Although the movement had been incubating in north-eastern Nigeria since 1995, its transformation into an armed violent group can be traced to events leading up to the 2003 general elections in Nigeria. Shortly after the original founder of the sect, Abubakar Lawan, left for further studies in Saudi Arabia, a committee of clerics appointed Mohammad Yusuf as their leader in 2002. Afterwards, Moham- mad Yusuf ousted the clerics who appointed him on allegations of their corrup- tion and failure to properly interpret the teaching of the Quran. In its early years, the group under Yusuf’s spiritual leadership and command:
strove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order to intellectualise and radicalise the revolu-
tionary process that would ultimately lead to violent overthrow of the Nigerian state. (Isa 2010: 333)
Yusuf’s preaching attracted unemployed youths from Yobe and Borno states, and even from neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad. It was around this time that the group became known as the Yusufiyya movement.
As the followership expanded, the group became very attractive to politicians in the build-up to the 2003 general elections (Monguno 2013). On the eve of the 2003 general elections, politicians who sought to outsmart their opponents in the north-eastern states used several youth groups and militias established or funded by them as political thugs. Ahead of the polls, youths belonging to the Yusufiyya movement, as well as others operating under titles such as Yan Kalare in Gombe and Sara Suka in Bauchi, were armed with sophisticated weapons by political leaders contesting gubernatorial elections in Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, and Yobe states (Ohia 2009; Idris & Adebayo 2012; Patrick 2013). In Yobe State, for in- stance, the Yusufiyya movement was invited to the state:
during the build-up to the 2003 elections in the wake of Sharia implementation in some northern states. But due to the fact that the election never took the shape that those that invited them thought it would, the then state government subsequently gave (the group) the ultimatum to immediately quit. (Ohia 2009: 3)
In Borno State, however, it was reported that Ali Modu Sheriff employed the services of young men belonging to the ECOMOG and Yusufiyya movement dur- ing the 2003 election to snatch Borno State from then Governor Mala Kachalla. According to Monguno (2013), “Ali Modu Sheriff promised the group strict im- plementation of Shari’ah, 50 million naira reward, 50 motorcycles and the office of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs in exchange for their support”. The group then provided Sheriff with the name of Alhaji Buji Foi as their candidate for the position of the Commissioner for Islamic Affairs. After becoming gover- nor, Sheriff created a Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed Alhaji Buji Foi, Yusufiyya’s national secretary, as its first commissioner (Idris & Adebayo 2012).
Shortly after the election, there was a breakdown in the relationship between Governor Sheriff and the Mohammed Yusuf-led group over issues of strict im- plementation of the Shariah, although there could have been other personal rea- sons behind their parting company. Consequently, Mohammed Yusuf pressured Alhaji Buji Foi to resign from Sheriff’s cabinet along with most of the other staff brought by Foi to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. At this point, Sheriff used rival group ECOMOG to confront the Yusufiyya movement. As the relationship deteriorated, Mohammed Yusuf became more vocal and belligerent in his preaching against the government (Monguno 2013).
The practice of arming youths, mainly unemployed, for electoral violence and subsequently dumping them after elections is a well-established electioneering
habit of most Nigerian politicians. In this connection, Ojo (2013) has rightly not- ed that south-eastern politicians used Bakassi Boys and members of the Move- ment for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and South-South politicians used the Egbesu Boys as well as members of the Move- ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), to deal with their politi- cal opponents. The political elite in the South-West used different factions of the Oodua Peoples Congress (remnants of the old Agbekoya Movement) and mem- bers of the Road Transport Workers Union, as well as street urchins known as ‘Area Boys’, to deal with their perceived political opponents.
It is not surprising, therefore, that to influence or win elections:
Northern politicians used various groups such as Yan Sara-Suka in Bauchi, Yan Kalare in Gombe, Yan Daba and Yan daukan amarya in Kano and ECOMOG in Borno and Yobe states. In Adamawa State, the political thugs are known as Damagun Boys and Shinko Boys. In Taraba State, they are called Bani Israila. (Ojo 2013: 25)
As is typical of Nigerian politicians, the northern youths and militia that were armed by politicians during the 2003 elections were eventually discarded by their sponsors after the election since they could not continue funding them. With no visible means of legitimate livelihood and frustrated over their fate in the after- math of the elections, some of these disillusioned youth and militias in northern Nigeria became very susceptible to the radical brand of Islam preached at the time by Mohammed Yusuf (Patrick 2013).
Mohammed Yusuf’s mosque complex, the Ibn Taimiyya Masjid, named after the medieval Islamic scholar who virulently condemned Shia, Sufis, and the rul- ing Sunni elite, was both a staging post for his virulent attack on government and a headquarters for his movement. By “naming his mosque after one of the Islam- ic scholars most often cited by Salafi jihadists, Yusuf signalled his hostility to the ruling Muslim elite as well as to traditional Nigerian Islam” (Tanchum 2012: 79). He ratcheted up his strident call for jihad to restore what he considered the pris- tine Islam of the early Islamic community as well as began the construction of an alternative society. The group also managed farmland and engaged in micro-financing, and Yusuf functioned as chief adjudicator of this miniature state-within-a-state (Tanchum 2012).
Yusuf subsequently redefined the doctrine of the sect around an ideology that abhors Western education and the tenets of Western science. He centred his as- persion and criticisms on the failures and corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern elites trained at secular schools) who have acquired Western education and are currently in positions of power. In the sect’s view, “the system represented by the
yan boko is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore unIslamic,
Subsequently, the movement first took up arms against the state establishment when, on 24 December 2003, it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanama, Yobe State. Members occupied the two build- ings for several days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement over the camps. A joint “operation of soldiers and police dislodged the group after killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members” (Suleiman 2007: 25). On 31 De- cember 2003 the group left the village and dispersed into other northern states after inscribing the word “Taliban” on a captured vehicle (Morgan 2009). In 2004 it established a “base called ‘Afghanistan’ in Kanama village in northern Yobe State, on the border with the Republic of Niger” (Awofadeji 2009: 8). With these developments, the sect became known as the Nigerian Taliban, which was used in a derogatory sense by local people who despised the ideology and teach- ings of the sect.
Yusuf’s radical ideology, however, generated friction between himself and other moderate northern-based Islamic scholars like the late Ja‘far Mahmud Ad- am, Sheik Abba Aji, and Yahaya Jingir. In particular, bitter theological disputes characterised the confrontation between Ja‘far Mahmud Adam and Mohammed Yusuf between 2004 and 2007 (the year of Ja‘far Mahmud Adam’s death). Ja‘far Adam criticised Mohammed Yusuf’s theological positions as “ignorant” and “stupid” and as dangerous for the political ambitions of Muslims in Nigeria. Con- trary to Yusuf’s position, Ja‘far Adam advocated the importance of Western and secular education for Muslims, noting that “only the conscious adoption of West- ern and secular boko education would eventually enable Muslims to effectively fight the Western enemy” (Loimeier 2012: 149).
The dispute notwithstanding, Yusuf’s charismatic skills endeared him to many young Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although Yusuf preached a simple, ascetic form of life for his followers, he enjoyed Western luxuries, including a Mercedes and imported delicacies (Onuoha 2012d: 27). The activities of his group became more worrisome from 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, who constituted the sect’s members, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates, and joined the group. By disassociating from society at large, members became more indoctrinated by the ideologues, who inculcated in them anti-secular ideologies. On 21 September 2004 members at- tacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several police- men and stealing arms and ammunition. It maintained intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe states until the famous July 2009 anti-government uprising.
The root cause of the July 2009 revolt can be traced to the fatal shooting of members of the sect on 11 June 2009 by men of Operation Flush.2 Some mem- bers of the sect, riding on motorbikes on their way to a cemetery to bury four of their members that had died in a motor accident, were intercepted by a patrol team of Operation Flush. The affected members were temporarily detained for not wearing crash helmets as stipulated in the state traffic law. Other sect mem- bers were infuriated with the interception, which they interpreted as a provo- cation, given that they were in a funeral procession. The resultant altercation between the sect members and security forces led to the shooting of some of their members by men of Operation Flush. Reacting to this event, Mohammed Yusuf, though absent at the time:
made a pronouncement through his well circulated Friday sermon in Maiduguri to retaliate the shooting of his men, boasting that his group would be prepared to confront all security agencies in the State as well as government which he described as the enemies of Islam. (Sani 2011: 29)
The security operatives later received a tip-off that the sect was planning to strike from their base in Dutsen Tanshi in Bauchi State. When “security opera- tives stormed the place, nine members of the group were arrested while items used in local production of bombs were recovered” (Ohia 2009: 6). In retaliation, the members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station on 26 July. This attack was the curtain raiser for a wave of unrest that manifested in Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe states. The revolt ended on 30 July 2009, when their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally captured in a goat pen in his resi- dence in Maiduguri. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was murdered extrajudicially by the police, although police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape. Over 800 persons, mainly sect members, were killed dur- ing the revolt, and hundreds of its members were arrested and detained for formal trial (Adesoji 2010; Sampson 2013). The way the 2009 revolt was repressed by the Nigerian state proved to be a critical factor in the deadly escalation of Boko Haram’s violent attacks.