OTROS GASTOS TECNICOS NO VIDA

good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is no maximum nor min- imum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is done equally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may be said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than mathematics, that if there were not the best [optimum) among all possible worlds, God would not have pro- duced any. I call "world" the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be said that several worlds could have existed in different times and different places. For they must needs be reckoned all to- gether as one world or, if you will, as one Universe. And even though one should fill all times and all places, it still remains true that one might have filled them in innumerable ways, and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds among which God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with Supreme Reason.

[Theodicy, sec. 10.] It is true that one may imagine possible worlds without

sin and without unhappiness, and one could make some like Utopian or Se- varambian romances: but these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in goodness. I cannot show you this in detail. For can I know and can I present infinites to you and compare them together? But you must judge with me from the results since God has chosen this world as it is. We know, more- over, that often an evil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without that evil. . . . A general makes sometimes a fortunate mistake which brings about the winning of a great battle. . . .

[Theodicy, sec. 44.) We must take into account that there are two great prin-

ciples of our arguments. The one is the principle of contradiction, stating that of two contradictory propositions the one is true, the other false; the other prin- ciple is that of the determinant reason: it states that nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or at least a reason determining it, that is, something to give an a priori reason why it is existent rather than non-existent, and in this wise rather than in any other. This great principle holds for all events, and a contrary instance will never be supplied: and although more often than not we are insufficiently acquainted with these determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless that there are such. Were it not for this great principle we could never prove the existence of God, and we should lose an infinitude of very just and very profitable arguments whereof it is the foundation. . . .

[Theodicy, sec. 173.) As far as one can understand him, he <Spinoza> ac-

knowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine nature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste time here in refuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is founded on the nature of the pos- sibles, that is, of things that imply no contradiction. I do not think that a Spi- nozist will say that all the romances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still exist in some place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances . . . are possible. Let us therefore bring up against him these words of M. Bayle, which please me well: "it is to-day," he says, "a great em- barrassment for the Spinozists to see that, according to their hypothesis, it was as impossible from all eternity that Spinoza, for instance, should not die at The Hague, as it is impossible for two and two to make six. They are well aware that it is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine, and a conclusion which

disheartens, affrights, and stirs the mind to revolt, because of the absurdity it involves, diametrically opposed to common sense. They are not well pleased that one should know they are subverting a maxim so universal and so evident as this one: All that which implies contradiction is impossible, and all that which implies no contradiction is possible."

[Theodicy, sec. 196.) It is therefore not a question of a creature, but of the

universe; and the adversary will be obliged to maintain that one possible uni- verse may be better than the other, to infinity; but there he would be mistaken, and it is that which he cannot prove. If this opinion were true, it would follow that God had not produced any universe at all: for he is incapable of acting without reason, and that would be even acting against reason. It is as if one were to suppose that God had decreed to make a material sphere, with no reason for making it of any particular size. This decree would be useless, it would carry with it that which would prevent its effect. It would be quite another matter if God decreed to draw from a given point one straight line to another given straight line, without any determination of the angle, either in the decree or in its circumstances. For in this case the determination would spring from the nature of the thing, the line would be perpendicular, and the angle would be right, since that is all that is determined and distinguishable. It is thus one must think of the creation of the best of all possible universes, all the more since God not only decrees to create a universe, but decrees also to create the best of all. For God decrees nothing without knowledge, and he makes no separate decrees, which would be nothing but antecedent acts of will: and these we have sufficiently explained, distinguishing them from genuine decrees.

[Theodicy, sec. 199.) I hold . . . that one can reconcile the evil, or the less

good, in some parts with the best in the whole. If the Dualists demanded that God should do the best, they would not be demanding too much. They are mistaken, rather, in claiming that the best in the whole should be free from evil in the parts, and that therefore what God has made is not the best.

[Theodicy, sec. 225.) The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is

no greater than that of the wisdom of God, who knows all possibles. One may even say that if this wisdom does not exceed the possibles extensively, since the objects of the understanding cannot go beyond the possible, which in a sense is alone intelligible, it exceeds them intensively, by reason of the infi- nitely infinite combinations it makes thereof, and its many deliberations con- cerning them. The wisdom of God, not content with embracing all the possibles, penetrates them, compares them, weighs them one against the other, to estimate their degrees of perfection or imperfection, the strong and the weak, the good and the evil. It goes even beyond the finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of infinites, that is to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the universe, each of which contains an infinity of creatures. By this means the divine Wisdom distributes all the possibles it had already contemplated sepa- rately, into so many universal systems which it further compares the one with the other. The result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of the best from among all these possible systems, which wisdom makes in order to satisfy goodness completely; and such is precisely the plan of the uni- verse as it is. Moreover, all these operations of the divine understanding, al- though they have among them an order and a priority of nature, always take place together, no priority of time existing among them.