National foreign policies are made in an institutional context. Consequently, in order to understand how foreign policy is formulated, and what motivates Portuguese foreign policy-makers to make certain choices, it is necessary to consider in detail the precise nature of how political institutions function day-to-day, how they are organised, and what goes on inside them. Institutions provide norms and rules to guide political actors to behave in appropriate ways in given situations. These norms are embedded in structures and identities which give these actions meaning. Institutional approaches to the study of politics, therefore, emphasise the role that institutions play in shaping human actions and determining political outcomes and how, through institutionalisation, these roles and norms of behaviour become reinforced and embedded (March and Olsen, 1998: 948).
An example of a “thin” conception of institutions is that of rational choice institutionalism, which sees institutions as “a structure that actors run into, go ‘ouch’, and then recalculate how…to achieve their interests…” (Checkel, 1999: 546). Then there is a “thicker” view of institutions: historical institutionalism. This approach takes into account the longer-term structuring effects of institutions on rational agents. Historical institutionalism is, essentially, a short-term rationalist perspective balanced by an awareness of long-term patterns of institutionalisation (Checkel, 1999: 546–547). Finally, sociological institutionalism represents an “unabashedly thick” view of institutions, which sees that institutions constitute actors and shape their interest formulation processes (Checkel, 1999: 547). Each brand of institutionalism offers a perspective on Portuguese foreign policy-making processes and the merits and limitations of all three require further elaboration and discussion.
Historical institutionalism takes a long-term view of organisational behaviour, which means it is able to account for continuities and changes over time. Instead of understanding decision-making in a purely short-term, rationalist manner, historical institutionalism accepts that behaviour is constrained by institutional rules, both formal and informal, which shape policy outputs (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 7). In order to better understand European integration, historical institutionalists were responsible for offering a ‘thicker’ understanding of how institutions operate and how this can explain patterns of continuity and change over time. Pierson (1996) challenged Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist analytical model (1993) and rational choice institutionalism by emphasising the importance of studying effects on institutions over time. Whereas intergovernmentalist theories tend to treat state preferences as fixed, Pierson, by taking a more long-term view, accepts that national preferences can change. As governments change frequently, or new information may force a reappraisal of the initial position, the institutional arrangements are unlikely to reflect the intentions of those who founded it. Therefore, the evolution of political institutions, such as the European Union, means that Member States are unable to directly influence the actions of the institution they created (Pierson, 1996: 139–140).
In terms of domestic institutional change, Pierson argued that political institutions are often “sticky”, i.e. “…specifically designed to hinder the process of institutional and policy reform” (Pierson, 1996: 143). To illustrate this stickiness, Pierson used European social policy as an example of ‘path dependency’, where Member States are
“…prohibited from pursuing a range of social policy options because their actions would be incompatible with the [pre-existing] single-market project” (Pierson, 1996: 156). This shows how policy can go through periods of considerable stability and that practices can become accepted and institutionalised over time (Greener, 2002: 164). Related to the path-dependent argument, ‘lock-in’ occurs when a particular path is chosen and momentum gained in this direction. Once the policy gains momentum, the previously viable second option becomes totally implausible, the point of no return is reached and the new policy is locked into the new trajectory. Lock-in results in the absence of conflict. In other words, a given policy becomes accepted because the alternative is deemed to be ludicrously implausible, despite it being perfectly feasible at the previous decision-point (Pierson, 1996: 146).
Pierson’s conclusions raise interesting questions when considering how changes in foreign policy priorities may, or may not, occur. The ‘lock-in’ of traditional Portuguese foreign policy priorities into the foreign policy-making apparatus may well have occurred, despite national political elites (and European elites indirectly through socialisation) seeking to change the principal foreign policy foci. The stickiness of foreign policy-making institutions may force elites to adhere to traditional foreign policy priorities against their short-term rational judgement. This logic presents a challenge to Moravcsik’s (1993) liberal intergovernmentalist model, in that institutions are active players in the system (Pierson, 1996: 130). Longer-term perspectives can offer more, and often better, explanations of causality and can give more detailed accounts of underlying motivations for particular policy outcomes which are ‘off the radar’ of more rationalist approaches. In defence of rationalist models, Moravcsik (2005) argues that path dependence can, in fact, be used as an extension of rational choice institutionalism. Rather than being inconsistent with rationalist assumptions, ‘path dependence’ and ‘lock-in’ can be utilised, so long as intended, rather than unintended, actions are given greater priority (Moravcsik, 2005: 24). While historical institutionalism offers useful insights, the fact that many of its features overlap with those of rational choice institutionalism means that it could go further in being able to account for underlying motivations, especially those closely wrapped up in matters of identity and dominant institutional belief systems, which can be more fluid over time.
Nevertheless, historical institutionalism is able to shed light on both continuities and changes. It is a framework for understanding long-term organisational permanence and
cultural persistence, as well as accounting for radical changes at times of upheaval. As Bulmer and Burch (2009) point out, the process of Europeanisation is iterative and involves institutional adaptation spanning several decades (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 28). While Bulmer and Burch hold that institutional change is usually an incremental process, Streeck and Thelen (2005) are careful to point out that processes of institutional change can also be ‘abrupt’ and result in wholesale institutional changes and the ‘breakdown and replacement’ of institutional norms and values (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 29; Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 8–9). Bell (2011) argues that tailoring historical institutionalism allows for agency-centred constructivist thinking to be brought in. This reinforces Streeck and Thelen’s argument that, historical institutionalism, while better at explaining institutional stasis, has the tools to account for micro-level changes which can lead to macro-level institutional transformation over time (Bell, 2011: 885–886).
The constructivist view of institutions and structuration theory also regards institutions as being malleable and “not permanent for-now-and-all-time” solid objects. Institutions are considered to be “habits”, which still possess structuring properties through the reification of discourses and the institutionalisation and formalisation of norms of behaviour. This conception of institutions is very different to the Weberian ideal type of a rigid bureaucracy that subjugates those who work within it (Fox and Miller, 1996: 91– 92). Proponents of constructivist institutionalism, as an approach, tend to focus on individual agency to explain institutional changes, citing the importance of ideational and discursive processes such as learning, emulation and socialisation (Bell, 2011: 894). It is the actions of agents that reinforce structures and create stable institutional norms of behaviour, yet, conversely, the institution is not reducible to the sum of the agents which inhabit it (Bell, 2011: 899).
Beyond the rather nebulous view of institutions sketched out by constructivist institutionalism, sociological institutionalism takes the ‘thickest’, most holistic, understanding of institutions:
Constructivists [in political science, using sociology’s institutionalism] have taken the notions of history, institutions, norms, ideas and culture well beyond the point at which historical institutionalists are willing to go…problematizing a number of key concerns that rationalists take for granted (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 19).
From this perspective, culture, values and beliefs are central to understanding European integration and how national and supranational institutions evolve (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 21).
Sociological institutionalism adopts a much broader view of institutions than mainstream political science does, and includes formal rules as well as informal norms which provide the ‘frames of meaning’ which shape actor behaviour. This breaks down the divide between an institution and the broader culture in which it is located (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 947). Sociological institutionalism emphasises the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship between institutions and human action. Therefore, the relationship between the individual and the institution can be understood as a type of ‘practical reasoning’. This does not mean that actors do not act ‘rationally’ when faced with a problem. Merely, that the ‘rationality’ itself is a social construction, actors aim instead to express their identities in socially meaningful ways (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 949).
Börzel and Risse (2000) argue that sociological institutionalism has considerable application to understanding European integration as it provides two explanations for domestic adaptation in response to Europeanisation. Firstly, ‘institutional isomorphism’, the gradual homogenisation of national and European political structures, becomes increasingly widespread as institutions interact more frequently. Secondly, actors are socialised into new ‘European’ norms and social learning leads to redefined national interests in light of European integration (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 8).
In addition to this potential contribution to the study of European integration processes, sociological institutionalism offers tools which would be of use to scholars in the field of International Relations. Finnemore (1996) argues that sociological institutionalism differs strongly from the realist and liberalist traditions of IR, in that social structure exists prior to political agents. Political agents are defined by their social context and not the reverse. Sociological institutionalism challenges the rational assumptions which are simply taken for granted by the traditional views within IR theory (Finnemore, 1996: 333).
The position of sociological institutionalism is one in stark contrast to that of rational choice institutionalism, which views actors as having a set of fixed preferences and
suggests that they behave in a calculated way to achieve their intended goals. Strategy, as opposed to impersonal historical forces, accounts for an actor’s behaviour. A rational choice view of how institutions are created and sustained does, however, rest on one dangerous assumption, that political institutions are the product of a logical, rational creation and have always served the purpose for which they are currently used (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 944–945). This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the assumption of the logical and rational creation and utility of political institutions cannot be justified in the real world, where irrational behaviour is rife and flawless rationality is a considerable improbability. Secondly, because rational choice institutionalism draws heavily from game theory approaches that view “…politics as an arena in which individuals try to maximize their personal gain” (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 11), political decisions are, therefore, taken with no reference to the social world that decision-makers inhabit and are constantly interacting with. There is no place in the rational choice institutionalist model to consider role conceptions, formal and informal rules, norms of behaviour, ideas and identities. In contrast, sociological institutionalism prioritises these issues and frames institutional behaviour in the longer-term, social context.
Deciding between the two brands of institutionalism involves making choices about epistemology and ontology and how best to capture and account for social phenomena. As Héritier points out, it is important to be explicit about how theoretical assumptions attribute causality, as competing theoretical explanations may also be able to attribute causality within their own paradigm. For example, this ‘subsumption’ of theory means that a sociological institutionalist assertion that explains an event by attributing causality to the logics of conforming to norms and values, could be successfully challenged by rationalists who can logically justify that acting in such a way is consistent with the individual’s rationality and anticipated gains from acting with that particular strategy (Héritier, 2008: 66). Making theoretical assumptions requires epistemological and ontological justification but also an awareness of other theoretical approaches and their potential utility.
Essentially, the rational choice institutionalism versus sociological institutionalism debate can be reduced to a discussion about whether agents conform to the “logic of expected consequences” or, alternatively, act according to the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1998: 949–952). The former is a rationalist perspective, the latter
accepts the normative role of institutions as a result of social construction and interaction. Explanations based upon the “logic of appropriateness”, such as normative or sociological institutionalism, therefore, place considerable emphasis on identities, roles, rules, cultures and senses of belonging (March and Olsen, 1998: 952). For March and Olsen it is the unpredictability of identities, and their impact on actions, which shapes their view of politics so as to bestow normative superiority upon the “logic of appropriateness” over the “logic of expected consequences” (Goldmann, 2005: 45–46).
To accept that the logic of appropriateness is intrinsically superior to the logic of expected consequences is problematic. However, the nature of formulating a theoretical standpoint from where to observe social phenomena requires making choices, and deciding which ontological and epistemological avenues to take. The sociological institutionalist perspective, embodied by the logic of appropriateness, offers a holistic view of the policy-making process, which allows room for both rational and irrational behaviour to be justified. For this reason it is right to prioritise this approach as being more useful for an analysis of Portuguese foreign policy-making because it recognises the social context within which ideas, identities and interests are formulated; it captures the nuances between structures and agents, which is central to the argument of structuration; and it offers a workable, socially grounded, framework for the analysis of the behaviour of both individuals and policies over time.
Sociological institutional analysis is useful because it accepts that formal and informal organisational rules and structures should not be separated from each other. Informal social relations, or unofficial belief systems, can be as pervasive as formalised goals and structures in helping to construct institutional cultures. In reality, as Hill (1972) argues, organisations often lack rigid structures and a clear set of goals and objectives. An organisation can only be partially understood by reference to its formal rules and procedures, if indeed there are any, as the term ‘informal organisation’ emerged to address the incompleteness in accounting for the formal. The informal organisation is the reality, it is the space where actors within the institution operate, and where social forces interact. Where organisational goals are disputed or unclear, as is often the case as organisations avoid over-formalising their business, it is through social relations that meaningful beliefs are developed and engrained (Hill, 1972: 35–36).
Sociological institutionalism takes a thick understanding of foreign policy-making organisations, prioritising the belief systems and key ideas which organise institutions and govern how they behave. The emergence of national cultures, beliefs, rituals and worldviews (and by extension national foreign policies) stem from institutionalised ideas about identity. Cultures, norms and identities cannot survive (or even exist) without being institutionalised, in one way or another. Goldstein and Keohane (1993) argue that such “conceptions of possibility”, or worldviews, are embedded in national cultures and identities (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 8). This means that the formation of foreign policy preferences is driven by ideas. Worldviews govern how choices are made and how situations are interpreted, even if the actors are motivated purely by self- interest (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 13). The institutionalisation of ideas within the bureaucracy, as well as the wider national culture, is the crucial determinant of policy outcomes (Jepperson et al., 1996: 50). Institutionalised ideas which serve the interests of those making policy, i.e. ideas which are deemed to be useful or have been proven to be successful, become embedded as norms. The reverse is also true, policy norms can be given renewed legitimacy by being redefined in ideological terms (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 21–22).
The ideas and beliefs of individuals, once formed, can become concretised and guide future decisions. However, these beliefs need not, necessarily, be based upon anything more considered than a fleeting, immediate, impulse to do something. Yet when internalised and rationalised post hoc the beliefs become the basis for dealing with the same problem, or a similar one, in the future (Jervis, 2006: 656–657). Ideas are part of the process of constructing and selecting political problems to be addressed and can be used to enforce permanence and to justify a long-established policy paradigm, as well as be imported to be a new weapon on a problem to make institutional change and modernisation possible (Béland, 2009: 704–705).
Institutions are historical and cumulative; they build upon the experiences of those who work within them. Where historical institutionalism accepts that behaviour can become embedded over time, sociological institutionalism is able to balance institutional change, fluidity and evolution on the one hand, and the persistence of institutional norms, values and cultures on the other. Institutions therefore can be “…seen as redefining themselves as well as reflecting their past” (Peters, 1999: 104). The process of ‘sedimentation’ builds new symbols that are not incompatible with those that were in
place before, but reflect the new situation. This has particular utility when thinking about national responses to European integration.
‘Sedimentation’ is a useful way of thinking about how the institutionalisation of new practices and beliefs has varying degrees of impact within an organisation. For instance, older members of an organisation may be more culturally resistant to changes because of their historical experiences. Other groups may be more involved in socialisation processes and thus mould their beliefs accordingly. In other words, some people have dissolved into the institutional solution; others remain undissolved as sediment and cloud what exactly the institution stands for. There are, therefore, identifiable strata of different beliefs within an organisation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996: 184). Cultural persistence is central to conceptions of institutions, and is generally based upon shared norms (Zucker, 1991: 84). An institution needs, therefore, to be understood as a whole, where beliefs and norms are shared and define the institution’s goals (formally or informally) and how, over prolonged periods, dominant beliefs can evolve or be influenced by external factors.
Understanding policy-making processes, the work of political institutions and governments, requires engaging with what constitutes the state and what shapes the national interest. Hall (1993) argues that because roles and ideas are central to constructing, institutionalising and reconstructing policy paradigms, policy-making is a social learning process, where societal pressures compete with state structures (Hall, 1993: 276). Building upon Hall’s work, Peterson (1997) offers a more precise conceptualisation of the social learning processes, outlining its internal components as well as the external influences on the system. He outlines two conceptually distinct types of social learning, “substantive learning” and “situational learning”. While the former is concerned with processes of experimentation, observation, analysis and adjustment as a reaction to dealing with the facts as they emerge, the latter accounts for changes which occur as a reaction to the social environment and the wider political context of what is deemed acceptable and permissible behaviour (Peterson, 1997: 1087– 1089). In addition, Peterson argues that politicians, as key participants in the learning process, can be decisive in implementing major reforms, as opposed to overseeing mere routine changes, to the policy-making process (Peterson, 1997: 1084–1085).
Checkel (1999) outlines four instances where such social learning is likely to flourish, two of which are especially relevant in the EU context. One of these is where a group meets repeatedly with considerable interaction between the members. Another condition is where a group is detached from direct political exposure (Checkel, 1999: 549). Both these scenarios occur frequently within the EU context and, consequently, suggest that