El derecho de desistimiento en la praxis judicial

In the conceptualisation of DDR, two divergent schools of thought have emerged about how DDR and in particular the reintegration phase has been problematised;

either as a minimalist agenda of improving security or maximalist agenda of an opportunity for development and reconstruction (Özerdem et al., 2008: 4-5 and Özerdem, 2009: 45). Muggah expounded the two perspectives in this way:

In addition to competing definitions of various aspects of DDR…there are also deeply rooted philosophical differences associated with the objective of DDR itself. Very generally, DDR can be viewed on a continuum: from a minimalist (improving security) to a maximalist (as an opportunity for development and reconstruction) perspective (Muggah, 2004: 27).

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Similarly, for Jennings (2008:6) the minimalist DDR approach aims to give former fighters something to do after being demobilised while the maximalist tends to have a transformative agenda of addressing underlying sources of conflict and pre-conflict grievances. Therefore, when a reintegration process is premised on minimalist assumptions, it will largely focus on managing ex-combatants as a security threat and potential ‘spoilers’ and obstacles to peace and stability, who immediately after their demobilisation must be provided with vocational skills and jobs so as to keep them busy (Muggah, 2006: 200 and Jennings, 2008: 6-7).

Conversely, if it is conceived as an avenue for development, reintegration will be premised on a socioeconomic transformative agenda that seeks to address the underlying sources of conflict in which ex-combatants and their dependants will be regarded as a potential source of human capital that can positively contribute to the post-conflict peacebuilding process (Ibid.). According to Özerdem (2008:

4-5) and Muggah (2009: 14), organisations such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKOs) subscribe to the minimalist perspective of DDR, while others such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank advocate for a more maximalist approach.⁶ Accordingly, the above conflicting perspectives on reintegration has led to conflicting operationalisation and ambiguity in the current practice of reintegration across different DDR programmes which Jennings (2008: 327-345) has demonstrated using the Liberian reintegration experience as an empirical case study. Jennings argues that, in Liberia, the reintegration literature was replete with phrases that suggest a maximalist agenda but in practical terms, it was implemented as a minimalist project that aimed to achieve security stabilisation. Suffice to say that my evaluation of the Niger Delta ADDR programme will disentangle which perspective; minimalist or maximalist informed its conceptualisation, implementation and why.

6. Muggah referred to the World Bank as advocating for a maximalist oriented DDR. However, the kind of development agenda it implements which generally falls under the liberal peacebuilding agenda and neoliberal market reforms have been heavily criticised as counterproductive to the basic needs of societies emerging from violent conflict. See for example 1. Paris, R. (2004). At war’s end: building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Sad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (2005). Neoliberalism: a critical reader. (ed.). London: Pluto Press. 3.

Newman, E. Paris, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2009). New perspective on liberal peacebuilding.

(ed.) New York: United Nations University Press.

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Given my earlier conceptualisation of combatants and militias, I will argue that the question of whether ex-combatants are regarded as a security threat and potential spoilers of the peace process or as possessing human resource capital that can positively contribute to postconflict peacebuilding depend on what type of combatants constitute the DDR caseload. In this case, it is my contention that if the DDR caseload mainly consists of militias of the Second-Generation type (see Francis, 2005: 1-3) then there is a high potential that they may constitute a security threat by becoming spoilers of the peace process and transition. This is because they generally have more limited human capital skills beyond weapon handling that can easily be transferrable to the civilian economy thereby making their reintegration into the civilian economy very difficult. However, there may be less security threat and the possibility of spoiling or undermining the peace process if the caseload consists of combatants from conventional armed forces or statutory forces as conceptualised by Gleichmann (2004: 29). I argue so because beyond weapon handling skills members of conventional armed or statutory forces tend to have more human capital potentials that can easily be transferable to the civilian economy thereby making it easy for them to reintegrate into the civilian economy.

At this juncture, it suffices to point out that the minimalist versus maximalist perspectives of DDR can be subsumed into the broader theoretical debates between traditionalist and wideners in the field of security which eventually led to a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of security and the emergence of the concept of human security. This, in turn, triggered a new debate regarding the nexus between security and development both at the academic and policymaking level. At the policymaking level, there was an increasing concern about ‘… [how]

war’s destructive impact undermined development in both the short and long term and the roles of economic and social factors in conflict…’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2010:

19). This development signalled the merging of security and development in both academic and policy arenas.

Hitherto, the traditionalists’ conception and understanding of security dominated the field of security during the Cold War era. In this perspective security was understood as ‘freedom from any objective threat to the state survival…’ (Sulovic, 2010:2). However, wideners’ canvassed for the broadening of the security

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agenda and the understanding of threats to national security to include economic, political, social and environmental threats (Ullman, 1983: 129-153; Mathews, 1989: 162-177; Jones, 1990: 3-7; Booth, 1991: 313-326; Booth, 1997: 83-119;

Ayoob, 1997: 121-146; Wilkin, 2002: 633-645; Landman, 2006: 21; Tigerstrom, 2007: 1-5; 7-26; Gromes & Banacker, 2007: 2; Biswas, 2011: 1-22 and Spear &

Williams, 2012: 11-16 and Dannreuther, 2013: 1-11& 47-48). The broadening of the definition of security and security agendas was reflected in the emergence of the concept of human security popularised by the United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report which defined human security as ‘… freedom from fear… [and] freedom from want’ (Ibid.: 24). The report further identifies economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security as the significant threats to human security. In this case, freedom from fear suggests

‘… a condition of existence in which human dignity is realized, embracing not only physical safety but going beyond that to include meaningful participation in the life of the community, control over one’s life and so forth’ (Thomas, 2007: 108-109). It also connotes ‘… freedom from domination/exploitation…’(Ibid.).

Similarly, ‘… human security as freedom from want describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which there is a reasonable expectation that protection will be afforded during any crisis or downturn-natural or man-made- so that survival is not threatened’ (Ibid.).

The above suggests that contemporary sources of threat to security are not necessarily military in nature but equally development based. The aftermath of this dynamism in the field of security studies and the consequent consensus on the reconceptualization of security and security agendas was the merging of security and development which reinforces the strong nexus between security and development both in theory and practice. In other words, it resulted in the coalescing of security and development both in academic and policy arenas and the recognition of the fact that development can only take place when there is security and then development will, in turn, reinforce security (see Stewart, 2004:

261-288). For instance, in buttressing this contention, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1997: 1) asserts that ‘wars have set back development severely in many countries, including in some of the poorest; excessive military

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expenditures have too often taken priority over more productive public investments…’ Similarly, on its part, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (2005: 7) has observed that ‘…development agencies cannot ignore the impact that security threats at all levels-local, national and global-have on poor people. At the same time, the world community cannot ignore the critical role of poverty and inequality in increasing risks for us all’. This implies that dysfunctional security systems can undermine the possibility of achieving peace, social and economic development and vice-versa (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001: 37). Thus, increasingly recognition is being given to the reciprocal role and interaction between development and security in both academic and policy arenas (Ibid.) Accordingly, the overall contention here is that:

Peace is essential for development, and vice versa: development is essential for lasting and sustainable peace. Without peace we will not win the fight against poverty. Without peace the Millennium Development Goals will be… unrealistic promises. Violent conflict leads to and exacerbates poverty, and poverty is often a cause of violent conflict. (Also) conflicts are a serious threat to development… (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 10).

Overall, my contention is that the paradigm shift in the re-conceptualisation of security has elevated and brought to the front burner the need to prioritise the security of individuals, families and communities as against State security.

Nevertheless, some scholars have expressed critical opinions against the securitisation of development in the Global South by external actors from the Global North (Mcgrew, 2007: 12). Similarly, many have interrogated the concept of human security both as a theoretical and empirical concept. For instance, Woods (2005: 394) contends that security concerns have always been a prime consideration in rendering development aid, but with the securitisation of development ‘new security concerns have rapidly come to dominate foreign policy since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001’. This suggests that the moral underpinning behind aid and development assistance has been displaced by security considerations. The consequence of this displacement is that ‘donors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security objectives rather than those which would help the poorest’ (Ibid: 393).

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In the same vein, Duffield (2007: 2) argues that the way multilateral development organisations and bilateral donors direct and coordinate their activities aiming them at regions of conflict and volatility in the Global South suggests that human security has become one of the ‘… technologies in securing the Western way of life’. This connotes that, human security is exported to the Global South as an antidote to conflict and insecurity for a secured Global North instead of being a genuine response to the development concerns of the Global South. Similarly, Mcgrew (2007: 13) observes that one apparent danger of securitisation is that it

‘… may provoke a covert, and sometimes overt, process of militarization’. This suggests the likelihood that securitisation can undermine the goal of human security by providing justification for external intervention under the pretext of advancing the goal of human security. As he notes:

Securitization also harbours the potential risk that legitimate rationales or pretexts for, and modes of, external intervention in the domestic affairs of developing states are expanded. In this regards the progressive notion of human security, or protective security… which is conceived as an alternative to orthodox or realist discourses of security, may unintentionally widen the parameters of legitimate interventionism. Framing development in terms of human security, as is currently the dominant progressive view, paradoxically may expose its subject to new insecurities (Ibid.).

Furthermore, even as a theoretical and empirical concept, human security has come under heavy criticism. Paris’s (2001: 87-102) seminal article titled ‘Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?’ argues that ‘human security does not appear to offer a particularly useful framework of analysis for scholars or policymakers’

(Ibid.: 96). Consequently, he doubts if the concept of human security can serve as a meaningful practical guide both for academic inquiry or at the level of governmental policymaking (Ibid.: 88). Indeed, part of the problem he contends is that:

… the concept lacks a precise definition… everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied (Ibid.).

Nonetheless, irrespective of the myriad of criticisms against human security both as a theoretical and empirical concept and the potential of its abuse by global

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hegemonic powers the case for a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of security and a broadening of security agendas is quite compelling. This is because contemporary threats to State security are largely due to lack of human security and development rather than to external military threats. For instance, Nickels in a paper presented at the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2014: 1) argues that Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram all ‘… emerged from conditions of relative deprivation and perceived marginalization of specific communities… each group exploited local grievances as well as the inability by central government to address the sources of social, political and economic exclusion’. So also, Salam (2012:150-151) argues in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Consequently, to what extent the conceptualisation, planning and execution of the Niger Delta ADDR programme take due cognisance of the coalescing of security and development will be explored throughout this thesis.

2.6.2. Minimalist Perspective and Assumptions on Reintegration and