To reduce the operational capability of the sect, the Nigerian government has adopted several measures, including prosecution of arrested members, deploy- ment of special security forces, temporary closure of parts of borders in northern Nigeria, deportation of illegal immigrants, capacity building of security forces on counter-terrorism (CoT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, installation of surveillance equipment, and collaboration with foreign partners.
The ramping up of violent attacks by the sect in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt played a critical role in the enactment of Nigeria’s first anti-terrorism leg- islation, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011. An important external factor that also contributed in this regard was the pressure from the US on the Nigerian government to expedite actions towards adopting comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation in the aftermath of the failed Christmas Day bombing of a US airliner by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Sampson & Onuoha 2011). The young Abdulmutallab, who had been trained in Yemen by Al-Qaeda, attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear while on board North- west Airlines Flight 253 en route to Detroit’s Metropolitan Airport on 25 De- cember 2009.
The establishment on 12 June 2011 of a Joint Military Task Force known as “Operation Restore Order” (JTORO) with headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, to counter the sect’s growing terrorist potentials is a prominent dimension of the government response to the Boko Haram threat. The deployment of the JTORO has been partly successful, especially the use of military patrol vehicles equipped to detect hidden bombs and other weapons within a radius of 50 meters. The special security forces have also registered successes in terms of arrest and killing of Boko Haram operational commanders and strategists.
Notwithstanding the successes of the special security forces in northern Nige- ria, their deployment has received criticism for harsh tactics that have injured civilians and damaged property. The approach taken by the security forces has led to unprecedented use of road blocks, cordon-and-search, and total blockade of some roads (especially those close to security establishments), often generat- ing long traffic jams. Particularly worrisome is the accusation of unlawful kill- ings, dragnet arrests, detention, intimidation, and extortion by the security forces. These real or alleged excesses undermine public support, especially in the area of providing tip-offs on Boko Haram members or hideouts. Sampson (2013: 17) has noted:
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This section benefited from Onuoha, F.C. (forthcoming), “Assessing the Implications of Counter Boko Haram Operations by the Nigerian Government”, commissioned by the Institute of Security Studies, South Africa.
[As] a result of these human rights abuses, the JTF has been severely criticised by a section of the Nigerian public over its violent counter-terrorism operations. Its use of disproportion- ate force has forced people, otherwise critical of the sect’s activities, to renege on their earli- er endorsement of military deployment.
Therefore, if the security forces are to be successful in the future, they must strike the proper balance of winning the hearts and minds of local people by offering security and using the ‘stick’ to weaken Boko Haram’s operational capacity through arrests and prosecution.
Given the discovery that Boko Haram moves weapons and fighters in and out of Nigeria through Nigeria’s porous international borders in the north, the federal government began an aggressive crackdown on illegal immigrants, repatriating around 11,000 foreigners as at 28 February 2012 (Vanguard 2012). Related to this was the decision to close part of Nigeria’s northern borders and the estab- lishment of two new defence intelligence missions in Niger and Mali in February 2012 to ensure better monitoring of the security situation in the Sahara–Sahel region. The Nigerian government has also scaled up training in counter-terrorism (CoT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations for state security forces in re- sponse to the growing audacity of the sect (Omonobi 2012). Training in special reconnaissance, close-quarters combat, urban warfare, amphibious operation, information operation and management, tactical communication, civil-military relations, and forensic analysis have equally been expanded in the training cur- ricula of the armed forces and other security agencies (Musa 2012). This inter- vention is also supported by the acquisition and installation of technical and sur- veillance equipment, such as closed-circuit televisions, identification equipment for post-bomb blast investigation, and military patrol vehicles equipped to detect hidden explosives and other weapons.
The government has also embraced collaborative engagements with foreign states and international organisations to increase Nigeria’s capacity to combat the Boko Haram threat. These include collaborations with organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the International Civil Aviation Organisation, as well as states like the US, France, South Korea, and Israel, geared towards ensuring that terror- ist organisations do not establish strong footholds in Nigeria. For example, Nige- ria established a collaborative framework with the UN known as the ‘Integrated Assistance on Counter-Terrorism’ (I-ACT), under the aegis of the UN Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Although details of these collaborative efforts are not made public, they cover areas such as intelligence sharing, capaci- ty building of security forces, and equipment support programmes.
In spite of the various measures adopted by the Nigerian government to reduce the sect’s capability, Boko Haram continues to demonstrate resilience and modi- fy its modus operandi. Since 2010, the sect has evolved into a more flexible, dy- namic, and decentralised organisation, capable of changing and combining tactics
as well as expanding or re-ordering target selection. This situation has prompted debates concerning Boko Haram’s ability to remain a potent force despite the losses it incurs from state security forces.