Most victims of Boko Haram attacks have been other Muslims. In some cases it was obvious why the rebels had killed them; for instance, when they executed a comptroller of customs in his residence in Potiskum. People in Yobe State knew that the customs officer had issued an order to murder detained Boko Haram sus- pects, allegedly by poisoning their food or by driving nails into their head. In other cases, however, the victims had just committed minor offences such as playing cards, selling bush meat, or drinking in beer parlours. Boko Haram’s leadership justified these executions, insisting that everyone must follow Shariah: “There are no exceptions. Even if you are a Muslim and you don’t abide by Sha- riah, we will kill you. Even if you are my own father, we will kill you.”54
Such extreme enforcement of Islamic Law alienated many Muslims. Critics pointed out that gambling and drinking, although forbidden in Islam, did not car- ry the death penalty, and it seems some Boko Haram leaders were aware that their arbitrary executions could not be justified in the light of Islamic orthodoxy. After an attack on a beer parlour, Shekau claimed that their aim had not been to punish drinkers but to kill security forces of the secular government:
[W]e do not kill those who drink alcohol. It is mere propaganda that we attacked a beer par- lour. We had heard that it was purely soldiers who gathered there to drink, and we confirmed it, that was why we went there and killed them. … we don’t kill a Muslim; if you hear that we have killed a Muslim, we must have found out that he was collaborating with the unbe- lievers … We are just fighting those who are fighting us, soldiers and police and the rest; and anybody, even if he is a learned Muslim teacher, if we confirm that he exposes us to the gov- ernment, his children will become orphans and his wife will become a widow, in God’s name. That is our way. But the ordinary people in town, we seek your forgiveness; I swear we will not harm you.55
Many Boko Haram operations show that great care was taken not to antago- nise ordinary Muslims. When attacking police stations and other government in- stitutions, the rebels urged passers-by to flee, lest they be hit by stray bullets. And when burning down schools, they also tried, at least initially, to avoid civil- ian casualties: “We are attacking the public schools at night because we don’t want to kill innocent pupils.”56
The Quran (in Surah 49, 10-11) forbids Muslims to kill fellow Muslims. But after the death of the Prophet, who had left no male heir, his disciples fought over the leadership of the caliphate; wars broke out, and the factions accused each other of not being genuine Muslims. In order to stop these intra-religious wars, which were threatening the very existence of the ummah, the great schools of
54
Abul Qaqa, spokesman of Boko Haram in M. Mark, “Boko Haram vows to fight until Nigeria estab- lishes Sharia law”, The Guardian (London), 27 January 2012.
55
Abubakar Shekau, in I. Sheme, “‘No reconciliation’ Boko Haram leader blows hot in first video”,
Newsdiary, 25 July 2011.
56
Islamic jurisprudence sought to ban fighting over religious doctrines and the proper implementation of Shariah. They acknowledged that many faithful were lax Muslims who broke divine injunctions, but this did not make them infidels who merited death. Whoever claimed to be a Muslim should be treated as such. There were, however, exceptions, namely those who supported the enemies of Islam. For the early adherents of Islam it was obvious that they had the right to attack those who had betrayed the ummah and abandoned the cause of Islam.57
The most famous scholar and warrior in pre-colonial Nigeria, Usman dan Fodio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate, referred to this ban against traitors (or apostates) when he declared war against the kings of Hausaland, who claimed to be Muslims. He even justified the attack on the Sultanate of Bornu, the oldest Islamic polity in the central Sudan, on the grounds that the Mai of Borno had sid- ed with the enemies of Islam.58 In 1808, the jihadists destroyed the ancient capital of Borno and devastated the whole western half of the empire, taking away many of its inhabitants as slaves.59 Given that Boko Haram has its home base in the Borno region, it is strange that its leaders have idealised the Fulani rulers of So- koto and their jihad, calling on all Muslims to “fight for the restoration of the Caliphate of Usman Danfodio”.60 I suspect that Boko Haram leaders wanted to overcome the age-old divisions between the various Islamic regions and gain a foothold in north-west Nigeria. In former years, the legacy of Usman dan Fodio was claimed mainly by Fulani (and some Hausa) politicians, such as Ahmadu Bello, who was Premier of the Northern Region until his assassination in 1966. As a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio, he often used the imagery of the jihad61 and promised to continue the religious project of his famous ancestor: “(T)he work of salvation for all the people which he so nobly undertook has now been handed to me. I dedicate myself totally to its completion.”62 The tradition of Islamic militancy was also revived by religious leaders, such as Abubakar Gumi,
57
Hodgson, Venture, 178, 197; Kenny, Boko Haram.
58
The ruling dynasty of the Borno Empire had been Islamic for more than 700 years. In the sixteenth century, Borno was seen as one of the four main sultanates in the Islamic world (Lavers, Kanem, 201). Its political and religious leader in the early nineteenth century, Shehu Al-Kanemi, wrote letters to Sokoto, protesting the invasion of his country, arguing that both empires, Borno and Sokoto, were Is- lamic and should not fight each other. The debate between the leaders of Sokoto and Borno over the legitimacy of the jihad is summarised in Brenner, Jihad Debate.
59
Brenner, Shehus, 25, 32.
60
Abul Qaqa in H. Idiris, “Boko Haram says no more talks with FG”, Daily Trust, 21 March 2012. – Abul Qaqa depicted the Sokoto Caliphate as a peaceful, thoroughly Islamic empire and thus as a coun- ter-image to the present Nigerian nightmare of violence and corruption. This meant that the utopian world Boko Haram was fighting for had really existed and could exist again if Nigeria’s Muslims mustered the determination of their forefathers: “peace will never reign until when Sharia as a com- plete way of life is restored 100 per cent; just like the way it was practiced during the period of Daular Usmaniyya” (Abul Qaqa, in H. Idris, “Boko Haram: Why we won’t listen to sultan”, Daily Trust, 3 October 2011).
61
Reynolds, Politics of History, 56-60.
62
who inspired the foundation of Izala. Calling for a purification of Islam, Gumi opposed the mysticism and the belief in miracles on the part of the Sufi brother- hoods, especially the Tijaniyya. Whoever adopted the prayer posture and the recitations of this group made himself an unbeliever, someone whom anyone was allowed to kill.63