DATOS MICROECONOMICOS
2. Contraste de la Hipótesis de Renta Permanente en Colombia.
Cyprus is a presidential democracy, in which the government implements the policy decisions of the president and its parliamentary majority. The dominance of the ‘Cyprus question’ is so substantial that it is not only visible in external politics and policies, but also in the organisation of decision-making structures. It is reflected in a quintessentially Cypriot peculiarity, the National Council, whose consent is needed for the negotiations on the resolution of the ‘national problem’.473 While this body does not
directly affect Cyprus foreign policymaking, it demonstrates the tremendous weight that the ‘Cyprus question’ has in terms of national strategising. Cyprus has historically aimed to ‘protect’ or externalise its national priorities (that is, the ‘national problem’) at EU level, as an associate and candidate country, and now as a full EU member state.
The EU accession process is still fresh enough in Cypriot memory for the government to recognise that becoming an EU member state is an especially demanding, arduous and long path. Institutionally, Cyprus has incorporated the European component at all working levels and all aspects of its foreign policy. First, the Ministerial Committee for EU Affairs and the Diplomatic Office were established in the Presidential Palace. Prior to accession, the Office of the Chief Negotiator was set up by then President Glafkos Clerides, which continued for about a year after accession as the office for harmonisation. More recently, ahead of the Cyprus EU Presidency, the temporary Office of the Undersecretary for EU affairs was set up under Ambassador Andreas Mavroyiannis, which was closed down with the completion of the presidency. Second, a European Union Affairs Directorate was created in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance and a number of small EU units were set up in other ministries. Third, reforms in the Permanent Representation in Brussels saw the number of staff increase substantially – particularly during the Cyprus Presidency of the EU Council – to liaise with the relevant services in the EU institutions, fully participate in the Council meetings and better liaise with other member state representations in Brussels. Fourth, the House of Representatives (Parliament) created a European Affairs Committee prior to accession. This has now merged with the Foreign Affairs Committee (creating the Foreign and European Affairs Committee), and a European Affairs Branch
472 The European Policy Centre, as standard practice, follows the European Commission in the usage of fYROM to denote the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
exists in the House civil service. Moreover, the Joint Parliamentary Committee brings together Members of the Cyprus Parliament and of the European Parliament.474
As with other member states, coordination of EU policy is a two-way exchange between the Cypriot Permanent Representation and the government in Nicosia. To simplify an intricate procedure, drafts of the Commission’s proposals are communicated by the Permanent Representation to the EU Directorates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Planning Bureau, the Law Office of the Republic, and responsible ministries. The EU Directorate of the Foreign Affairs Ministry acts as the de facto central coordination authority of the state on EU affairs and consults with relevant government stakeholders to prepare the country’s common position. Throughout this consultation process, EU legislation is also examined by the House of Representatives’ Foreign and European Affairs Committee and other competent parliamentary committees, and the EU Directorate of the House of Representatives that shape the executive’s stand, and debate and scrutinise its position.475 The
Parliament can counterbalance its weakness towards the executive through the safeguards of its autonomy and its ability to introduce legislation or persuade the government. But in practice, the Cyprus issue has been the greatest catalyst for consensus within the Parliament and the government. In that sense, the Parliament has not been a vocal actor questioning government policy on foreign affairs, especially not on issues that would ‘jeopardise’ national interests.476
EU accession inevitably brought adaptation and policy convergence of Cyprus with the EU institutions and policies, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP) statements, declarations and démarches. The country began taking national positions that were previously inconceivable, as long as they did not compromise the ‘national problem’. For example, already in September 1998 and 2000, Cyprus implemented an oil and arms embargo and financial sanctions on the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and banned flights and officials.477 Cyprus has
also joined CSDP agencies (the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre, the EU Institute for Security Studies, and the European Security and Defence College), but Turkey has vetoed its participation in a number of international arrangements where the consent of all members is required if new states want to join (namely NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme478 and the ‘Berlin Plus’479
arrangement between NATO and the EU). Cyprus has also participated in CSDP missions in the Western Balkans and has contributed to the police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (with four police officers) and fYROM (EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT, with two and one police officers respectively).480 However,
due to restrictions imposed by the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement, it has no staff in the EU’s military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea).
In 2014, for the first time, the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a National Strategy for EU Issues, a policy document that aims to define the main priorities and ambitions of Cyprus in the EU, “taking into account the particularities of our country”, and includes preliminary action points for its
474 Stavridis, Stelios and Kasimeris, Christos (2013), “Cyprus: the limits of European solidarity with a small member state” in
Baun, Michael and Marek, Dan (eds.), The new member states and the European Union: foreign policy and Europeanisation, London: Routledge, pp. 145-146.
475 Sepos, Angelos (2008), The Europeanisation of Cyprus: polity, policies and politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.
51-52.
476 Interview with official in the House of Representatives, 28 May 2014. 477 Sepos (2008), op. cit., p. 122.
478 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner
countries and NATO. Cyprus sees the PfP as a possible precursor to full NATO membership.
479 The ʻBerlin Plusʼ agreement refers to a comprehensive package of security arrangements finalised in early 2003 between
the EU and the NATO that allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (including its planning capabilities and NATOʼs Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe).
implementation.481 It is a first concrete indication that the EU is actively thought of at a strategic level
and that international action is not only conceived within the UN parameters (Cyprus’ natural home base) but increasingly within the framework of the EU – “on the basis of EU norms and values”.482 A close look
at the key objectives mentioned in this policy paper shows how closely aligned they are with the priority areas identified in the Strategic Agenda for the Union at Times of Change, which the European Council agreed upon on 27 June 2014.483 While this constitutes further evidence of the Europeanisation of
Cyprus’ foreign policy, it also means that EU enlargement or the Western Balkans do not figure in Cyprus’ national strategy. In practice, this means that the Cyprus government will not table an initiative on EU enlargement but, if invited, will participate – as it did, for instance, in the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments (COSAC) events on the Western Balkan region, organised by the Slovenian Presidency in 2008 and the Irish Presidency in 2013.484
When planning its foreign policy (especially the compromises at stake), the Cyprus government also considers public opinion. European integration was, until recently, valued in Cyprus and perceived as reinforcing the country’s international role and image. The Cypriot public, decision and opinion makers, businesses and organised groups considered belonging to the European family as a serious asset. A look at the 2006 Eurobarometer, for example, shows that more than half of the citizens (56%) stated that they had a positive image of the European Union. The economic crisis, however, has dampened the enthusiasm for Europe in Cyprus, as noted in the same Eurobarometer.485 The July 2014 Eurobarometer
survey on Europeans in 2014 shows that public opinion support for Europe has markedly decreased. Cyprus is one of only two member states (the other one being the UK) where a majority of people surveyed agree (51%, versus 43% who disagree) that their country could better face the future outside of the EU.486 In addition, Cyprus is among the three least trusting countries, with only 22% of respondents
saying they trust the EU (at the same level as the UK, and just above Greece and Italy).487
Another important aspect of Cyprus’ foreign policy is the country’s small size. It poses serious limitations in terms of its output and international clout when, for example, negotiating its position at the European level (even if all member states are ‘among equals’), defending its particular position on the ‘national problem’, and managing the different standpoints and degrees of support of other EU member states to its sensitivities. Size is a policy factor that Cyprus instrumentalises in two ways: first, as a similarity with its partners. For instance, on a recent visit to Montenegro, Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides discussed the role, importance and possible cooperation of small EU member states.488
Second, it uses its size in its legal argumentation. Former Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Markoulli (2011) made this link in one of her articles: “[f]or the Republic of Cyprus, a small and fairly young state, our sovereignty and sovereign rights, as these are prescribed and safeguarded by international law, are of paramount importance”.489
481 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus (2014), Εθνική Στρατηγική για Θέματα ΕΕ [National Strategy for EU Issues],
Nicosia, p.1.
482 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014), op. cit., p. 2.
483 See European Council, European Council Conclusions 26/27 June 2014, EUCO 79/14, Brussels, p. 14-20. 484 Interview with official in the House of Representatives, 28 May 2014.
485 European Commission (autumn 2006), National Report. Executive Summary. Cyprus (Areas under the Control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus), Eurobarometer 66, Public Opinion in the European Union, Brussels: TNS opinion & social and Directorate-General Communication, European Commission, pp. 5-7.
486 Special Eurobarometer 415, Europeans in 2014, p. 46. 487 Ibid., p. 49.
488 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, Ολοκληρώθηκε η επίσκεψη του Υπουργού Εξωτερικών στο Μαυροβούνιο.
[The Foreign Ministers’ visit to Montenegro has ended], press release, 26 February 2014, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/C900995ADB178DE8C2257C8B00451C90?OpenDocument&highlight=%C E%92%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%BA%CE%AC%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%B1 (last accessed on: 25 August 2014).
489 Kozakou-Marcoullis, Erato (2011), “The sovereign rights of small state”, Foreign Affairs (Hellenic Edition, in Greek).
The Europeanisation of Cyprus’ foreign policy has also called for adjustments in the government’s relations with its allies. Following EU accession, Cyprus withdrew from the non-aligned movement, which it had helped form in the early 1960s. This framework had allowed Cyprus to foster good relations with Russia (and by extension traditionally favour pro-Serbia positions) and to build links with China. These two global players have historically backed Cyprus politically in the UN Security Council (Russia has consistently supported Cyprus’ wording of UNSC resolutions) and financially (Cyprus has a €2.5 billion ‘stabilisation loan’ from Russia and was offered a loan from China, which it declined).490
Following the election of President Nicos Anastasiades in February 2013, Cyprus took a U-turn on NATO (hoping to join the PfP programme) and strengthened relations with the United States.491 While the
current centre-right president is less keen than his communist predecessor on following the Russian line, he also recognises that his “small homeland” is “largely dependent on the Russian Federation, whether its economy, or services, or tourism, or defence, or solidarity on the Cyprus issue”.492
Consequently, as Stavrinidis and Kassimeris explain, the special relationship of Cyprus with Russia and China may be seen as “ring fencing”, that is, as drawing ‘red lines’ that hinder the Europeanisation of foreign policy.493