Boko Haram, as a “spiritual off shoot” of Izala,30 has maintained a number of features which are characteristic of Izala’s preaching, such as the hostility to Ti- janiyya and its Sufi ‘mysticism’. However, the emergence of Boko Haram also marked a break with Izala; it was a protest against clerics who appeared too friendly with corrupt politicians. Izala acted as an anti-establishment movement that articulated popular anger against the political class, yet on a local level poli- ticians and religious leaders often found ways of getting along with and profiting from each other. In Yobe State, the governor and members of his cabinet attend- ed Izala prayers (at least occasionally), and some local government chairmen paid allowances to Izala imams and donated public funds for the building of Izala mosques.31 Certainly, most politicians and rich businessmen had little personal interest in the austere lifestyle propagated by the reformers, yet they had to ap- pease religious critics by making religiously correct statements and by donating a part of their ill-gotten wealth to the construction of mosques and the subsidisa- tion of Islamic clerics:
These mosques are known colloquially as Allah ga naka (“Allah here’s your share”) – and the owner may hire a young imam for the mosque as part of his ‘good works’. Many young students go round preaching, or perform other ritual services for people (such as repeating for them 10,000 prayers). (Last 2008/9: 9)
Despite (or because) of its tendency to compromise, Izala had much support among intellectuals, university students, and civil servants who loathed Nigeria’s dysfunctional state but were at the same time forced to live off it. This paradoxi- cal attitude – abhorring the political system and being part of it – prevented them from being serious in their fight against corruption. And the same inner disunity haunted Izala. By spreading a message of moral rectitude and obedience to God, it was still the most important force of a spiritual renewal, yet it was tainted by its collaboration with the rich and powerful. I heard many stories about the greed and hypocrisy of individual Izala representatives. It was even said that Izala’s
guard (print edition), 11 November 2001, 14). In 2010, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Global
Attitudes Project (Osama bin Laden, 1) found that “confidence” in the Al-Qaeda leader was still high. Among Muslims in Nigeria as a whole, the approval rate was 48 per cent (and in the North probably higher). This was the highest rate in all countries analysed in the survey.
30
Ulama of the Caucus, in Alkali (a.o.), Overview, 13; M.Q.S. Isa, “Controversy over Proposed FG, Boko Haram Dialogue”, Daily Trust, 15 June 2012.
31
split in 1990 was not motivated only by ideological differences but also by rival- ry over the distribution of funds from abroad.32
A saviour
Religious associations offer citizens a chance to organise themselves outside the networks of political patronage; hence, these organisations could be used by Ni- geria’s discontents to submit the ruling class to public control. However, reli- gious activists have not found ways to overcome their differences and cooperate. Even the campaign for a common goal – Shariah – failed to unite them. Ordinary Muslims often watched with disgust the petty strife among preachers competing for followers and/or political patronage. Some individual clerics with a reputation of scholarliness and integrity were held in high esteem, but none rose above reli- gious factionalism. The only person who enjoyed almost universal support among the Muslims I met in Borno and Yobe states was Muhammadu Buhari, a former general who had ruled Nigeria from January 1984 to August 1985 and who had tried to become head of state again as an opposition candidate in the elections of 2003, 2007 and 2011. He combined a tough anti-corruption stance with a strong commitment to Islam. Moreover, he was known for carrying out his announcements without compromising them. Thus, he seemed capable of rising above his fellow politicians, forcing them to bow to the laws. However, the belief that a strong and upright leader like Buhari would be able to achieve what mil- lions of citizens could not – checking the lawlessness of the ruling elites – is na- ïve. If he were elected president in 2015, militant Muslims might lay down their arms, trusting in his good intentions. But he would not have the means to radical- ly transform the country. As an army general who ruled by decree, he had arro- gated to himself the power to arrest and detain any citizen indefinitely. Govern- ment critics had been intimidated by extremely harsh laws. Whoever exposed army members and other state agents to public ridicule faced lengthy prison sen- tences.33 In a democratic setting, Buhari would have to seek approval for all the measures he suggested as a president. As the present federal constitution, with its system of checks and balances, curtails the power of the executive, Buhari would have to accept compromises, accommodate political antagonists, and reconcile hostile factions. However, he is not known as someone who can listen to and win over his opponents. He was not even able to manage his own political parties and win the loyalty of ANPP and CPC politicians who had made him their presiden- tial candidate.
32
The Bushawa faction, with its headquarters in Jos, followed the policy of Saudi Arabia by supporting President Bush’s war against Iraq, while the Saddamawa faction, based in Kaduna, denounced the US intervention as an attack against fellow Muslims.
33
During the Shariah campaign, Buhari alienated Christians when he demanded the spread of Shariah to all parts of the country,34 and when he called on fellow Muslims not to vote for a Christian as president.35 In the 2011 presidential elec- tion, he won a majority in the 12 Shariah states of the Far North but was defeated in all others. Although he had kept the implementation of Shariah and other reli- gious issues out of his election campaign, many adherents perceived his defeat in religious terms: Christians (and their Muslim collaborators) had kept out of pow- er the only candidate capable of bringing sanity to the decadent land.36 In a deep- ly divided society, democracy does not work. Pious Muslims, as the losers of the election, were denied the right to be ruled by a fellow Muslim whom they could trust. Southerners, mainly Christians, had prevented them from purifying their social and political environment. Through their resistance to a sincere Islamic politician, Christians had aborted a project of self-purification that might have healed Nigeria’s broken society.