CAPITAL 100. Capital suscrito

cause either. The reason of truths lies in the ideas of things, which are involved in the divine essence itself. And who would dare to say that the truth of God's existence depends upon the divine will?

C O M M E N T A R Y

Overall, Leibniz's Monadology thus rehearses three arguments for the ex- istence of God: ( 1 ) the currently contemplated ontological argument as modi- fied by his own special proviso concerning possibility, (2) the aforementioned argument from eternal truths (compare sec. 43), which he regards as an impor- tant innovation, and (3) the cosmological argument (compare sec. 38), to which he assigned a subsidiary status because of its a posteriori character. The pos- sibility proviso of (1) hinges on the fact that in Leibniz's view simple, un- analyzable perfection-predicates (being knowledgeable or good, say)—unlike standard predicates (being round or square)—are bound to be compatible with one another, since they represent "positive and absolute" qualities. An impor- tant role is played in Leibniz's thought by the idea that if [per impossibile) the necessary existent did not exist, then nothing else could exist either—and in- deed nothing would even be possible (compare sec. 43).

KEY W O R D S :

God/Dieu

the Necessary Being/i 'être nécessaire possibility /possibilité

contingent beings/êtres contingents

limit/borne

negation/'négation

contradiction/contradiction

a prioria posteriori

existence/'existence

eternal truths/Verités éternelles

final reason/raison dernière (ou suffisante)

SECTION 46

46. However, we must not imagine, as some do, that the eternal truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend upon his will, as Descartes seems to have held, and Monsieur Poiret after him. That is true only of contingent truths, whose principle is fitness or the choice of the best. Instead, the neces- sary truths depend solely on God's understanding, and are its internal object. (See Theodicy, sees. 180-84,185, 335, 351, 380.)

46. Cependant, Une faut point s'imaginer avec quelques-uns, que les vérités éternelles, étant dépendantes de Dieu, sont arbitraires et dependent de sa vo- lonté, comme Des-Cartes paroist l'avoir pris et puis Monsieur Poiret. Cela n 'est veritable que des Vérités contingentes, dont le principe est la convenance ou le choix du meilleur: au lieu que les Vérités nécessaires dépendent uniquement

de son entendement, et en sont l'objet interne. fThéodicée, secs, 180-84, J#5,

335, 351, 380.)

{Theodicy, sec. 180.) I find also that M. Bayle combats admirably the opinion

of those who assert that goodness and justice depend solely upon the arbitrary choice of God; who suppose, moreover, that if God had been determined by the goodness of things themselves to act, he would be entirely subjected to neces- sity in his actions, a state incompatible with freedom. That is confusing me- taphysical necessity with moral necessity. . . . [Moreover] it opens the door to the most exaggerated Pyrrhonism: for it leads to the assertion that this prop- osition, three and three makes six, is only true where and during the time when it pleases God; that it is perhaps false in some parts of the universe; and that perhaps it will be so among men in the coming year.

[Theodicy, sec. 181) To say that God, having resolved to create man just as

he is, could not but have required of him piety, sobriety, justice and chastity, because it is impossible that the disorders capable of overthrowing or disturbing his work can please him, that is to revert in effect to the common opinion. Virtues are virtues only because they serve perfection or prevent the imperfec- tion of those who are virtuous, or even of those who have to do with them. And they have that power by their nature and by the nature of rational creatures, before God decrees to create them. To hold a different opinion would be as if someone were to say that the rules of proportion and harmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because they occur in music only when one has re- solved to sing or to play some instrument. But that is exactly what is meant by being essential to good music: for those rules belong to it already in the ideal state, even when none yet thinks of singing, since it is known that they must of necessity belong to it as soon as one shall sing. In the same way virtues belong to the ideal state of the rational creature before God decrees to create it; and it is for that very reason we maintain that virtues are good by their nature.

{Theodicy, sec. 182.) <Some theologians> exempt the will of God from any

kind of reason: ubi stat pio ratione voluntas. But, as I have observed already on various occasions, Calvin himself acknowledged that the decrees of God are in conformity with justice and wisdom, although the reasons that might prove this conformity in detail are unknown to us.

{Theodicy, sec. 183.) God saw from all eternity and in all necessity the es-

sential relations of numbers, and the identity of the subject and predicate in the propositions that contain the essence of each thing. He saw likewise that the term just is included in these propositions: to esteem what is estimable, be grateful to one's benefactor, fulfil the conditions of a contract, and so on, with many others relating to morals. One is therefore justified in saying that the precepts of natural law assume the reasonableness and justice of that which is enjoined, and that it would be man's duty to practice what they contain even though God should have been so indulgent as to ordain nothing in that respect. Pray observe that in going back with our visionary thoughts to that ideal mo- ment when God has yet decreed nothing, we find in the ideas of God the prin- ciples of morals under terms that imply an obligation. We understand these maxims as certain, and derived from the eternal and immutable order: it be- seems the rational creature to conform to reason; a rational creature conform- ing to reason is to be commended, but not conforming thereto is blameworthy.