Perfil del ahorrador colombiano

17.1 Introduction 179

17.1.1 Domestic political dynamics and the EU 180

17.2 Positions on enlargement 181

17.2.1 General view on enlargement 181

17.2.2 EU enlargement to the Balkan countries 181

17.2.3 Public opinion on enlargement 183

17.2.4 Perceptions of other member states and EU institutions 184

17.3 How is the Swedish position on enlargement formed? 185

17.4 Why does Sweden adopt this position? 186

17.5 Conclusions 187

17.1 INTRODUCTION

Historically, the field of security and defence has had a considerable impact on Swedish policy towards Europe, creating both impetuses and obstacles to action. Such conditions have shaped Sweden’s traditional international approach. After World War II, Sweden failed in its attempts to form a defence alliance with Norway and Denmark, and thus chose to remain non-aligned, like Finland. A policy of neutrality came to define Sweden’s conduct and the way it was perceived by others. In geographic terms, the period of the Cold War meant that Swedish policies regarding peace and security were more focused on parts of the world such as Africa and Latin America than on Europe, where positions were locked between the East and West.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union – the only possible military threat to Sweden – the context in which Sweden formed its policies changed completely. While non- alignment was retained, the policy of neutrality was formally abolished and replaced with a pro- European policy. Within a year, Sweden had announced its intentions to join the European Community – an aspiration that would have previously been impossible to reconcile with Sweden’s neutrality policy, given the EU’s budding security policy. On 1 January 1995, Sweden, together with Finland and Austria, were admitted as members of the EU after an uncomplicated process of negotiations, in which Sweden sought no exceptions.

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, Sweden also initiated a closer relationship with NATO in all fields except the common defence guarantee, which is Article 5 of NATO’s statutes. The development of ever-closer relations continued at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, when Sweden

formally became part of a group of five partner countries, seen as making “particularly significant contributions” to NATO operations.532

17.1.1 Domestic political dynamics and the EU

Sweden joined the EU after a referendum in which those in favour won with a narrow majority533_{. In}

spite of this, there is not much disagreement on important areas of EU activity, including enlargement. However, disparities become apparent when talking about the EU as an organisation, where the Left Party, the Green Party and the Sweden Democrats differ from other political actors in that they are more critical.

To be sure, Europe as an idea has not taken firm root in Sweden, either in leading political circles or among the wider public, and outright support for federalism is uncommon. In fact, the 2014 elections to the European Parliament revealed a shared view among political parties and their electorates that the subsidiarity principle needed to be strengthened. According to this argument, the EU should leave things that would be better handled on a national level to the member states.

However, weak interest in the idea of Europe and widespread support for the principle of subsidiarity do not necessarily preclude a strong commitment to the issues with which the EU deals. During the 2014 European elections campaign, Swedish politicians spoke out in favour of the EU becoming more active in areas such as democracy and human rights, economic growth and employment, free trade, mobility within the EU, the environment, enlargement, a humane refugee policy, and sustainable development. They also advocated for the EU to do more in the fight against protectionism and international crime, as well as in the treatment of animals and women’s issues. The Left Party and the Sweden Democrats, the two parties positioned on opposite sides of the political spectrum, were more critical towards the EU than the others, claiming that Sweden, like the UK, should have a referendum on EU membership.

At the same time, a growing ambition on the part of Sweden to become an active member of the EU has materialised over the years.534 _{Yet the fact that Sweden is not part of the eurozone or NATO has}

sidelined the country in two of the most important fields of European cooperation. Both of these issues are determined by public opinion. The referendum of 2003 decided against joining the euro and a new referendum would now certainly lead to similar results. With regards to NATO, the polls have recently shown an increase in support for joining, most likely due to Russia’s aggressive behaviour towards Sweden. The latest figures from the Civil Contingencies Agency’s annual poll show 48% of respondents to be in favour, with 35% preferring to continue the non-alignment policy and 17% undecided about NATO membership.535 _{Furthermore, Sweden has been much engaged in EU security policy, including}

also of its military aspects, having taken part in all the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The initiative of the EU to take over the military tasks of the Western European Union (WEU) was prompted by Sweden and Finland, which were eager to participate in and influence decision making in this area. Sweden takes battlegroups seriously: it now leads the third Nordic battlegroup and has also tried, albeit to no avail, to employ the battlegroups in tasks.

532 _{The other countries are Australia, Finland, Georgia and Jordan.}

533 _{In the referendum on 13 November 1994, 52.3 % voted in favour of joining the EU, 46.8 % voted against it, and 0.9 %}

gave a blank vote.

534 _{Sweden has been ranked as a leader in 10 fields and was behind in only one, thereby sharing third place with Germany in}

terms of activity (after France and the UK), European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014, European Council on Foreign Relations, p. 18.

535 _{Opinioner 2014 [Opinions 2014], Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap [Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency],}

17.2 POSITIONS ON ENLARGEMENT

17.2.1 General view on enlargement

Since it became an EU member state, Sweden has endorsed enlargement. This policy line has been consistent in spite of changes in government. Among political parties, the stance on enlargement is generally strongly favourable, with the exception of the Sweden Democrats, who argue that Turkey should not join the Union.536

In the run up to the 2004 enlargement, Sweden fought hard for the admission of the Baltic countries into the EU at a time when few other member states saw them as desirable members of the Union, not least due to their geographical proximity to Russia. This was a continuation from when the Commission had only included Estonia in its Agenda 2000, back in 1997. Sweden has also made the case for the so-called ‘regatta approach’, according to which all aspiring states should be allowed to start negotiations, and to accede if and when they are ready. This position was accompanied by an emphasis on a strict application of the criteria for accession. The approach finally passed at the Helsinki European Council.537 _{Sweden’s sustained work to help the then-EU-hopeful countries of Central and}

Eastern Europe was also mirrored in the fact that ‘enlargement’ was one of the three ‘E’s in the motto of the Swedish presidency of 2001 (the others being ‘employment’ and ‘environment’).

This positive attitude towards enlargement was maintained in Sweden even after the Social Democratic government was replaced in 2006 by a centre-right alliance with Fredrik Reinfeldt as Prime Minister and Carl Bildt as Foreign Minister. The Eastern partnership (EaP), initiated by Poland and Sweden in 2008, while not formally related to enlargement, does not—in the mind of Sweden— exclude the EaP countries from ultimately becoming EU members.

The Swedish standpoint on enlargement is illustrated in an article by Carl Bildt. After a suggestion made by Chancellor Merkel concerning the definition of the EU’s future borders, Bildt wrote in 2006: “Drawing big lines on big maps of Eastern Europe risks becoming a dangerous process. We should know that such a process would have profound effects in those areas or nations that fear ending up on the other side of those lines. We could easily see forces of atavistic nationalism or the submission to other masters taking over when the light of European integration – however, vague or distant – is put out.”538

17.2.2 EU enlargement to the Balkan countries

Sweden was involved in the efforts to put a stop to the wars in the Balkans and helped out with the humanitarian crisis on the ground. Starting in 1993, the country participated in UN-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, from 1995 under NATO in SFOR and IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thereafter in the EU’s Athena. Between 1995 and 1997, Carl Bildt was High Commissioner for the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the spring of 2001, while Sweden held the EU presidency, much was done in close cooperation with NATO and the EU to prevent the escalation of bloodshed in the former

536 _{They claim that Turkey does not belong in the EU and that admitting this large country would have serious consequences}

for the Swedish welfare system, considering the freedom of mobility in the EU.

537 _{Utrikesfrågor [Foreign Policy Issues]1997:76, “1997-11-28. Joint press release on the Danish-Swedish Initiative for a common}

start to the enlargement negotiations with all applicant states”. See also Europe 7121, 14 December 1997; Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999. See also Ojanen, Hanna together with Herolf, Gunilla & Lindahl, Rutger (2000), Non-Alignment and European Security Policy: Ambiguity at Work, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Institut für Europäisch Politik.

538 _{“Open wide Europe’s doors. Who wants to be ‘absorbed’ by the European Union and who can design the ‘borders of}

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) and to reach an agreement among the combatants. During the period of war, Sweden accepted large numbers of asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia. More than 100,000 of them were given permanent residence in Sweden.539

Other efforts have included a continued support for efforts to ensure stability in the area, such as within the EULEX and NATO’s KFOR in Kosovo, as well as within the UN and the OSCE, and Sweden’s contribution to the EU’s Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II).

The Swedish bilateral contributions in the region have been carried out through a strategic reform programme, which is adapted to the specific challenges of the Balkan countries and which aims to: 1) increase their economic integration within the EU and their transformation into market economies; 2) strengthen democracy, respect for human rights and the development of the rule of law; and 3) improve the environment and limit negative effects on the climate. In addition, a priority is given to measures targeting gender equality. Support is therefore given to initiatives that are seen to fulfil these goals. The importance of the Balkan accession process for Sweden is also evident from the large number of visits paid by the former Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, to the region, during his mandate.

Among the Balkan countries, Serbia is perceived as the most significant aspirant, for historical reasons and due to its size. The EU enlargement to the Balkans would be considered by Sweden to be a failure if it excluded Serbia. However, Serbia and all the other EU-hopeful countries in the Balkans are still in need of major transformation according to Stockholm.

Sweden’s engagement with the Balkans could also be seen during the 2009 presidency, when the arbitration agreement between Slovenia and Croatia was signed in Stockholm. Furthermore, a decision on visa-free travelling for Serbia, Montenegro and fYROM was taken during the presidency.

The strong support for further enlargement was also evident in Carl Bildt’s more recent reaction to reports that the incumbent President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, would not include an enlargement commissioner in his team. In the end, the enlargement portfolio was preserved, even if, as declared by President Juncker, no new admissions would take place within the next five years. While Sweden agrees that much reform is still needed in the countries of the region, the announced break in enlargement was interpreted as a sign of waning interest in widening the EU, and therefore at odds with Sweden’s intention to broker a meaningful negotiation process, preceded by strong efforts going into the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).

When commemorating the ten-year anniversary of the ‘big bang’ enlargement, Carl Bildt declared that Sweden’s enlargement policy was rooted in the conviction that enlargement makes a decisive contribution to stability, prosperity and democracy in Europe. According to Bildt, without the clear sense of direction that the perspective of the EU has given to all countries in the region, the relative political stability of the day would not have been secured.

Bildt also mentioned the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which stipulates that all European democracies have the right to apply for membership. He went on to point out the increased GDP of the new member states, an effect of their membership, which had benefited old member states as

539 _{Migrationsverket [The Migration Board], available at: http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-}