Clasificación de la contratación a distancia

This section of the review focuses on the kind of incentives to be offered to combatants in order to serve as an adequate motivation for them to disarm and sustain their commitment to peace and not return to violence. According to Douglas, et al (2004: 41) weapons for food/goods, weapons for development and the exchange of weapons for cash are the common incentives used in DDR.

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Similarly, an approach known as weapons in competition for development² is being suggested (Ibid.) However, among these incentives, a commonly applied one that has gained popularity has been ‘the weapon buyback’ in other words weapons for cash programme. According to Tanner (1996: 185) and Isima (2004:

3) it is an approach whereby economic incentive, particularly cash payments are extended to combatants in order to encourage them to undergo the process of disarmament and demobilisation.

Berdal (1996: 33) has suggested that the practice is premised on the assumption that ‘… weapons usually have an economic as well as security value’. As a result, monetary compensation should be given to motivate combatants to renounce violence and commit to the disarmament and demobilisation process. Its efficacy was tested with reasonable success in El Salvador where cash was given in exchange for guns (Jeong, 2005: 51). Recent examples of arms buy-back disarmament programmes in Africa (albeit not as successful as in the case of El Salvador) include Liberia in 2003 and Cote d’Ivoire in 2004 (Omach, 2012: 89).

Other forms of economic inducement applied include the food for guns’

programme implemented in Somalia which recorded a clear success (Tanner, 1996: 185). As earlier mentioned, another economic inducement mechanism highlighted in the literature is the ‘weapons for development programme’ which was implemented in Mali in the middle of 1997; whereby the locating of community development projects and the distribution of goods and services were traded for weapons after the signing of a peace pact between the government and rebel forces (Ibid.: 89).

Suffice to say that it is important to take into cognizance the underlying economic agendas of warring parties in conflict when determining the appropriate economic inducement to be offered to them to disarm. In line with this, Spear (2006a: 168-189 and 2006b: 63-80) identifies three different levels of combatants with varying economic motives behind their involvement in armed violence. The first group is the leadership who presides over large fighting groups with numerous commanders under their control and engages in high-level economic predation in cahoots with national, regional and international criminal networks. The second

2 According to Douglas et al, (2004: 41) weapons in competition for development, ‘…targets two communities of similar size and divides the funds available for development proportionally between them, according to the percentage of weapons handed in by each community.’

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group is the middle-level officers heading fighting units, who exercised command and control over fighting forces and so benefit immensely from the war and its booty. While the last category is that of the individual fighters (foot soldiers) whose motive many argue is often predatory as witnessed during the civil wars in Sierra-Leone and Liberia. Wennmann (2011: 24-24) also argues that armed violence is lucrative and provides a steady means of living for insurgents and so they are less likely to respond positively to a ceasefire that does not offer high rewards relative to the option of continuing fighting. Wennmann further argues that the basis of initiating any engagement with insurgents to demobilise is not the acclaimed ‘mutually hurting stalemate, but a mutually profitable stalemate’

(Ibid.: 24). Therefore, both Spear and Wennmann are of the contention that disarmament and demobilisation are more likely to succeed if reasonable economic incentives are offered, commensurate to the economic benefits accruing to the various levels of fighters/leadership in an insurgent movement.

The debate on economic incentives raises the pertinent question of the extent to which the Niger Delta DDR programme adequately attended to the underlying economic motives of the various categories of fighters in the conflict. To what extent has the economic dividend of peace in the Niger Delta outweighed the temptation of returning to violence as a means of livelihood? This question will be explored further in this thesis.

At the same time, though, the effectiveness of economic incentives such as ‘arms buy back’ during disarmament and demobilisation has been contested. According to Douglas et al, (2004: 41) ‘the effects of buy-back programmes are short-term and not sustainable.’. Indeed, the UN IDDRS posits that:

Recent field report indicates that ‘Buy-back’ schemes rarely have the desired effect; instead, old and unserviceable weapons are often submitted to allow combatants to enter the demobilisation phase while commanders hold on to serviceable weapons as protection in case of the failure of the peace process (UN IDDRS, 4. 20. 2006: 5).

Also, Ginifer et al., (2004: 4); Willibald (2006: 325) and Knight (2008: 47) all argue that cash payments to ex-combatants during disarmament tends to lift them above other victims of conflict in society, thereby creating resentment against them which jeopardises their reintegration. Consequently, Knight suggests that:

… it is probably better to utilize in-kind assistance or other forms of material support that would also have benefits for the community at large

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and not just for the ex-combatant. When monetary incentives are considered necessary, they should be made in small payments over a longer period to assure a peaceful resettlement (Knight, 2008: 47).

Other scholars have contested the undue emphasis on monetary inducement during disarmament and demobilisation. A leading voice is Walter (1997: 335-364; 1999: 129-130 and 2002: 3-43) who argues that whenever combatants are called to demobilise in the context of a negotiated war to peace transition they are confronted with a security dilemma, which revolves around the fact that:

…civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider unthinkable. At a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces and prepare for peace. But once they lay down their weapons and begin to integrate their separate assets into a new united state, it becomes almost impossible to either enforce future cooperation or survive attack. In the end, negotiations fail because civil war adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms (Walter, 1997:

335-336).

In other words, warring factions fear that as they ‘…hand in their weapons, and surrender occupied territory, they become increasingly vulnerable to a surprise attack’ (Walter, 2002: 21). What Walter suggests in all these assertions is that the combatants’ main concern, when asked to demobilise and disarm, is whether their personal security can be guaranteed in the absence of a legitimate authority.

Consequently, Walter contends that given this circumstance, the greatest incentive and primary concern for warring parties to disarm and demobilise is, if their personal security will be assured during the treacherous demobilisation period. According to Walter, ‘the first and most critical is a third-party security guarantee to protect against a surprise attack during demobilization’ (Walter, 2002: 26). She further explains that ‘third party guarantors can change the level of fear and insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facilitate settlement... Third parties, …can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept…’ (Walter, 1997: 340). Lending credence to Walter’s assertion, Nilsson posits that:

It …is essential to ensure the physical security of ex-combatants when they return to civilian life. If this is not done, it will not only be difficult to persuade combatants to disarm, there is also a high probability that already disarmed and demobilised combatants will rearm themselves (Nilsson, 2005: 40).

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In a related argument, Hill (1999: 57-82) explains that while the resolution of the security dilemma is essential, it is not the only incentive needed to woo combatants to disarm and demobilise. Instead, the ability of the United Nations to ensure the simultaneous implementation of a twin track approach to a peace accord is far more significant. The first dimension of the twin track peace accord

‘…involves overcoming their [referring to the combatants] security dilemmas …’

(Hill, 1999: 62), while the second track ‘…addresses the political and economic aspirations of the parties, so as to ameliorate to the greatest extent possible the root causes of the conflict’ (Ibid.). What this implies is that the greatest incentive to disarmament and demobilisation is to guarantee the security of the ex-combatants’ as well as resolving the underlying socio-economic and political grievances that led to the conflict. On the other hand, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003:

303-320) argue that the best way to address the security dilemma that discourages ex-combatants from disarming and demobilising is to ensure that the peace accord provides for institutional power sharing arrangements in the post-war military, political and economic institutions. This will give all the post-warring parties a near equal stake in the post-war political, military and economic power dispensation, and so warring parties will feel more secure if all of them have a stake in the post-war power equation (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005: 21-40; 2006:

155-167 & Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007: 3).

However, power sharing as a solution to the security dilemma has been criticised on the basis that it only empowers ethnic elites or warlords to the detriment of the low-ranking members of the warring parties; in essence, it only consolidates elites’ power dominance in post-war societies (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 28-82). Corroborating this position, Jennings (2008: 340) argues that appointing elite or middle-level commanders into lucrative positions in government and the state security apparatus is often a compromise used as an inducement during disarmament. However, it undermines the genuine reintegration of foot soldiers because ‘the “big men” in command before or during the war continue to assert authority and enrich themselves, generating cynicism while reinforcing the message already implicit in DDR that conflict is rewarding, especially for those at the top’ (Jennings, 2008: 340). Sriram (2008: 1) provides a further critique of the supposed motivating and stabilising effect of power sharing by arguing that it has the potential to lead to instability instead of stability because ‘... power-sharing

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and similar incentives can often reify existing cleavages in societies, increasing rather than decreasing the risk of conflict.’ Thus, a pertinent question that will be explored further in this thesis is to what extent did the Niger Delta DDR programme address the militants’ security concerns as well as the underlying grievances that led to the conflict?

2.4.3. Management and Handling of Weapons Collected During