PRESTACIONES PAGADAS

some things do not exist, and then a reason must be given otherwise than from a general reason of essence or possibility, assuming that the possible demands existence in its own nature, and indeed in proportion to its possibility or ac- cording to the degree of its essence. Unless in the very nature of Essence there were some inclination to exist, nothing would exist; for to say that some es- sences have this inclination and others not, is to say something without a rea- son, since existence seems to be referred generally to every essence in the same way. But it is as yet unknown to men, whence arises the incompossibihty of diverse things, or how it can happen that diverse essences are opposed to each other, seeing that all purely positive terms seem to be compatible inter se.

(G VII, 303; Loemker, p. 487; Ariew & Garber, p. 150; "On the Radical Orig- ination of Things" [1697].) Perfection is nothing but quantity of essence.

C O M M E N T A R Y

For Leibniz, X exerts causal influence on Y if X is involved in the sufficient reason for some fact about Y—that is, is part of what impels God toward ac- tualizing Y. Leibniz thus grounds agency in perfection. The harmonious at- tunement of substances in the world means that each must be accommodated to all the rest. As Leibniz sees it, God, in selecting a particular substance over against its alternatives for actualization, recognizes in more perfect substances an entitlement to be predominant—to have others accommodated to their needs. The more imperfect substances are as they are because they need to be so in order to accommodate the requirements of the more perfect—in relation to which they are, accordingly, the active agents. The inherent rationality of God's choice of the best thus coordinates perfection and active agency by embedding the latter in the former. (Note the equation: quantity of essence = degree of perfection = claim on God for actualization = agency.)

His coordination of perfection with agency means that, for Leibniz, the order of causes (of active agency) and that of reasons of (rational explanation) stand in perfect coordination with one another. The causal agency of the world's pro- cesses finds its basis in the rational structure of God's choices: things act as they do (operatively) because this conduces to the best (normatively). In Leib- niz's system all causality is ultimately teleological.

Leibniz's doctrine here is the antithesis of Hume's: for Hume, reason has no foothold in the causal order (causal connection being a matter of experienced- based expectation where reason has no role). For Leibniz, the causal order op- erates throughout on reason-legislated principles, the laws of nature reflecting divinely chosen regularities. To be sure, Hume considers the matter from the angle of human reason, Leibniz from the angle of God's.

KEY W O R D S : created being/créature perfection/per/ection reason/raisorz a priori/a priori to act/agir

SECTION 51

51. But in simple substances there is only an ideal influence of one monad on another, which can have its effect only through the intervention of God, insofar in the ideas of God one monad demands with good reason that God should have regard for it in regulating the others from the very beginning of things. For, since one created monad cannot have any physical influence on the inner make-up of another, it is in this way alone that the one can be dependent on the other. (See Theodicy, sees. 9, 54, 65, 66, 201; Abridgment, obj. 3.)

51. Mais dans les substances simples ce n'est qu'une influence idéale d'une Monade SUT l'autre, qui ne peut avoir son effect, que par l'intervention de Dieu, en tant que dans les Idées de Dieu une Monade demande avec raison, que Dieu en réglant les autres dès le commencement des choses, ait égard à elle. Car, puisqu'une Monade créée ne sçauroit avoir une influence physique sur l'in- térieur de l'autre, ce n'est que par ce moyen, que l'une peut avoir de la dé- pendance de l'autre. (Théodicée, secs. 9, s4, 65, 66, 201-, Abrégé, obj. 3.)

{Theodicy, sec. 9.) For it must be known that all things are connected in

each one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there to any distance whatsoever, even though this effect becomes less perceptible in proportion to the distance. Therein God has ordered all things beforehand once for all, having foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all the rest; and each thing as an

idea has contributed, before its existence, to the resolution that has been made

upon the existence of all things; so that nothing can be changed in the universe (any more than in a number) save its essence or, if you will, save its numerical

individuality. Thus, if the smallest evil that comes to pass in the world were

missing in it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it.

{Theodicy, sec. 54.) It will be said also that, if all is ordered, God cannot then

perform miracles. But one must bear in mind that the miracles which happen in the world were also enfolded and represented as possible in this same world considered in the state of mere possibility; and God, who has since performed them, when he chose this world had even then decreed to perform them. Again the objection will be made that vows and prayers, merits and demerits, good and bad actions avail nothing, since nothing can be changed. This objection causes most perplexity to people in general, and yet it is purely a sophism. These prayers, these vows, these good or bad actions that occur to-day were already before God when he formed the resolution to order things. . . . The prayer or the good action were even then an ideal cause or condition, that is, an inclining reason able to contribute to the grace of God, or to the reward, as it now does in reality. Since, moreover, all is wisely connected together in the world, it is clear that God, foreseeing that which would happen freely, ordered all other things on that basis beforehand, or (what is the same) he chose that possible world in which everything was ordered in this fashion.

{Theodicy, sec. 65.) And now, to bring to a conclusion this question of spon-

taneity, it must be said that, on a rigorous definition, the soul has within it the principle of all its actions, and even of all its passions, and that the same is true