As discussed in the previous sections, one of the key developments in the contemporary management of foreign and international policy is the transformation of domestic bureaucracies into what Spence (2003: 23) terms ‘transnational administration’. A characteristic example of such bureaucracies concerns the EU’s COREPER II which comprises not only traditional diplomats, but also officials from various lead ministries. The rationale of national public administrations, in the form of national representations to the EU, participating in European policy making attaches renewed significance to national bureaucracies while at the same time exemplifying arguments for the growth of foreign policy bureaucracies outside the MFA.
National representations to the EU are largely similar in terms of their internal organisational structure which reflects their functions in the EU bodies where they participate and when they differentiate this is due to those elements particular to
their given political culture (Spanou, 2001: 120). Spanou (2001: 121) argues that national permanent representations to the EU constitute a characteristic example of institutional isomorphism as defined by Di Maggio and Powell (2001) while at the same time reaffirm assumptions discussed in chapter one according to which national factors and elements condition isomorphism. Based on this, the form and operation of national representations reflect national responses to the same demands for certain functions and coordination.
The Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (PeRepGr) termed by its officials as an ultra-ministry [υπερ-υπουργείο] or meta-ministry [µετα-υπουργείο] where the whole of government is represented (Interview, no 2; 5; 8; 9) provides us with the ultimate and perhaps the sole evidence of growth of a foreign policy bureaucracy outside the MFA. The PeRepGr, one of the largest national representations in Brussels16, numbering 130 officials in 2008 (Interview, no 2) was set up initially in 1962 under the responsibility of the MCo17 due to the economic/technical substance of pre-accession negotiations. The responsibility of the PeRepGr was transferred to the MFA in 1981 (when Greece entered the EC) based on the increased role envisaged for the MFA in EC affairs. Responsibility for the PeRepGr lies with the MFA and it is a MFA diplomat of ambassadorial rank18 who heads the mission.
In terms of communication and liaison with the home administration, the MFA constitutes the first and ultimate linkage of PeRepGr. Communication between sectoral officials dispatched to the PeRepGr and their home ministries is not permitted unless in cases of emergency. Communication with national administration in Greece must take place through the PeRepGr hierarchy and through the Permanent Representative or his deputy who monitor information flow to sectoral ministries (Spanou, 2001: 134). In theory, this hierarchical and
16
Spanou (2001: 126) argues that two reasons can explain the large size of the Greek
representation. Firstly, the long distance of Athens from policy making centres in Brussels and secondly, the tendency of sectoral ministries to dispatch many of their own officials as
representatives to Brussels. Ths way, they believe, they can ensure direct communication with their counterparts by passing the MFA
17
Renamed the Ministry of Economy (MNE) in 1982
18
channelled practice aims to strengthen coordination nonetheless at the same time it reflects a climate of suspicion and resentment against direct communication which would potentially lead to bypassing the MFA. Therefore, in order to safeguard the MFA’s centrality in the European policy process this hierarchical and centralised modus operandi is systematically preserved (Spanou, 2001: 134-135). PeRepGr has come to constitute one of the main actors in coordinating European and international policy. With coordination of external policies being facilitated at the level of the PeRepGr due to its immediacy to policy making loci and physical proximity of the representatives of various domestic departments, the mission has undertaken a large share not only in policy coordination but also in policy formulation. A PeRepGr official (Interview, no 8) in Brussels argued ‘
‘When you have people from every domestic ministry represented at the PeRepGr located on the same floor and literally next door it is only natural that they both make and coordinate policy in the premises of the PeRepGr and then transmit positions home rather than the other way around.’
The official argued that significant decentralisation takes place in Brussels with the PeRepGr undertaking most of the formulation and coordination of European and international policy. However one factor that impedes effective coordination relates to the HQ’s weakness to transmit timely unified positions to the PeRepGr. More specifically, a PeRepGr official (Interview, no 2) argued that very often national positions arrive after the meetings of the working groups have been held if at all. The official (Interview, no 2) suggested that ‘there is some sort of a rolereversal in
the case of Greece’ and explained that for a large number of issues, national
positions are formulated in Brussels and are then transmitted to the HQ to be ratified and implemented rather than the other way around.
As mentioned above, in many cases the PeRepGr improvises and formulates national positions on an ad hoc basis, whereas policy coordination becomes something of a rapid negotiation between experts dispatched from each ministry
within the PeRepGr premises. In order to serve purposes of fast and effective coordination the various branches of the PeRepGr which were previously scattered in different buildings moved together in 2008 in a newly hired building at the centre of Brussels19. The realisation that it is time and cost effective to make and coordinate policy with colleagues next door gave a pragmatist approach to organising the mission and transformed coordination into an intra-PeRepGr process involving all sectors of Greek administration away from the MFA (Interview, no 8).
PeRepGr officials emphasise that if a degree of foreign policy decentralisation exists outside the MFA then this has to be in the PeRepGr, which is increasingly inhabited by extra-MFA officials (Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 9). This is both natural and necessary, as a PeRepGr official (Interview, no 8) argued because ‘a policy
manager in Brussels knows much more about the current status of policies and is in a position to defend more effectively the national position if not to formulate the national position than officials or political leadership back home’ (Interview, no 8).
Such realisations were not without implications for the status and recruitment processes of the Greek representation.
More specifically, the PeRepGr which in the past functioned as a national repository for staff unwanted at home and as a forum available to the political leadership to pay back promised positions before elections (Interview, no 2; 8) has changed its recruitment and functional approach.
‘It has been over a decade that the PeRepGr has been recruiting taking into consideration candidates’ credentials and qualifications. Unlike previous patterns, today Greek governments do not fool around with the PeRepGr any more’ (Interview, no 8).
Such attitudinal change has gradually given the mission significant autonomy to decide their budget and logistics as well as freedom to manage Greek European and international policy away from home. As a result significant policy making
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takes place at the level of the PeRepGr thus reinforcing horizontal trends in Greek foreign policy management (Interview, no 2; 3; 8). Nevertheless, despite significant change, the PeRepGr does not offer incentives to Greek officials to pursue a career in the mission. Evidently, PeRepGr officials’ wages are significantly lower than those of their counterparts whereas it still does not offer an expense account despite Greek governments’ expectations that Greek officials in Brussels socialise, lobby and entertain their counterparts (Interview, no 2; 8).