Información precontractual y el deber de información

The provision of reinsertion supports to demobilising combatants, is critical to the overall success of the DDR process; this is because after demobilisation and prior to reintegration, ex-combatants are left without any means of income to take care of themselves, families and dependants (Jensen & Stepputat, 2001: 13-14;

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Özerdem, 1999: 31). Consequently, the provision of reinsertion support becomes handy as a safety net that helps ex-combatants to cope with the challenges of transiting from conflict as a source of livelihood. Such assistance can last up to six to twelve months and should cover their basic needs including families and dependants (Colleta et al., 1996: 15 and Kostner, 2001: 1).

In the immediate aftermath of war, ex-combatants and their dependants’ needs can be classified into two broad areas, namely; ‘household consumption, such as food, clothes, healthcare and children’s education; and household investment, such as shelter, agricultural tools and kitchen utensils’ (Özerdem, 2009: 32). The debate in the literature on reinsertion revolves around whether ex-combatants should be supported in cash or in material form, or a combination of the two.

Özerdem et al (2008: 10) argue in support of both when they observe that

‘reinsertion benefits involve a mix of material and monetary assistance to the families of the ex-combatants easing the transition to civilian life; it includes food supplements, indemnity payments and cash allowances.’ Ball (1997: 89) and Ball (2006: 16) provided a comprehensive list of ‘potential support to ex-combatants during assembly and discharge’.⁵

According to, Colleta et al., (1996: 15), whether cash or material reinsertion is decided is contingent on certain conditions ranging from the relative cost of the transaction, the financial capacity of the banking or postal system, and the overall logistics capability of the agency responsible for implementation. According to Knight and Özerdem (2004: 511):

...five primary issues must be addressed when planning cash reinsertion assistance: the mobilization of funds, differentiation criteria, the amount of allowance, financial education and the development of a non-corruptible identification system. Alongside the overall challenge for the DDR process in general, mobilization of the necessary funds for financial reinsertion assistance is obviously the first obstacle to be overcome in this process.

If financial reinsertion support is to be provided, then efforts must be made to mobilise adequate funding so that it can be sustained throughout the stipulated

5. According to Ball potential support to ex-combatants during assembly includes: ‘food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, medical exams, basic education, leisure activities, orientation on adjusting to civilian life, including financial counselling, health counselling, civic duties, income generation (for soldiers and spouses, assistance to child soldiers, census, discharge and documentation’. During discharge potential support include ‘short-term food supplements, transport, orientation on conditions in district of residence and first tranche of reinsertion benefits’.

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period. This is because any sudden stoppage could trigger a negative reaction on the part of the ex-combatants. The eligibility criteria for determining who should benefit from reinsertion support should be transparently decided to avoid discrimination, particularly against female and child combatants (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 511). Another conundrum that needs to be resolved is the correct amount to be paid to ex-combatants; that is, are they to be treated homogeneously or differently? I am of the view that the hierarchy of the ex-combatants and the distance of their respective communities of resettlement will warrant the payment of different amounts. Nevertheless, irrespective of these considerations the disparity should not be too much so that it will not trigger resentment within the ex-combatants which could undermine the demobilisation process and the DDR programme in general. Generally, the golden rule is that the amount to be paid should not be too high to discourage the ex-combatants from seeking alternative sustainable sources of income (Berdal, 1996: 47 and Özerdem, 2009: 33-34). Berdal and Özerdem also maintain that it should not be far above the general income level in the local community the ex-combatants are returning to as it would potentially lead to resentment against them (Berdal, 1996:

47). In Uganda, a uniform method known as ‘egalitarian differentiation’ was applied; a situation whereby ‘it was the same for all former combatants, irrespective of their rank, age or years of service’ (Özerdem, 2009: 33).

Conversely, in Ethiopia, the yardsticks for determining the amount to be paid were years of service, intended location of settlement whether urban or rural and the level of disability (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 511). Closely related to the question of how much to pay is whether the amount to be paid should be given in bulk payment or instalments. Some argue that ex-combatants lack the financial experience to prudently manage and utilise bulk amounts paid to them at once (World Bank, 1993: 59-68). Given this challenge, for financial reinsertion support to be meaningful, payment should preferably be made by instalments, while during cantonment a series of financial education lectures and counselling should be given to ex-combatants (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 512 and Özerdem, 2009:

34). Furthermore, to guarantee against impersonation, it will be appropriate for beneficiaries, once they have been registered, to be issued with non-transferable identification card with his or her individual picture embossed on the card (Özerdem, 2009: 35).

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Several advantages and disadvantages associated with cash payments have been identified; in terms of advantages, cash reinsertion support tends to be flexible, reduce overhead costs, is more amenable to transparent handling, and is accountable and responsive to the needs of ex-combatants (Fusato, 2003: 7).

It also has a positive psychological effect because ex-combatants see it as a form of empowerment (Ibid.: 7).

However, some drawbacks associated with cash payments include their potential to encourage ex-combatants to turn the cantonment site into a permanent place of abode and become nonchalant towards becoming self-sustaining in life (Isima, 2004: 5). Cash payments may be susceptible to fraudulent abuse and corruption, particularly where a good system of accountability is not in place (Ibid.). It is equally argued that cash payments to ex-combatants may potentially open a floodgate of demands on their part, and when unmet can induce frustration leading to protest and ultimately remobilisation (Willibald, 2006: 325).

Additionally, when payment of cash is made at disarmament and demobilisation centres, it has the potential to produce a cash for weapon perception, and this, in turn, will trigger corruption, insecurity and regional weapons proliferation (Willibald, 2006: 331). In addition, when payment of cash in the entire DDR process is targeted at the ex-combatants, be it at disarmament or reinsertion stages to the exclusion of other victims of conflict in society, it may potentially encourage ex-combatants to perceive themselves as a special group of people that must be appeased. This, in turn, can potentially generate resentment against them which may jeopardise their reintegration (Ibid.: 332).

My contention, notwithstanding the evidence in support of cash reinsertion support, is that; it should not be considered in complete isolation from material support (Özerdem, 2009: 35). In this regard, Colleta et al, (1996: 16-18) identify three major forms of material reinsertion support that are critical to the stabilisation of ex-combatants. Specifically, ex-combatants need to be assisted with basic building materials, such as roofing sheets, cement etc., in order to fast-track, the process of owning their own shelter (Ibid.). Similarly, in the initial period of their settlement, ex-combatants need to be provided with medical services and educational support for their children (Ibid.).

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