IMPUESTOS DIRECTOS (COMO PORCENTAJE DEL PIB)
4. Hipótesis de ciclo de vida y renta permanente
Bilateral relations with fYROM deserve attention as they are the most visible and debated part of Bulgaria’s policy on Balkan enlargement. Bulgaria is supportive of fYROM’s aspirations to join the EU but the ties between the two countries have deteriorated over time, and Bulgaria is no longer unconditionally backing Skopje’s membership bid.
With regard to the so-called “disputes over history”, the mainstream view in Bulgaria is that the Macedonian nation emerged in early 20th century, and was reinforced during the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia and the socialist period. Therefore, Macedonia’s history is seen as part of Bulgarian history, and its language as being based on the Bulgarian language. In contrast, the conventional wisdom in fYROM is that it underwent a separate linguistic and national historical development from Bulgaria, which stretches back to medieval times, or to antiquity with Alexander the Great. This clash of readings of the past affects some key figures and events of the 19th/20th centuries, as each side claims them as
419 OSI-Sofia, 2011.
part of its own history. Bulgaria’s proposal to have joint celebrations of historic events was found unacceptable by the majority of Macedonian politicians.
Yet such disputes about history and identity have often disguised concerns about irredentism, for example the possible territorial claims of fYROM over parts of Bulgaria (namely, Pirin Macedonia in Bulgaria’s south-west), as well as about the mistreatment of Macedonian citizens who identify as Bulgarians and, more generally, about the negative portrayal of Bulgaria in the media, history books or films sponsored by the government in Skopje420. All these are seen as damaging good neighbourly
relations and also tend to become the subject of the regular progress reports by the European Commission under the “regional cooperation” rubric.421
The bilateral political relations between Bulgaria and fYROM had seen ups and downs throughout the years. Bulgaria was the first country to recognise the newly independent Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name on 15 January 1992. Reportedly, the then-President of Bulgaria, Zhelyu Zhelev, persuaded his counterpart, Boris Eltsin, that Russia should also recognise the new republic422. In 1999,
contacts between the two countries peaked with the signing of a declaration on good neighbourly relations, which was supposed to solve – or at least put aside – many of their historical and identity hurdles.
But in the mid-2000s, relations between Sofia and Skopje began to deteriorate as the Bulgarian government came to the conclusion that the authorities in Skopje were antagonising Bulgaria. The statement made in 2006 by the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivaylo Kalfin, that “Bulgaria will no longer support unconditionally the EU integration of Macedonia”, marked a turning point in Bulgaria’s official approach towards fYROM423.
In 2012, the Bulgarian government said that it would not support fYROM’s opening of accession talks with the EU.424 Bulgaria was convinced that the government in Skopje did not intend to work on
improving relations with Sofia after it essentially rebuffed in 2011 the proposal of Bulgaria’s then- Foreign Minister, Nickolay Mladenov, to sign a bilateral agreement. The proposed pact on good neighbourly relations was considered as the main solution to bilateral issues between Bulgaria and fYROM; in 2015 the proposal is still on the table.
420 Bulgarian MEPs and the Bulgarian government have repeatedly raised the issue of people with Bulgarian identity living in
fYROM, with Bulgaria’s ambassador to the EU Dimiter Tzantchev saying that his country was losing patience with Skopje’s reprisals against Macedonian citizens who identified themselves as Bulgarian; information from 8 May 2013, available at: http://www.mfa.bg/en/events/6/1/770/index.html (last accessed on 10 February 2015). See also “Bulgarian FM Mladenov speaks on Macedonia’s ‘Third Half’ film controversy”, Sofia Globe, 14 September 2012, available at: http://sofiaglobe.com/2012/09/14/bulgarian-fm-mladenov-speaks-on-macedonias-third-half-film-controversy/ (last accessed: 2 February 2015). Three Bulgarian MEPs sent a letter to EU enlargement commissioner Stefan Füle about the film (http://www.andrey-kovatchev.eu/en/news/view/2/2139).
421 In The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2013 Progress Report, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council, COM (2013) 700 final, Brussels, 16 October 2013.
422 See the interview with Stefan Tafrov, Deputy Foreign Minister in 1991-1992, “Стефан Тафров: Как признахме
Македония и отворихме европейския път на България” [“How we recognised Macedonia and opened the European way to Bulgaria”], Balgarska armia, 17 January 2012, available (in Bulgarian) at: http://e-vestnik.bg/13651 (last accessed on 9 February 2015).
423 See “Думи на министър Калфин разгневиха Скопие” [“Statements of Minister Kalfin angered Skopje”], Mediapool, 24
July 2006, available at: http://www.mediapool.bg/dumi-na-ministar-kalfin-razgneviha-skopie-news119751.html (last accessed on: 10 February 2015).
424 See Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, General Affairs Council Meeting,
Brussels, 11 December 2012, available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/134234.pdf (last accessed on: 9 February 2015).
Politicians and experts in Bulgaria consider that the government in Skopje is at best not friendly towards Bulgaria, and at worst deliberately provoking Sofia for political mobilisation along nationalistic lines. Moreover, there is the suspicion that Macedonian officials are not sincere in their EU integration efforts, and prefer to capitalise on a siege mentality – that is, reinforcing a collective feeling among the public of isolation and victimisation blamed on outside players.
While for some the situation between Bulgaria and fYROM might bring to mind the name dispute between Athens and Skopje425, Bulgaria strives to distance itself from such associations. As one of the
interviewees put it: “Bulgaria closely watches what Greece is doing, sometimes to do the same and sometimes to do exactly the opposite”426.
Moreover, technical and cross-border cooperation (such as EU-funded cooperation among border regions and transport infrastructure projects) between Bulgaria and fYROM is thought to happen far more smoothly than bilateral spats would suggest. This also includes symbolic gestures, such as when Bulgarian organisations do not use the acronym ‘fYROM’ or ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ that is required for official use in the EU and which Skopje finds offensive.
Table 14.1: Support for fYROM’s EU entry in Bulgaria
Q: Would you support EU membership for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and under what conditions?
Unconditional support 17%
Support only after signing bilateral agreement 42%
Oppose Macedonia’s EU membership 19%
Source: Exacta poll, 2013
Whereas Bulgarian politicians, experts and opinion leaders tend to agree on how they assess fYROM’s attitude towards Sofia, they can diverge with regard to the form and substance of the response to Skopje. The Bulgarian government’s tougher stance towards fYROM adopted in 2012 was critically received by both centre-right and left427, including two former presidents of the country. First, it was believed that
this would backfire, further reinforcing anti-Bulgarian feelings in fYROM and enabling the Skopje authorities428 to rally support against an ‘external enemy’. Second, many were apprehensive of the image
of Bulgaria in the EU if it were to be associated with the unrelenting opposition of Greece to fYROM. Coupled with the low level of knowledge about Bulgaria’s motivation among its European partners, it was feared that this would tarnish the image of the country in the EU. Third, this was seen as a negation of Bulgaria’s own top priority, to see its neighbour advance on the EU path as soon as possible.
425 Greece opposes the name “Republic of Macedonia”, considering it a claim over its own Macedonia region. The latest EC
progress report on fYROM says: “The failure of the parties to this dispute to reach a compromise after 19 years of UN- mediated talks is having a direct and adverse impact on the country’s European aspirations.” European Commission (2014), The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress Report, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia- progress-report_en.pdf (last accessed on: 10 February 2015).
426 An observation made during an interview for the current article.
427 Position of Ivaylo Kalfrin, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2005-2009, published on his personal blog on 29 December
2012: “Къде сбърка ГЕРБ с Македония” [“Where Did GERB Go Wrong with Macedonia?]), available at: http://kalfin.eu/bg/kade-barka-gerb-s-makedoniya/ (last accessed on: 9 February 2015).
428 The position of Meglena Kuneva, former EU Commissioner and leader in Bulgaria of the Citizens Party. “Партията на Кунева атакува ГЕРБ за Македония” [“The party of Kuneva attacks GERB over Macedonia”], Mediapool, 27 December 2012, available (in Bulgarian) at: http://www.mediapool.bg/partiyata-na-kuneva-atakuva-gerb-za-makedoniya- news201112.html (last accessed on: 9 February 2015).
Concerning public opinion, a poll by the Exacta agency from December 2013429 showed that 17% of
Bulgarians offered unconditional support for fYROM’s EU membership, while 42% would support it only after signing the bilateral agreement on cooperation and good neighbourly relations. Thus, only 19% oppose fYROM’s membership versus 59% who support it (conditionally and unconditionally).