Recent research has indicated that member state transposition is influenced by the government’s preference for European integration (Toshkov 2007), with transposition occurring more quickly when the government is more supportive of the EU. From this finding, it follows that those factors that influence party support for the EU will also influence transposition speed.
Indeed, public attitudes towards the EU have been shown to influence party position on the EU (Arnold et al. 2012; Williams and Spoon 2015). It has been argued that parties vote- and office- seeking goals influence their responsiveness Stemming from parties vote- and office-seeking goals, Myriad studies have examined political responsiveness to public opinion (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson et al.1995, Erikson et al.2002; Wlezien 2004; Soroka and Wlezien 2004; McDonald and Budge 2005; Ezrow et al. 2011, etc.), finding generally that governments and political parties react to public policy preferences both in policymaking and the policy positions that they take.
The general theoretical theme within this literature rests upon the idea that the public controls governments and parties through the threat of electoral retribution and/or the promise of electoral
Responding to Euroscepticism
victory (see Ferejohn 1986; Erikson et al. 1993; Stimson et al. 1995; Manza and Cook 2002; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008). Governments wish to be re-elected, and fear being turned out of office. Therefore, they provide the public with policies they prefer in the hopes of gaining public support in the next election.
This basic theoretical framework can be applied to the process of transposition. Studies concerning policy responsiveness have shown that, following the theory of dynamic representation, governments and political parties are generally responsive to public opinion in both policymaking and policy positions (Stimson et al. 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2005; Adams et al. 2004, 2006, 2009; Ezrow and Hellwig 2011). More specifically, and importantly for this study, parties have been found to take public attitudes on the issue of European integration into account when taking a position regarding integration (Arnold et al. 2012; Williams and Spoon 2015).
Causally, this responsiveness to public attitudes on European integration is due to parties’ vote- and office-seeking goals. In a desire to appeal to changing public preferences, win more votes, and ultimately increase the likelihood of winning office, political parties shift their positions to become more similar to those of the public. A more positive public attitude towards the EU (Europhilia) indicates that the public prefers more integration. Conversely, when the public is more negative about the EU (Eurosceptic), this indicates that the public prefers less integration. Thus, when the public is more Eurosceptic, political parties become more Eurosceptic, and when the public is more Europhilic, political parties are more Europhilic (see Arnold et al. 2012; Williams and Spoon 2012). These changes in party position should influence party actions in the legislature, including their actions towards transposition (see Toshkov 2007).
Transposition can be viewed as a policy tool which allows member state governments to respond to public attitudes regarding integration. As Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005, 2) wrote, “Transposition [has] important consequences for the effective functioning of the internal market, the even application of Union law, and the overall depth of policy integration in the EU.” Simply put, good faith transposition is imperative for deeper European integration. Good faith transposition (i.e. transposition that is done in a timely fashion) is a policy decision that implements European policies at the member state level, and thus contributes to a migration of policymaking competencies away from the member state and towards greater centralization of policymaking power in the EU institutions. Following this understanding, faster transposition of European directives can be seen as policy decision that pushes integration forward more quickly. Conversely, delaying or refusing to transpose directives can be seen as a policy decision designed to resist the Europeanization of policymaking power and to impede further integration.
Conversely, high levels of opposition to the EU, which indicate a public preference for less integration, suggest that public opinion is not with the historically pro-integration parties. Therefore, in order to avoid losing votes to more Eurosceptic challengers, parties that historically tend to be pro- integration, including government parties, should engage in actions that attempt to bring the party back in line with public attitudes. As research suggests that governments will respond to public opinion by addressing public policy, (see Stimson et al. 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2005), one would expect that higher levels of opposition to the EU should result in governing parties making anti-integration decisions.
One anti-integration action available to governing parties is to delay transposition.1 The
transposition of directives is a pro-integration decision as it implements European policies into member state laws, and similarly, delaying transposition is an anti-integration decision as it is resistance to the implementation of European policy at the member state level. As governing parties should respond to public opposition to the EU by engaging in anti-integration actions, it would then follow that government parties should delay transposition when public opposition to the EU is higher.
1 Although most transposition occurs in the bureaucracy of a member state, government leaders and parties play an important
role as veto players in the transposition process (for more on veto players in the process of transposition, see Steunenberg 2006). This should not be construed as to imply that governing parties are always veto players, but rather that governing parties have the power to act as a veto player on any directive.
Christopher J. Williams
Thus, from the above theory, it can be expected that higher levels of opposition to the EU will result in governing parties resisting transposition, and one can hypothesize:
Hypothesis: Higher levels of aggregate Euroscepticism in an EU member state result in
slower transposition of EU directives in that state.
Importantly, this theoretical construction does not require public knowledge of government action concerning the transposition of directives. Rather, this argument only requires that the public can become aware of government action concerning directive transposition (for a similar argument see Casillas et al. 2011). Resistance to transposition provides policy-makers (i.e. government parties) an opportunity, if questioned on the issue of European integration by more Eurosceptic entities (e.g. Eurosceptic parties), to argue that they have been pragmatic in implementing European policy — resisting European policies that they deem to be detrimental to their state. In essence, by resisting transposition, governing parties can, if necessary make a viable claim of defending the member state against Europeanization, while highlighting their desire to maintain member state autonomy and sovereignty. The ability to claim both defense from Europeanization, and the protection of state autonomy and sovereignty can minimize the likelihood that these Eurosceptic entities question a government party on the issue of European integration, and if the government party is questioned, this can reduce the risk that voters accept this argument. This reduces the risk that government parties lose votes to more Eurosceptic parties. Thus, it is not necessary for the public to be aware of government action on transposition, but rather, the public only need to be able to become aware.