El deber de información sobre el derecho de desistimiento y la sanción a su

One of the current issues that have engaged the attention of academics and DDR experts, is the financing and ownership of DDR programmes. The contention revolves around whether those that fund DDR programmes, in general, such as the UN and its agencies, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and other donor agencies should arrogate to themselves the right and power to conceive, design and determine the implementation of DDR and reintegration programmes. This is in line with the dictum that says, ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’. Alternatively, should the benefiting societies be given the opportunity to take ownership of the DDR process particularly the reintegration phase while international agencies provide the necessary funding and advice. Accordingly, Colleta et al., (1996: 30) state that the reintegration phase of DDR has remained a contested terrain due to incompatible agendas between the recipient societies and donors who want to impose their agendas,

Similarly, Shibuya (2012: 123) maintains that ‘every DDR project faces several levels of leadership challenges. First, any DDR program with international involvement has to deal with the “international vs. domestic” leadership problem.’

This implies a possible clash of interest between the national government and international partners. It is against this backdrop that Özerdem (2009: 48) asks the rhetorical question; is reintegration only meant for the international community? He contends that ‘…the current practice indicates that… the importance of communities is still not adequately recognised by donors, nor is it incorporated into their undertakings’ (Ibid.: 48). In the same vein, Özerdem argues that what in most cases is adduced as community-based reintegration

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programmes, are largely planned and implemented by external financiers and donors without any inputs from the beneficiaries; hence they can best be described as community-located approaches rather than community-based (Özerdem, 2012: 59). According to Berdal (1996: 48), this approach ignores the fact that reintegration training opportunities that directly involved beneficiaries in the process of planning and implementation has the greatest probability of succeeding as experience has demonstrated in Somaliland and Eritrea.

Furthermore, the implementation of DDR and other post-conflict peacebuilding programmes is funded by numerous multilateral and independent funding agencies with each of the agencies focused on a different aspect of the DDR process in line with its mandate. Consequently, Muggah (2006: 190-205) asserts that their commitment to funding is determined by their different mandates and agendas. Muggah also posits that while disarmament and demobilisation are usually funded by the assessed budget of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations the budget does not take care of reintegration.

Conversely, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) limit their funding to demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and the broader postconflict peacebuilding and reconstruction processes (Muggah, 2006: 200).

According to Muggah this results in ‘…poor appreciation among donors of the various dimensions of DDR and weapons reduction programs’ (Ibid.: 200).

Consequently, agencies such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations focus on security and stabilisation, while the World Bank and IMF concentrate on broader issues of development (Ibid: 200). Ginifer (1997: 7) corroborates this by arguing that, a major challenge to United Nations Peace Missions has been the lack of policy coordination between the Secretariat and Bretton Woods’s institutions, resulting in the pursuit of contradictory policies.

Thus, the conflicting agendas of the various funding agencies, lack of coordination and rivalry amongst them can undermine the goals of DDR. Castillo (2008: 1-47) buttresses this position by arguing that the main reason for DDR and post-conflict reconstruction is political; which is to achieve security and stability to avoid a relapse into war. This implies that the political objective is paramount and overrides any other consideration such as economic objectives, particularly during the immediate post-conflict transition period. This connotes that whenever there is a conflict between the political and economic objectives, the political

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objective must take precedence. Nevertheless, Castillo argues that the kind of development priorities that funding agencies such as the World Bank and IMF implement are often diametrically opposed and contradictory to the political objective of reintegration and DDR in general as experience in El Salvador has shown. She contends that in El Salvador, the United Nations Observer Mission (ONUSAL) succeeded in implementing a disarmament programme for the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) combatants based on its mandate. However, the demobilisation and reintegration process was almost jeopardised because it was undermined by financial constraints imposed by the IMF, the leading financier of the reconstruction programme for fear that over budgetary spending on demobilisation and reintegration would trigger inflation (Castillo, 2008: 42). This clearly demonstrates the extent to which international agencies that fund DDR programmes and post-conflict reconstruction, can work at cross-purposes and end up undermining the goal of the intervention.

It is sufficient to point out that the trend of events highlighted above regarding the funding and ownership of reintegration process and DDR in general, is summative of the unequal power relations that exist between the financiers of interventions and the beneficiaries. This trend, in my view, succinctly conforms to Hay’s (2002: 168-182) conceptualisation of the three faces of power, namely, power as decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping. Against the backdrop of Hay’s three faces of power theorisation, Özerdem (2009: 49-50) postulates that it is replicated in the politics of DDR and postconflict reconstruction between the international community, ex-combatants and the larger postconflict society. Özerdem contends that power as domination over others and its zero-sum conception informs the relationship between ex-combatants and the International Community. Özerdem argues that the international community perceives ex-combatants and post-conflict societies as a potent threat to international peace and security. Consequently, they must be rehabilitated in conformity with the standard and overall interest of the international community. Regarding power as agenda setting, Özerdem maintains that the international community, being the financier, sets the agenda for DDR and post-conflict reconstruction. As he asserts, ‘with the funding dependence on external actors [sic], the agenda for the process is often set by international actors, leaving almost no room for the involvement of national and

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local authorities, and of former warring sides’ (Özerdem, 2009: 49). Concerning power as preference shaping, Özerdem argues that while implementing DDR programmes, the international community imposes certain options on ex-combatants regarding vocational trades and skills acquisition on the pretext of lack of resources and time constraints regardless of the preferences of the ex-combatants.

In this circumstance, the ex-combatants have no option than to accept the imposed options offered to them, given their condition of powerlessness.

However, as previously argued, the unequal power relations that characterise the politics of DDR processes and post-conflict reconstruction has been called into question, and in its place national ownership and participatory approaches are often advocated. For example, Castillo contends that national governments should be the key driver of the DDR process and post-conflict reconstruction while the international community represented by the UN, its agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) should serve as facilitators and coordinators as well as providing technical and funding support:

Thus, we envisaged war-to-peace transitions in which the sovereign government [my italics] would be in the front seat designing and implementing policies, with the UN system and the IFIs in the back seat, facilitating, coordinating, and monitoring the international community’s technical and financial support (Castillo, 2008: 13).

Castilo’s position is supported by studies by Dzinesa (2006: 39-43), Kilroy (2014:

275-308) and Kilroy (2015: 37-41); all of which demonstrate that participatory approaches to DDR and indeed, war to peace transition that involves the international community, national government and local communities working together is more effective and can potentially lead to better outcomes. In other words, participatory approaches envision a situation whereby a broad-spectrum of DDR stakeholders are given the opportunity to actively participate in its conceptualisation, design and implementation. In line with this, the United Nations pointedly highlights the risk involved in DDR funding agencies alienating other stakeholders in the design and implementation process when it notes that:

One of the reasons why DDR operations have failed in the past is a lack of local ownership [my italics] resulting in the perception that DDR is imposed from outside. The participation of a broad range of stakeholders in the development of a DDR strategy is essential to its success, as it

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provides a basis for effective dialogue among national and local authorities, community leaders, and former combatants, and helps define a role for all parties in the decision making process. These actors should be fully involved in planning and decision making from the earliest stages.

A participatory approach will significantly improve the DDR programme…

(United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, 4. 30. 2006: 11-12).

It is apposite to point out that the above discussions show the nature of power asymmetry that characterises internationally driven DDR programmes. However, in terms of how the Niger Delta ADDR programme fits into this debate; I will argue that it is supposedly an example of a nationally owned DDR programme fully driven by the Nigerian State beginning from conceptualisation, design, implementation and funding. I argue that it is supposedly because a fundamental component of national ownership is missing in the programme’s conceptualisation process which was the failure to give the ordinary DDR participants and impacted communities the opportunity to fully participate and be drivers of the conceptualisation, design and implementation process. Thus, this type of national ownership can best be described as a ‘neopatrimonial elite nationally owned DDR programme’. In this case, one could argue that the neopatrimonial Nigerian State assumed the position of the international community and an external securitising actor in relation to the Niger Delta.

Consequently, just as the international community securitised development in the global south so also the Nigerian State securitised development in the Niger Delta. Thus, development efforts in the region were carried out not as a response to the genuine development needs and concerns of the region but as a response to the security repercussions that its absence could result in for the Nigerian rentier neopatrimonial state.