El mercado internacional del plátano, tal como lo conocemos hoy, es resultado de la gestión empresarial de las tres multinacionales norteamericanas, a saber, Chiquita Brand Internacional (anteriormente conocida como United Fruit Company), la empresa Dole (anteriormente conocida como Standard Fruit Company) y Del Monte Fresh Produce. A esas tres multinacionales, añadimos en la actualidad dos empresas importantes: una multinacional europea, la Fyffes, y la otra internacional, de origen ecuatoriano, la empresa Noboa Corporación.
Dicho esto, cabe resaltar que con la incorporación en el comercio del plátano del barco a vapor y del contenedor climatizado, las tres multinacionales norteamericanas mencionadas participaron activamente en desarrollar, a través de su capital y tecnología, una producción y comercialización modernas que culminaron en lo que hoy es el comercio internacional de las frutas perecederas en general, y del plátano en particular. Como consecuencia, aquellas multinacionales desarrollaron una estrategia de integración vertical, mediante la cual se involucraron en todas fases de la producción, embalaje del producto, transporte, sistema de maduración de dicho producto y su comercialización desde el país exportador al país importador-consumidor. Así pues, sea directa o indirectamente, las multinacionales se hicieron presentes en todas las fases del proceso de comercialización del plátano en el comercio internacional, utilizando su conocimiento de la producción y de la comercialización para captar rentas mediante el valor añadido que aportaron en dicho comercio.
No obstante, la estrategia del mercado internacional del plátano de las mencionadas multinacionales se vio cuestionada por la introducción de la nueva Política de Importación
- 146 -
del Plátano en la Unión Europea (1993). Cada una de las multinacionales y de algunas empresas internacionales del plátano, tales como la Noboa Corporación, respondió al Nuevo Régimen del Plátano de la Comunidad con la estrategia que consideró oportuna. Por ejemplo, la empresa Chiquita optó por una estrategia considerada agresiva. La empresa optó por denunciar el Nuevo Régimen Comunitario del Plátano con el objetivo de preservar su cuota de mercado establecida en el mercado comunitario y combatir dicho régimen ante la OMC (Organización Mundial de Comercio) alegando ilegalidad y trato de favor hacia los plátanos procedentes de los países ACP (África, Caribe & Pacífico). Esa denuncia se llevó a cabo a través del gobierno norteamericano y junto con otros gobiernos sudamericanos, entre otros el de Ecuador. El argumento de los países sudamericanos que denunciaron al Nuevo Régimen de Importación del Plátano en la Comunidad fue también presentar dicho régimen como ilegal y discriminatorio para sus respectivas empresas nacionales, exportadoras de plátanos al mercado comunitario, como es el caso de la empresa Noboa Corporación de Ecuador, o subcontratantes de las multinacionales de dicho producto. Por contra, las empresas Dole, Del Monte y Fyffes optaron por una estrategia visionaria, que se adaptaba más o menos a la nueva escena del mercado comunitario en el sector del plátano. Dichas multinacionales, sin embargo, optaron por la estrategia de alianza estratégica y de acuerdos ínterempresalriales con entidades europeas, asiáticas y de los países ACP caribeños y africanos (productores y exportadores de plátanos al mercado comunitario) con el objetivo de atenuar los efectos adversos del Nuevo Régimen de Importación del Plátano de la Unión.
La empresa Noboa, siendo internacional, optó por la estrategia defensiva y, representada por su gobierno, denunció ante la OMC la Nueva Política de Importación del Plátano de la Comunidad alegando ilegalidad y discriminación. Todo ello tuvo como objetivo preservar su volumen de exportación en el mercado comunitario del plátano y, a la vez, garantizarse un margen de expansión en dicho mercado. Al mismo tiempo, la oposición de la empresa al Régimen de Importación del Plátano de la Unión ha tenido como objetivo evitar que la Comunidad impusiera gravámenes insostenibles y limitase su volumen de negocio en los plátanos procedentes de fuera de los países ACP y la Comunidad (España, Grecia, Portugal & Francia).
Además de todo lo anteriormente mencionado, el creciente protagonismo de las superficies comerciales y los distribuidores y operadores del sector del plátano en los países importadores, y la creciente tendencia del consumidor europeo hacia el consumo de un plátano de calidad proveniente de un comercio justo, así como su interés por las
- 147 -
condiciones de los trabajadores del sector del plátano de los países productores/exportadores, han hecho que las multinacionales del plátano adaptaran su estrategia teniendo en cuenta más al consumidor que al productor. Además, las presiones que han ejercido las ONGs medioambientales en los países latinoamericanos productores y exportadores del plátano y las reclamaciones de los sindicatos y asociaciones de trabajadores del sector a principios de los noventa, han contribuido significativamente a que las multinacionales cambiaran su conducta y estrategia en el comercio internacional del plátano. Todos esos factores propiciaron que las multinacionales desarrollaran una nueva política empresarial conocida como estrategia de coordinación vertical. Es decir, las multinacionales pasaron de la estrategia de integración vertical en la que todo se coordinaba, desde el lugar de producción (país de origen de plátano) hasta el de consumo (país de destino). La estrategia de coordinación vertical se centró en hacer participar a los socios de las multinacionales en las fases de transporte, maduración y comercialización del plátano en el país del consumo del producto. Todo eso se llevaba a cabo mediante la implicación de todos los agentes económicos en todas las fases de la comercialización del plátano tanto en los países productores como en los países consumidores. En Suma, se trataba de integrar a todos agentes comerciales y económicos en la producción y comercialización del producto en cuestión cualquiera que fuese su grado de implicación en la comercialización del plátano.
- 148 -
TERCERA PARTE:
VALORACIÓN COMPARADA DEL EFECTO
DEL RÉGIMEN DE IMPORTACIÓN DEL
PLÁTANO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA SOBRE
LAS ISLAS CANARIAS Y LAS ISLAS
- 149 -
CHAPTER 6.
EU TRADE PREFERENCES AS COMMERCIAL AND
DEVELOPMENT
POLICY
INSTRUMENTS
WITH
ACP
COUNTRIES
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In the last forty years, trade preferences as commercial policy instrument have been the cornerstone of the trade and economic relations between developed and developing countries19. The United States, Canada, Japan and the EU (Quad countries) have all granted at one time or another trade preferences and agreements to a group of developing countries or a subset of those countries in order to help them sustain their economic growth and meet their development objectives; and ultimately facilitate their integration into the multilateral trading system. The objectives of granting those preferences from the developed to developing countries were manifold. On the one hand, developed countries´ primary motivation was to provide developing countries with market access that otherwise would have resulted difficult for them to accede, given that their economies were not at par with the ones from the industrialized countries (at least at the initial phase). On the other hand, considering that forty years ago, most of the developing countries were either coming out of colonization or had economies that were based on single commodities as their source of export earnings, thus, the granting of trade preferences was a means to helping those developing countries integrate the world economy20. In addition, in some cases, industrialized countries granted trade preferences to developing countries as a way to preserve trade and economic relations that were in place before some of those developing countries (in the case of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) gained their independence. From the outset, except for the Yaoundé Conventions (1963-1975), the
19
See EU Generalised System of Preferences “EBA” Everything But Arms initiatives: Special Arrangements for Least Developed Countries Generalised updated 07-08
20
See Agricultural trade policy and food security in the Caribbean: Structural issues, multilateral negotiations and competitiveness, Trade and Markets Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Rome, 2007
- 150 -
overwhelming majority of the trade preferences granted by the EU (formerly EEC) and the US as well as Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand were non-reciprocal but discriminatory in nature. And as it was to be expected, this led to all sort of controversy and denouncements from other developing countries that felt excluded from the trade preferences enjoyed by an exclusive group of other developing and least-developed countries. Moreover, proponents of a liberalized multilateral trading system followed suit in denouncing the supposed discriminatory trading practices that they considered would distort the global trading system and provide disincentives for the preference receiving countries from making sound domestic economic reforms and policies that would put their economic developments on the right track (Johnson, 1965). Hence, trade preferences were considered as trade and economic instruments, among a set of policies, which could help bridge the gap of economic divide between the richer North and the poorer South.
That said, from the beginning, the relevance and value of preferential trade schemes have been subject to numerous studies by its critics as well as its proponents. Nevertheless, developed countries have, however, justified their granting of unilateral market access to developing countries on the premises of the GATT provisions (Special and Differential Treatment and the Enabling Clause as the legal justification of such policy) and assistance to the economic growth and development objectives of those nascent economies.
However, over the course of the years, the value of trade preferences has gradually eroded due to the accelerated reduction of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs. This has become even so since the introduction of tariff reductions in agricultural trade policies of the GATT/WTO member countries during the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations. As a consequence, trade preferences for special groups of developing countries, such as the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, have incessantly come under scrutiny in the WTO.
At the heart of the negotiations for further liberalization of the global trading system today, are the incessant efforts from developing and special groups of developing countries to safeguard the accrued privileges accorded to them by the developed countries. At the same time, the critics of such an arrangement have also been making their voices heard against such trade preferential regimes and rightfully or not rightfully so demand further MFN trade liberalization, which consequently, will further erode the value of trade preferences. In essence, this is what has stalled the current Doha Round Negotiations between the Industrialized developed countries and the developing/emerging economies and the least- developed ones.
- 151 -
Therefore, considering the issues that confront the developed and developing countries within the ongoing Multilateral Trade Negotiations, we consider that a series of questions related to the relevance of trade preferences ought to be studied and analyzed. First, what is the value of trade preferences for developing and special groups of developing countries in the current globalized trade system? Second, what are the advantages and disadvantages of trade preferences? Third, what other trade policy alternatives should developed countries consider as other avenues of assistance for economic development?
In the case of our study, our focus and interests will be to analyze the EU agricultural trade policy schemes with the ACP countries and our analysis will specifically deal with the EU banana regime and its implications on the exports and productions of commodities such as bananas from export dependent islands like the Windward Islands. That said, agricultural export tariff preferences for developing countries are in general of paramount importance to those countries, and in the case of the EU banana policy, they have been fundamental in maintaining the production and exportation of many ACP countries. For instance, many studies have corroborated that the Caribbean banana exports and in particular the Windward Islands have been a big beneficiary of the EU banana tariff preferences21. However, with the gradual and continuous reduction of the MFN tariffs, special preferential regimes such as the EU banana policy have been losing the significance that they once held for the vulnerable export dependent economies such as the Windward Islands. This in effect, has been the new paradigm of trade relations between the developed and developing countries since the liberalization of agriculture trade policies agreed on in the Uruguay Round. Hence, given that the preferential trade regimes for developing and a subset of developing countries are becoming less and less accepted as an efficient development tool (at least from the standpoint of developed countries and critics of preferential treatment), and the acceptance of the trade liberalization is more desired and widespread in the international trade relations today, the following questions are of utmost relevance to our analysis. That is, on the one hand, are ACP countries, in particular the Windward Islands, going to lose the most when the agricultural trade is further liberalized and the preference margins are eroded? If so, what should be the policy response to that from both the EU and the international community at large? On the other hand, if compensation is to be the answer of the first question raised, to whom then and how should the compensations be allotted? Besides, what
21
See Forthcoming Changes in the EU Banana/Sugar Markets: A Menu of Options for an Effective EU Transitional Package. Report by Ian Gillson, Adrian Hewitt & Sheila Page. Overseas Development Institute
- 152 -
is the future of trade preferences in the Doha Round and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in general?
That said, the aim of this chapter is to introduce and assess trade preferences that have been the cornerstone of commercial and economic relations between the developed (Quad countries in particular) and developing countries. In the case of our work, our objective is to present the EU trade preferential schemes, alongside the US, Canada and Japan, and evaluate the potential that the preference erosions may have on the production and export dependent economy such as the Windward Islands. We will then later use the knowledge gained about the importance of preferential treatment in trade relations, and subsequently utilize it to compare the effects that preference erosions may have on the production and export of the Windward Islands (ACP member country) and the Canary Islands (EU banana producing region) to the EU banana markets. Afterwards, we will then undertake a comparative study and derive some conclusions from the effects of EU banana policy changes on the development dimension of an EU internal producer such as the Canary Islands as well as an external producer such as the Windward Islands in the following chapter (chapter 7).
Hence, the organization of this chapter will be structured in the following manner. The chapter deals, first, with the introduction of trade preferences as commercial and economic instruments used by the developed countries to govern their economic relations with developing countries and assist them as well in their quest for economic growth and development. It then proceeds by explaining the rationale, nature, and origin of the trade preferences as well as the development dimension of the preferential trade schemes of the EU, U.S., Canada and Japan. In addition, it goes on to present the cost and benefits of the preferential trade schemes for the preference receiving countries and conclude with an assessment of preference erosion and policy responses from both developing and developed countries. And as a conclusion, the chapter summarizes the relevance of the trade preferences for the developing countries in their international economic relations and their quest to integrate the world economy through the political economy of the global trading system.
- 153 -