MEMORIA ABREVIADA

piness and goodness in created things which the universe could allow. For as all possible things have a claim to existence in God's understanding in pro- portion to their perfections, the result of all these claims m u s t be the most perfect actual world which is possible.

(PNG, sec. n . ) The supreme wisdom of God has made h i m choose especially those laws of motion which are best adjusted and most fitted to abstract or metaphysical reasons. There is conserved the same quantity of total and ab- solute force or of action, also the same directive force. Furthermore, action is always equal to reaction, and the entire effect is always equal to its full cause. It is surprising that no reason can be given for the laws of motion which have been discovered in our own time, and part of which I myself have discovered, by a consideration of efficient causes or of matter alone. For I have found that we m u s t have recourse to final causes and that these laws do not depend upon the principle of necessity, as do the truths of logic, arithmetic, and geometry, but upon the principle of fitnesss, that is to say, upon the wisdom.

(DM, sec. 6.) God has chosen < t o create> that world which is the most perfect, that is to say, which is at the same time the simplest in its hypotheses <i.e., its laws> and the richest in phenomena.

(DM, sec. 13.) The demonstration of this predicate of Caesar < t h a t he re- solved to cross the Rubicon> is not as absolute as those of numbers or of ge- ometry, but presupposes the series of things which God has chosen freely, and which is founded on the first free decree of God, namely, to do always what is most perfect, in regard to h u m a n nature, which is that m a n will always do (though freely) what appears best. N o w every truth which is founded on decrees of this kind is contingent, although it is certain. . . . All contingent propositions have reasons for being as they are rather than otherwise, or (what is the same thing) they have a priori proofs of their truth, which render t h e m certain, and show that the relation between subject and predicate of these prepositions has its foundation in the nature of the one and the other. But they do not have demonstrations of necessity, since these reasons are only founded on the prin- ciple of contingency, or of the existence of things, i.e. on what is or appears the best among several equally possible things.

(DM, sec. 31. ) In regard to that great and ultimate question why it has pleased God to choose h i m among so great a number of possible persons, it is surely unreasonable to demand more than the general reasons which we have given. The reasons in detail surpass our ken. Therefore, instead of postulating an ab- solute decree, which being without reason would be unreasonable, and instead of postulating reasons which do not succeed in solving the difficulties and in turn have need themselves of reasons, it will be best to say with St. Paul that there are for God's choice certain great reasons of wisdom and congruity which he follows, which reasons, however, are u n k n o w n to mortals and are founded upon the general order, whose goal is the greatest perfection of the world.

(G III, 582; to Bourguet [1715].) Two hypotheses can be formed—one that nature is always equally perfect, the other that it always increases in perfection. If it is always equally perfect, though in variable ways, it is more probable that it had no beginning. But if it always increases in perfection (assuming that it is impossible to give it its whole perfection at once), there would still be two ways of explaining the matter, namely < w i t h or without a beginning>. . . . I

do not yet see any way of demonstrating by pure reason which of these we should choose. But though the state of the world could never be absolutely perfect at any particular instant whatever according to the hypothesis of in- crease, nevertheless the whole actual sequence would always be the most per- fect of all possible sequences, because God always chooses the best possible. (G VII, 303; Loemker, p. 487; Ariew & Garber, pp. 150-51; "On the Radical

Origination of Things" [1697].) To explain a little more distinctly, however, how temporal, contingent, or physical truths arise out of truths that are eternal and essential, or if you like, metaphysical, we should first acknowledge that from the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, there is a certain urgency [exigentia] toward existence in possible things or in possibility or es- sence itself—a pre-tension to exist, so to speak—in a word, that essence in itself tends to exist. From this follows further that all possible things, or things ex- pressing an essence or possible reality, are real to the degree of perfection which they have; for perfection is nothing but quantity of essence. Hence it is very clearly understood that out of the infinite combinations and series of possible things, one exists through which the greatest amount of essence or possibility is brought into existence. There is always a principle of determination in nature which must be sought by maxima and minima; namely, that a maximum effect should be achieved with a minimum outlay, so to speak. And at this point time and place, or in a word, the receptivity or capacity to the world, can be taken for the outlay, or the terrain on which a building is to be erected as commo- diously as possible, the variety of forms corresponding to the spaciousness of the building and the number and elegance of its chambers. The case is like that of certain games in which all the spaces on a board are to be filled according to definite rules, but unless we use a certain device, we find ourself at the end blocked from the difficult spaces and compelled to leave more spaces vacant than we needed or wished to. Yet there is a definite rule by which a maximum number of spaces can be filled in the easiest way. Therefore, assuming that it is ordered that there shall be a triangle with no other further determining prin- ciple, the result is that an equilateral triangle is produced. And assuming that there is to be motion from one point to another without anything more deter- mining the route, that path will be chosen which is easiest or shortest. Simi- larly, once having assumed that being involves more perfection than nonbeing, or that there is a reason why something should come to exist rather than noth- ing, or that a transition from possibility to actuality must take place, it follows that even if there is no further determining principle, there does exist the great- est amount possible in proportion to the given capacity of time and space (or the possible order of existence), in much the same way as tiles are laid so that as many as possible are contained in a given area.

(Loemker, p. 146; to Magnus Wedderkopf [1671].) What, therefore, is the ul- timate reason for the divine will? The divine intellect. . . . What then is the reason for the divine intellect? The harmony of things. What the reason for the harmony of things? Nothing. For example, no reason can be given for the ratio of 2 to 4 being the same as that of 4 to 8, not even in the divine will. This depends on the essence itself, or the idea of things. For the essences of things are numbers, as it were, and contain the possibility of beings which God does not make as he does existence, since these possibilities or ideas of things coin- cide rather with God himself. Since God is the most perfect mind, however, it