The constitutional basis for foreign policy-making
With regards to the constitutional basis for Greek foreign policy making the following model applies. At the level of the government the main agents for foreign policy formulation and coordination are the Cabinet, KYSEA (Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence) which is presided over by the PM, and EDOS (Committee on International Economic Relations). KYSEA22, which is similar to the American National Security Council (NSC) and constitutes an ad hoc branch of the Cabinet is intended to promote effective coordination of the government in foreign and defence policy (Gkikas, 2005: 78-79; Zoras and Gkikas,
22
KYSEA comprises the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, Finance and Economy, Environment, and the deputy Foreign Minister. Depending on the agenda other ministers can participate including the General Secretary of the MFA. For a detailed account of KYSEA’s jurisdiction see Gkikas (2005), Zoras and Gkikas (2002)
107 2002: 26)., Even though KYSEA was conceived in post-dictatorial Greece (after 1974) as a symbol of the democratisation of the foreign policy process (Makris, 2007: 235-240) it raises questions with regards to its legality in decision making since it operates instead of the cabinet in plenum which is what the constitution provides for foreign policy making (Gkikas, 2005: 78). Despite the primacy of KYSEA in decision making in the area of foreign and international policy, this collective body is frequently bypassed by the PM and the FM. Significant efforts have been made to turn KYSEA into the central policy-formulating and decision making body (Ioakimidis, 1999:161) but the above synergy has prevailed (Griva, 2002). In the Greek political system the PM is recognised by the constitution as the
primus solus actor (Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997: 46; Makridimitris, 1992:
28).
The aforementioned constitutional provision together with the long established unquestioned ministerial allegiance to the PM, render him the ultimate foreign policy maker whereas significant input is afforded by the FM (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 268; Griva, 2002: 46; Makridimitris, 1992: 35). The PM is in charge of the state’s representation abroad and determines relations with ‘foreign subjects’. The participation of the PM in international and European summits is a good example. The FM formulates foreign policy based on the special instructions received by the PM and represents the state abroad in other fora. The appropriation/distribution of the roles between the two depends on the political significance of the issues at hand for the national interest (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 268). The FM cannot make decisions independently from the PM on high politics but, rather, follows the PM’s instructions, whether in agreement with the PM or not. Constitutionally, the FM and the rest of the ministers must respect the constitutional dominance of the PM (Constitution, 2008, art. 37, para. 1).
Forming part of the executive and of the governmental mechanism but not a governmental body in itself in the sense that it comprises consultants and experts
108 outside the governmental machinery, the National Council of Foreign Policy23 comprises members of the parliament and external experts (Art. 82 para 4 of the 2008 Greek Constitution) and makes up the constitutional consultative body to the cabinet (Gkikas, 2005: 84-87). Despite the official constitutional role of governmental collective bodies such as the cabinet and KYSEA, foreign policy - especially this part which relates to low policy-is, to a large extent, formulated by the bureaucratic mechanism. In this respect the primary role is held by the PMO and the Ministers’ offices and most precisely the FM’s office, and to a lesser degree the Minister of Defence’s office, together with the MFA’s diplomatic service. The upper bureaucratic levels of the ministries provide continuity and coherence and remain in office irrespective of the government of the day (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270).
The MFA is considered to be the ultimate bureaucratic actor for foreign policy- making and implementation. However, an increasing number of other government departments are having an input to the foreign policy process, but as the discussion in the next chapter indicates, this input is still limited. The MFA’s role in the policy process has been central and unquestioned. Even when other government agents participate in foreign policy-making, the MFA is the conditio
sine qua non in policy planning, formulation and implementation (Makridimitris and
Stoforopoulos, 1997: 41, 97).
The MFA’s latest Charter (Article 6 Law 3566/2007) provides that for the coherent expression of Greek foreign policy, ministries, other government departments and local authorities cooperate with and report to the MFA for all matters relating to the state’s foreign and international relations thus affirming the primacy of the MFA vis- á-vis other government departments. The article establishes inter-ministerial cooperation but most importantly, it establishes the supremacy of the MFA vis-à- vis the rest of the bureaucracy by vesting the ministry with foreign and international policy coordination (Article 6 paras b and c). In charge of the monitoring and
23
109 assessment of foreign policy is the Greek Parliament but, as demonstrated below, its role to date has been characterised as ‘cosmetic’ (Couloumbis, 1983).
The Greek Parliament in the foreign policy process
The role of the Parliament in Greek public policy making and especially in foreign policy-making has been significantly limited (Featherstone, 1996: 10; Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 45). There are two reasons for this: firstly, because its role as provided for by the Greek constitution is limited to policy review; and secondly, because the Parliament in the Greek political system is significantly vulnerable against political pressures (Karabarbounis, 2005: 320). The Greek Parliament has been dominated by two major parties, which have managed in the last three decades to secure single party majorities. As a result, the parliament has always been captive to Greek governments24 and served as a forum for political debates (Ioakimidis, 1994: 150). Even though it has the right to conduct a referendum if it is decided that crucial national interests are at stake (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270) it hardly ever performs this task.
A member of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign and European affairs (Interview, no 10) stated that
‘It is common practice for foreign policy positions to be presented to the committee a posteriori. Policy is merely presented to the committee for ratification and the whole task of parliamentary control has become somewhat procedural’.
Another official argued that the only incentive for parliamentarians’ involvement is that they receive payment for the questions on policy that they direct to the political leadership (Interview, no 30). Naturally, the involvement of parliamentary committees in foreign policy formulation has been characterised as merely
24
110 ‘decorative’ in the sense that they only validate and legalise decisions rather than substantially contributing to foreign policy-making either through recommendations or through control (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270; Couloumbis, 1983: 111).
In terms of parliamentary diplomacy, the Greek Parliament follows, to an extent, patterns observed worldwide with slowly increasing involvement in the promotion of Greece’s international relations. Diplomatic action is represented by the development of bilateral parliamentary exchange, participation in parliamentary fora and association in European processes. The main patrons of such processes are the various parliamentary bodies such as the Presidency of the Parliament, the Standing Parliamentary Committees such as the committees for Foreign and European Affairs, for Religion, for Expatriates and others. Equally important are the parliamentary representations to international organisations such as the European Council, NATO, CSCE, WEU, BSEC and others. Such parliamentary action is supported by a series of bodies of officials such as the Diplomatic Cabinet of the Parliament and the MFA’s Secretariat for International Economic Relations (Karabarbounis, 2005: 321).
The inability of the Parliament to contribute to strategy-setting regarding foreign policy, economic policy or even education and defence has added to its limited exercise of parliamentary diplomacy. An underlying problem is that the majority of the parliamentarians who become part of the MFA’s political leadership do not believe in the exercise of diplomacy by the parliament. They have a traditional approach to the conduct of diplomacy which they consider to be the prerogative of traditional diplomats. Once part of the political leadership of the MFA, they do not appear in the parliament to inform fellow parliamentarians about their work. There have been cases of foreign ministers with a long tenure, for instance of seven years, who never appeared before the parliament (Tsouderou, 1992:65). The same delays are manifest in the ratification of international contracts by the parliament, with large numbers of international contracts remaining non-ratified thus posing problems for the governments’ pursuit of Greek interests abroad. With the constitutional basis for foreign policy making presented in the present section,
111 the following sections will focus on those elements in the domestic environment that form part of the Greek FPS. The next section focuses on Greek political culture.
Greek political culture and foreign policy
Political culture is a crucial determinant of political behaviour and organisation (Papoulias et al, 2005: 87) and at the same time, a very a complex area to handle. It has been argued that not only does political culture influence foreign policy- making but it can also amount to a source of foreign policy-making on its own (Clarke, 1996: 22). Greece appears to be a distinctive case amongst its fellow EU member states because it is the only member-state with a cultural identity with elements of Orthodoxy, Byzantine tradition, classical influences as well as the Ottoman legacy (Ioakimidis, 1994: 143; 1996: 46; 2003: 107). The search for sources of Modern Greek culture should start with the Greek experience, with Ottoman rule, under which it existed for four centuries.
The environment in which Greek society developed its attitude toward politics, law, the state and public policy as well as foreign policy is described by Diamandouros (1983: 44) as agrarian, theocratic and pre-capitalist, which demanded obedience and tax revenues from its subjects thus forcing them to seek protection in families and clientage networks25. Such practices seem to be perpetuated today and to
25
For a more analytical description of the society in which Greece developed its attitude towards politics and the state see Diamandouros (1983). Part of the author’s description is provided as follows: ‘Basically, we are talking about an overwhelmingly agrarian, pre-capitalist society and
economy situated at the periphery of a theocratic, Asiatic empire which, true to its military origins and pre-modern essence, sought not assimilation but obedience, military service and tax revenues from its subject peoples. During the heyday of theEmpire, enlightened centralised administration afforded the peasant at the bottom of the social pyramid a modicum of security and protection. [...] however, from the seventeenth century onwards, western commercial capitalism, precipitated a number of centrifugal forces which not only destroyed the traditional bases for security and
protection in the countryside but, in addition, brought about conditions of lawlessness, arbitrariness, increasing oppression, and profound uncertainty which, over time, became endemic features of Ottoman society. These conditions, which were even more exacerbated at the periphery of the weakening Empire, forced the individual to seek, more than ever before, private means of security and protection. And in a deeply traditional pre-capitalistic social formation, where social
112 determine relationships between the state, political parties and society. Political socialisation of the individual within such a state of affairs led to the erosion of the state’s legitimacy26 which became the cause of discord in the war of independence that broke out (Diamandouros, 1983: 46). The same peculiar attitude applies to more recent history. The Civil War (1944-1949), the Colonels’ dictatorship and the fact that a large number of Greek families were refugees from hostile surrounding countries made Greeks very sensitive to any repetition of such humiliating and painful experiences and also very conservative and defensive (Pettifer, 1996: 19; Wenturis, 1994: 227).
The country’s geographical position aggravated its tendency for introversion manifested in its foreign policy. As a result, the Greek political attitude in the international environment became isolationist and xenophobic (Ioakimidis, 2003: 105), while domestically clientelism underlay all political and social interactions. Makridimitris (1994: 23) suggests that there is more than the well established clientelism and xenophobia in Greek political culture. Greek politico-administrative culture, which is still ‘a culture in transition’ (Featherstone, 1990b: 101) seems to derive from two contradicting normative orientations27. More specifically, it seems to have lain either on a traditionalist, Hellenocentric and populist orientation or on a more meritocratic, rational and modernising orientation both informing Greek foreign policy images. The former dominated Greek political attitudes and interactions for many decades and played a significant role in the formulation of
differentiation was minimal, the extended family emerged as the foremost defensive institution capable of offering invaluable protection to its members at all levels of society. [...] the extended family and the broader clientage network to which it gave rise as it spread both horizontally and vertically to fill up critical social space, became the central mechanism of social integration and organisation. ’
26
For an extensive description of individual socialisation in the antagonistic, unfair and elitist environment and particularly for the origins of the Greek attitude toward political power and office holding see Diamandouros, (1983) p. 45. In the same section the author also discusses the legal confusion that was created with the parallel use of three different bodies of laws. The Shari’a applied by the Ottoman authorities, the Byzantine law applied by the Greek Orthodox church and customary law applied by local authorities within the realm of their competence.
27
For more on the two models of the traditionalist prism society or Gemeinschaft and the rising civic culture or Gessellchaft see Makridimitris (1994)
113 the Greek national identity and international interests which focused on safeguarding Greek territorial and ethnic integrity.
In short, the Greek national identity and foreign policy attitude is epitomised in that ‘whatever is Greek is separate from anything foreign’. This strong view is due to the fact that Greece is one of the most homogenous societies in the EU based on its ethnic composition, language and religion and has never been faced with any demands for secession or separatism (Featherstone, 1996: 13). The ‘ethnos’ (nation) in Greece assumed social primacy and supremacy against notions such as individual rights. Greeks see themselves as ancestors of Alexander the Great or Pericles yet they are unable to conduct properly many of the basic functions of a modern democratic state (Pettifer, 1996: 18). They expect that the rest of the world appreciates them for their glorious past which has influenced Greek foreign policy especially with regards to Turkey (Ioakimidis, 2003: 107).
Besides the passionate and empathetic foreign policy and the nominal respect for the state and its institutions, which as explained above, is historically explained, Greeks also always possess a sense of distinctness and a fear of a threat to their territorial integrity (Ioakimidis, 2003: 104; Tsoukalis, 1996: 26) which, whilst not unfounded, has had major implications for the Greek foreign policy agenda as well as foreign policy processes and structures as explained in later chapters.
Their deep-rooted xenophobia makes them trust, even today, only immediate family and friends thus perpetuating the clientage pattern and weakening state institutions (Ioakimidis, 2003: 106). The Greek inability to separate the glorious past from current realities (Wenturis, 1994: 227) has often led to emotional and exaggerated reactions in the field of foreign policy28 in other words maximalist foreign policy, which as mentioned above seems to be characteristic of the Greek foreign policy-making model. Most importantly, it has attached a significant
28
A complementary reason of emotional foreign policy reactions comes from the rather excessive interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics; and more precisely in the use of foreign policy in order to either satisfy public opinion, to divert attention from domestic politics to (Clogg, 1993; Mitsotakis, 2006) or even to offer solutions to domestic problems (Hammond, 1965: 661).
114 secretive and introverted attitude to foreign policy-making. As an MFA official stated, Greek foreign policy makers are paranoid about information leakages which would give the enemy an advantage. ‘They, arguably, prefer to be
traditionalist than to modernise if this means that they have to share information’
(Interview, no 30).
Greek xenophobia and ‘inwardness’ has been termed as the ‘underdog’ syndrome or ‘the underdog culture’ which has had implications for Greek foreign policy (Diamandouros, 1983). This syndrome translates into the belief that Greece is treated as inferior by the Western world because the West envies it for its ‘glorious historical tradition’ and conspires against it to humiliate it. This stance has led to irrational attitudes both internationally and in the context of European institutions29 on several occasions, with Greece aligning with whoever appeared to be against the West or rejecting instantaneously any compromising act30 (Ioakimidis, 1996: 47).
The underdog culture has ascribed a traditionalist view to society and has dominated public foreign policy-making (Makridimitris, 1994: 24). The aforementioned concept of Hellenicity expressed through Hellenocentrism has been traditionally intertwined with orthodoxy in Greece. This dual perception of the Modern Greek state has had serious implications for the value structure of the society (Diamandouros, 1983: 57). While the overall involvement of the church in individual life has been in decline31 it remains one of the most influential institutions in terms of values, attitudes and beliefs and provides a parallel forum for political socialisation (Lambrias, 1988).
29
The case of the irrational Greek usage of its veto power in the context of the EPC is characteristic
30
This impression was further reinforced by the fact that Greece was proclaimed as a ‘delayed nation’ in terms of synchronisation with the rest of Europe (Wenturis, 1994: 228)
31
Until recently the mid 1980s priests were hired to teach at schools without any relevant teaching qualification and the priest together with the teacher constituted the two prominent figures in all rural areas. In the large number of villages of Greece, where illiteracy was 24% for those over ten years of age, the priest was viewed as the ethical leader of the village.
115 Not only has the Greek Church been a normal segment of national identity and domestic politics, a tendency which goes back to the War of Independence in the early nineteenth century, but it has also been a major determinant in many foreign policy matters (Pettifer, 1996: 18-19). For instance, the identification of Hellenicity with Orthodoxy has been an obstacle to the integration of ethnic and religious minorities32 into the Greek culture (Diamandouros, 1983: 55) and the Greek society, which has been criticised for social intolerance (Pettifer, 1996: 19) and for abuse of the rights of minority groups (Featherstone, 1996: 13). Such intolerance is even further aggravated and encouraged by schools and school texts which are virtually silent on groups such as the Kutzovlachs, the Pomaks, the Sarakatsans, the Albanian and Slav-speaking populations in Greece (Featherstone, 1996: 13). It seems that such egocentric and xenophobic views are embraced by the entirety of the educational system in Greece. The education system in Greece until very recently, has been characterised by a significant degree of authoritarianism and emphasis on discipline, rote-learning and authority. Critical thought and discussion have been strategically ignored and the transmission of finite knowledge in often obsolete, centrally prescribed textbooks has been repeatedly imposed (Diamandouros, 1983: 56). The worst consequence of this system was the creation of para-school private institutions, which prepared students for the university entry exams. At the university level, extensive reliance on professors’ texts, remoteness and authority of professors as well as pronounced formalism and intellectual rigidity make up a rigid system which encourages populism,