Cuestiones de Filosofía y Metodología general de la Ciencia

Forman parte de este epígrafe bibliográfico tanto lo que es Filosofía y Metodología general de la Ciencia, en sentido estricto, como los trabajos sobre cuestiones epistemológicas y metodológicas de las Ciencias Formales y de aquellas Ciencias Empíricas otras que las Ciencias Humanas y Sociales o las Ciencias de lo Artificial, que tienen ambas apartados propios. Buena parte de estos trabajos de Simon están en revistas especializadas de Filosofía, mientras que otros estudios pertenecen a otro tipo de publicaciones; en este caso figuran aquí por el tipo de enfoque, que es de conjunto, lo que hace más aconsejable su presencia en el marco general (por ejemplo, en casos como la predicción científica).

Son dos los epígrafes que articulan este apartado bibliográfico de Filosofía y Metodología general de la Ciencia: por un lado, están aquellos trabajos sobre conceptos y problemas en la Ciencia que se ocupan de temas de amplio espectro, como es por ejemplo la caracterización de la causalidad; y, por otro lado, se encuentran aquellos estudios sobre los modelos y el descubrimiento científico que aspiran a cubrir el plano general, al menos en lo que concierne a las Ciencias empíricas. Se trata de modelos científicos que guardan relación con el descubrimiento y, en su caso, con la posterior justificación de lo alcanzado. La reflexión metodológica de Simon sobre la predicción científica se ha ubicado en este último campo, debido al papel que le asigna en los modelos científicos. 118 _{Traducción italiana de Isabella Neri de una versión resumida del libro: Scienza Economica e Comportamento} Umano, Comunitá, Turín, 2000.

119 _{La perspectiva abarcante corresponde a los enfoques de Metodología especial de la Ciencia que conectan} con cuestiones filosóficas (semánticas, lógicas, epistemológicas, …), mientras que la orientación restringida se ocupa sólo de las cuestiones metodológicas que son específicas de una disciplina sin buscar la conexión con el ámbito filosófico. Cfr. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Marco teórico, trayectoria y situación actual de la Filosofía y Metodología de la Economía”, pp. 13-59; en especial, pp. 15-18.

6.2.1.1. Conceptos y problemas en la Ciencia

SIMON, H. A., “The Axioms of Newtonian Mechanics”, The Philosophical Magazine, v. 38, (1947), pp. 888-905. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 349-369.

SIMON, H. A., “On the Definition of the Causal Relation”, The Journal of Philosophy, v. 49, (1952), pp. 517-528. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Man, J. Wiley, N. York, 1957, pp. 50-61, y en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 81-92.

SIMON, H. A., “The Axiomatization of Classical Mechanics”, Philosophy of Science, v. 21, (1954), pp. 340-343. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 370-375.

SIMON, H. A., “Further Remarks on the Causal Relation” [Réplica a la reseña de N. Rescher sobre el artículo “On the Definition of the Causal Relation”], Journal of Philosophy, v. 52, (1955), pp. 20-21.

SIMON, H. A., “Definable Terms and Primitives in Deductive Systems in the Axiomatic Method: With Special Reference to Geometry and Physics”, en: International Symposium at the University of California, Berkeley, Diciembre 1957-Enero 1958, 1958, pp. 159-164.

SIMON, H. A., “Reply: Logical Positivism and Ethical Judgments” [Sobre el artículo de A. Koch “The Status of Values and Democratic Theory”], Ethics, v. 69, (1958), p. 62.

SIMON, H. A., “Definable Terms and Primitives in Axiom Systems”, en HENKIN, L., SUPPES,

P. y TARSKI, A. (eds), The Axiomatic Method, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1959, pp. 443-453. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 376-386.

SIMON, H. A., “A. Lotka: Elements of Mathematical Biology”, Econometrica, v. 27, (1959), pp. 493-495.

SIMON, H. A., “A Note on Almost-everywhere Definability” [Abstract], Journal of Symbolic Logic, v. 31, (1966), pp. 705-706. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, p. 387.

SIMON, H. A. y RESCHER, N., “Cause and Counterfactual”, Philosophy of Science, v. 33, (1966), pp. 323-240. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 107-134.

SIMON, H. A. y GROEN, G. J., “Ramsey Eliminability and the Testability of Scientific Theories”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 24, (1973), pp. 367-380. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 403-421.

SIMON, H. A., “The Axiomatization of Physical Theories”, Philosophy of Science, v. 37, (1979), pp. 16-26. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 388-402.

IJIRI, Y. y SIMON, H. A., “Some Distributions Associated with Bose-Einstein Statistics”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, v. 72, (1975), pp. 1654-1657.

SIMON, H. A., “Bradie on Polanyi on the Meno Paradox”, Philosophy of Science, v. 43, (1976), pp. 147-150.

SIMON, H. A., “Identifiability and the Status of Theoretical Terms”, en BUTTS, R. E. y

HINTIKKA, J. (eds), Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977, pp. 43-62. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 422-440.

SIMON, H. A., “Fit, Finite and Universal Axiomatization of Theories”, Philosophy of Science, v. 46, (1979), pp. 295-301.

SIMON, H. A., “Foreword”, en GLYMOUR, C., SCHEINES, R., SPIRTES, P. y KELLY, K. (eds), Discovering Causal Structure, Academic Press, N. York, NY, 1987, pp. xiii-xv.

SIMON, H. A., “Discussion: Progress in Philosophy”, en SIEG, W. (ed), Acting and Reflecting, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990, pp. 57-62.

SIMON, H. A., “Epistemology: Formal and Empirical”, en SIEG, W. (ed), Acting and Reflecting, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990, pp. 127-128.

SIMON, H. A., “The Human Mind: The Symbolic Level”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, v. 137, (1993), pp. 638-647.

SHEN, W. y SIMON, H. A., “Fitness Requirements for Scientific Theories containing Recursive Theoretical Terms”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 44, (1993), pp. 641-652.

SIMON, H. A., “Creativity in the Arts and Sciences” [In Cultures of Creativity: The Centennial Celebrations of the Nobel Prizes], The Kenyon Review, v. 23, n. 2, (2001), pp. 203-220.

SIMON, H. A., “Science seeks Parsimony, not Simplicity: Searching for Pattern in Phenomena”, en ZELLNER, A., KEUZENKAMP, H. A. y MCALEER, M. (eds), Simplicity, Inference and Modeling: Keeping it Sophisticatedly Simple, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, capítulo 3.

6.2.1.2. Modelos y descubrimiento científico

SIMON, H. A., “Prediction and Hindsight as Confirmatory Evidence”, Philosophy of Science, v. 22, (1955), pp. 227-230. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 20-24.

SIMON, H. A., “Models of Science” [Réplica a la reseña de Bush del libro Models of Man], Contemporary Psychology, v. 3, (1958), pp. 317-318.

SIMON, H. A., “The Meaning and Uses of Models” [Comentario sobre el artículo de P. Suppes], Synthese, v. 13, (1961), pp. 173-174.

SIMON, H. A., “Scientific Discovery and the Psychology of Problem Solving”, en COLODNY,

R. G. (ed), Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1966, pp. 22-40. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 286-303.

SIMON, H. A., “The Logic of Heuristic Decision Making”, en RESCHER, N. (ed), The Logic of Decision and Action, The University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 1967, pp. 1-20. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 154-178.

SIMON, H. A., “On judging the Plausibility of Theories”, en ROOTSELAAR, B. VAN y STAAL, J. F. (eds), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, III, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 439-459. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 25-48.

SIMON, H. A., “Does Scientific Discovery have a Logic?”, Philosophy of Science, v. 40, (1973), pp. 471-480. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Discovery, Reidel, Boston, 1977, pp. 326-337.

LARKIN, J. H., MCDERMOTT, J., SIMON, D. P. y SIMON, H. A., “Models of Competence in Solving Physics Problems”, Cognitive Science, v. 4, n. 4, (1980), pp. 317-345.

SIMON, H. A., LANGLEY, P. W. y BRADSHAW, G. L., “Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving”, Synthese, v. 47, (1981), pp. 1-27.

SIMON, H. A., “Unity of the Arts and Sciences: The Psychology of Thought and Discovery”, Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, v. 35, (1982), pp. 26-53.

SIMON, H. A., “Fitness Requirements for Scientific Theories”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 34, (1983), pp. 355-365.

ZYTKOW, J. M., LANGLEY, P. W. y SIMON, H. A., “A Model of Early Chemical Reasoning”, Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Boulder, CO, 1984, pp. 378-381.

SIMON, H. A., “Quantification of Theoretical Terms and the Falsifiability of Theories”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 36, (1985), pp. 291-298.

SIMON, H. A., “Understanding the Processes of Sciences: The Psychology of Scientific Discovery”, en GAMELIUS, T. (ed), Progress in Sciences and its Social Conditions, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 159-170.

SIMON, H. A., “Is Scientific Discovery a Topic in the Philosophy of Science?”, en RESCHER,

N. (ed), Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective, University Press of America, N. York, NY, 1987, pp. 1-16.

SIMON, H. A., “Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling”, en WEAVER, P. (ed), IIASA: Perspectives and futures: A report on the 15th Anniversary Conference, 14-15 junio, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1988, pp. 11-16.

SIMON, H. A., “Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling”, Operations Research, v. 38, (1990), pp. 7-14120_{. Compilado en SIMON, H. A., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 3:}

Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, pp. 115-128. SIMON, H. A., “Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v. 6, (1992), pp. 3-14.

SIMON, H. A., “Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving” [Reply to critics], International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v. 6, (1992), pp. 69-88.

SIMON, H. A., “What is a Systematic Method of Scientific Discovery?”, Working Notes, AAAI Spring Symposium on Systematic Methods of Scientific Discovery, Stanford University, 27-29 marzo, (1995), pp. 1-2.

SIMON, H. A., “The Theory of Scientific Discovery”, en GOTSCHL, J. (ed), Revolutionary changes in understanding man and society, Kluwer, Dordrect, 1995, pp. 55-73.

KLAHR, D. y SIMON, H. A., “Studies of Scientific Discovery: Complementary Approaches and Convergent Findings”, Psychological Bulletin, v. 125, n. 5, (1999), pp. 524-543.

SIMON, H. A., “The Discovery of Magnetic Induction of Current: The Interplay of Phenomena and Concepts” [Abstract], History of Science Society, 1999 Annual Meeting Program, (1999), p. 147.

SIMON, H. A., “Remarks on the Methodology of Science: Discovery and Verification”, en

ALT, J. E., LEVI, M. y OSTROM, E. (eds), Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science, Russell Sage Foundation, N. York, NY, 1999, pp. 326-330.

SIMON, H. A., “Foreword”, en KLAHR, D., Exploring Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, pp. ix-x.

SIMON, H. A., “Seek and ye shall Find: How Curiosity Engenders Discovery”, en CROWLEY,

K. D., SCHUNN, C. D. y OKADA, T. (eds), Designing for Science: Implications from Everyday Classroom, and Professional Settings, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 2001, pp. 3-18.

KLAHR, D. y SIMON, H. A., “What have Psychologists (and others) Discovered about the Process of Scientific Discovery?”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, v. 10, n. 3, (2001), pp. 75-79.

SIMON, H. A., “Learning to Research about Learning”, en CARVER, S. M. y KLAHR, D. (eds), Cognition and instruction: Twenty-five years of progress, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 2001, pp. 205-226.

SIMON, H. A., “Foreword”, en KLOESGEN, W. y ZYTKOW, J. M. (eds), Handbook of Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.