cześć (feeling of personal dignity, good name, reverence); plural only: dostojeństwa, godności, odznaczenia (high position, rank, distinctions); plural only: oznaki czci, poważania, szacunku (indications of reverence, high regard, respect) (SJP). Face in its social sense is defined as:•
(face) good name, reputation (OED),•
(twarz) szacunek (respect) (SJP),•
(twarz) dobre imię, szacunek ludzki (good name, human respect) (Kopaliński, 1987).As can be seen above, the two concepts honour and face have a lot in common. Both concepts are defined in part as good name, reputation and respect (which can be gained by moral conduct). The words honour and face in English, and
honor and twarz in Polish, are partial synonyms. For example, in Polish it is
possible to say stracić honor (lose honour) or uratować honor (save honour) instead of saying stracić or zachować/uratować twarz (to lose or save face).
Renée Hirschon (2001) reaches similar conclusions when he analyses the character of social life and politeness in Greek culture. He claims that face and honour are cognate concepts. He discusses two interpretations of the concept of honour. The first refers to a person’s reputation, prestige and esteem, the second to a person’s intrinsic worth and moral integrity. In the first case it is an attribute which belongs to social life, while in the second case it is a moral attribute, “inherent in a person’s notion of self” (Hirschon, 2001: 20). These are the same attributes and values constitutive of the notion of face.
Harald Weinrich, in the essay “Politeness, an affair of honor” (2005), tries to find some relation between honour and politeness. According to him, honour “expresses the high opinion held by others (to the extent that they themselves are possessed of honor) of the absolute value of the honorable man’s personal worth,” whereas politeness serves “to accommodate others, to be as pleasant as possible to them so as actually to please them” (Weinrich, 2005: 109). The code of honour is more rigid than the code of politeness, which consists of subtleties and nuances. Weinrich mentions a social strategy of avoidance employed to prevent insult and loss of honour. And this is “the special task of politeness,” claims Weinrich, quoting Claude Chauchadis (1990). Thus, politeness involves avoidance (cf. Brown and Levinson’s (1987) concept of negative politeness; see Section 5.3.1.1.). Weinrich claims that the
honour code is masculine and the politeness code is feminine. He explains this in the following way:
At the center of the honor code is masculine honor, which must be defended with weapon in hand against every insult [...]. Women’s honor, which differs in many respects from men’s, depends in the last analysis upon it, since a woman who loses her virginity or a woman who violates the commandment of faithfulness in marriage brings more disgrace to the male members of her family than to herself [...]. To that extent, by the rules of this code, feminine honor is only a pendant to masculine honor. [...] The reverse is true with regard to gender and politeness, which in Europe [...] has taken a specifically feminine turn, in the form of courtesy. [...] At the center of this conduct stands the conversation, a gay and witty form of linguistic intercourse (2005: 111—112).
The division into men’s and women’s honour is also noted by Hirschon (2001), who maintains that there are different constituents of honour for men and women. Men’s honour is connected with upholding the reputation of the family and protecting it from insult; men are expected to be brave and assertive. Women’s honour is associated with shame, entailing modesty and chaste behaviour.
Honour is said to be located in the human body (Weinrich, 2005: 112):
Everything that attacks honor touches the body, and in this sense “touches on honor,” like a slap in the face but also an insulting word that makes the face redden with anger, and correspondingly all affairs of honor ultimately concern “body and soul.”
The honour code depends on this fundamental corporeality. The norms of politeness also have corporeal elements as they require that polite people control their “creatureliness” (Weinrich, 2005: 112). The corporeality of face is even more evident, due to the bodily origin of the concept. Besides, it encompasses the two areas; to maintain face people are obliged to comply with both the honour code and the norms of politeness. Face is gender-neutral and is inclusive of both types of honour. Face concerns go far beyond the honour concerns mentioned above. Apart from men’s and women’s honour concerns, they include the need for dignity, respect and esteem, the need to be treated tactfully and the need for justified pride and self-esteem.