68 Lo que distingue a la mujer es, pues, que en ella la debilidad, o por decir mejor, la inocencia del

Casual

8

27

17

Total

100

100

100

All Industries

Permanent

94

83

90

Casual

6

17

10

Total

100

100

100

The extent of casual employment appears to be increasing rapidly and by 1986 the proportions of casuals in the workforce as a whole had risen. For people working in the retail industry for ten or more hours per week, casual employment had risen to 26.6%. For males it had more than doubled to reach 17%, while 36.8% of females were employed on a casual basis. These figures under-estimate the proportion of casuals in the industry. In 1986, if workers working fewer than ten hours per week are included, then casual employment in the retail industry was 37.3% overall and 49% for women (Table 4.8*).

Table 4.8

Trends in Casual Retail Employment by Sex.

Males (%) Females (%) Persons (%)

March - M a y l 9 8 2 (10+ hours/wk) Permanent 92 73 83 Casual 8 27 17 Total 100 100 100 Sept - N o v . 1 9 8 6 (10+ hours/ wk) Permanent 83 63 90 Casual 17 37 10 Total 100 100 100

All Retail Workers 1986

Permanent 75 51 63

Casual 25 49 37

Total 100 100 100

(Source: ABS Alternative Working Arrangements Survey, unpublished data.

Some of the difference between 1982 and 1986 figures is accounted for by seasonal variation in employment of casuals: which is higher in Sept-Nov. than March- May. The seasonal variation is likely to inflate the number of casuals employed by between 3% and 6%, see Figure 2 and 6248.0).

In summary, the retail labour market fluctuates seasonally. It is characterised by high rates of female employment and high levels of labour turnover. The increased market share of the largest retailers described in the previous section was not reflected by increased employment share in the 1980s. Instead a few specialist retail areas increased their employment share. There was a change in the occupational profile in the industry

with a reduction in the numbers of clerical jobs. There has also been a reduction in full- time jobs and a growth in part-time and casual jobs. These trends reflect the trends in other sectors of the Australian labour market described in Chapter 2. They also reflect trends in retail labour markets in other OECD countries.

Government Intervention

Dixon (1972) provides an historical account of government regulation of the retail industry in Australia. In summary, this regulation includes licensing laws for the sale of selected products such as liquor, medicines and milk. Hawkers and peddlers require a licence. Trading hours are regulated in each state, as is the quality of goods sold, especially the quality of food. Advertising and marketing strategies are subject to regulation. Hire Purchase agreements are restricted and sellers who sell on hire purchase must be registered. There are statutory controls on the pricing of some goods, generally food. Restrictions on foreign nationals or firms selling goods are similarly few. O f these regulations, those affecting employment directly are those pertaining to trading hours; while those affecting it indirectly are those which affect the structure of the industry, such as those pertaining to competition. As well as these regulations government intervention affects retailing through support for small business, infrastructure, training provisions and zoning poHcies.

With respect to trading hours, a survey of the Australian Industrial Law Reports (AILR) shows continued activity in the 1960s and 1970s with prosecutions for breaches of trading hour regulations in most states. In particular pharmacists and discounters were prosecuted most often for infringements. While pharmacists were challenging the laws only in so far as pharmacists were forced to close, discounters challenged the whole principle of trading hour restrictions. As well as challenges by particular types of retailers, the Retail Trade Associations in various states also mounted area-based legal challenges. In Queensland, for example, a series of area based cases were mounted in an attempt to re-zone some retail areas as 'tourist' areas and hence subject to fewer restrictions on opening times [(1967) AILR ^ 4 4 ; (1968) AILR ^408; ^506; (1978) AILR (1979) AILR ^ 3 0 ; (1983) AILR ^33].

The 1980s was characterised by new entrants to the opening hours debates: the large retailers such as Coles and Myer became involved (The Mercury 13.9.1980: 3; The Age

13.10.83: 1). Coles-Myer for example, argued that their 'trade' was being curtailed by limited trading hours. In particular Coles-Myer campaigned to lengthen the trading hours for fresh meat the sale of which was subject to stricter hours in some states. As one part of their strategy they lobbied the beef producers: "Our chicken, fish and

prepared food sales are far greater in the States where we are not allowed to sell meat during late night trading hours." (Arnfield, 1981: 5. Coles' representative at the Cattlemen's Union Conference).

Another strategy which retailers can use to by-pass the trading hours restrictions is to obtain classifications other than that of 'shop'. Thus Venus sex shops obtained classification as 'libraries' enabling them to trade 7 days per week (AFR July, 19, 1980:

1,10). This was probably not a strategy open to many shops, however.

A series of parliamentary committees in various states were set up to make recommendations regarding hours of opening of retail stores. In New South Wales for example the Macken Report was presented in 1983. This recommended some extension to shopping hours. Subsequently the Shop Distributive and Allied Workers Union (SDA) negotiated agreements with the largest retailers in New South Wales which traded off longer opening hours for additional penalty rates and a minimum of 50% of employees being full-time and a phasing out of casual employees. In 1986 inquiries in both Victoria and Brisbane recommended de-regulation (The Age 9.1.86: 1,10; Courier Mail 8.12.86: 5). Further de-regulation of hours appears to be likely: in 1988 the Westfield shopping centre was allowed a trial period of opening for 24 hours per day to assess the effect of complete de-regulation of trading hours (The Retail Trader May/June

1988: 1).

Zoning restrictions have acted to protect small retailers in a similar way. Local councils (the composition of which often includes small retailers) have attempted to prevent the spread of franchised 'convenience' stores into the suburbs of Australia. These stores differ from the established milk bars in that they are larger and they stay open for longer hours. In Victoria, the process has been documented by Mercer and Maher (1986) who argue that the local councils, despite state government policy to restrict opening hours, have failed to prevent the spread of convenience stores in Victoria. The process of failure to have land re-zoned and appeals to those decisions has clearly slowed the spread of these stores. The slow spread of the stores in other states indicates that state regulations are having an inhibitory, if not arresting, effect.

Historically, concentration in the retail industry has also been affected by Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). In Australia there has been a history of legislation relating to competition and the restriction of monopoly practices which is related to RPM (Rosewarne, 1984: 85). As in other countries, RPM has operated in Australia to support the small independent retailer. It did this by preventing larger retailers, who could reduce profit margins and maximise profits by selling a large number of items,

from doing so. It emerged here, as elsewhere, with the branding of goods and has thus not affected certain 'trades' such as fresh food and clothing where branding is not of central importance (The Australian 24.3.71: 13; Davidson and Stewardson, 1974: 210- 227).

In the 196()s the practice of R P M came under significant attack both legislatively and through successful attempts by retailers to undercut the price maintained (Davidson and Stewardson, 1974: 216; Rosewarne, 1984: 86; Briggs and Smyth, 1967: 144-6). 'Collective' R P M involving agreements among manufacturers or among retailers to sell particular goods at a particular price was made illegal in 1965 by the Trade Practices Act. Since then the issue has been whether manufacturers have a right to restrict the sale of their goods to retailers who will sell them for a minimum specified price. This issue was resolved in 1971 when it was ruled unlawful to refuse to sell goods to a retailer on the basis that the retailer would resell them too cheaply and undercut the image of the product. From this time R P M became unlawful.

While it is difficult to assess the relationship between extended trading hours, the demise of R P M and concentration in the retail industry, they appear to have proceeded apace in Australia in the last thirty years: to the disadvantage of the traditional independent retailer and the advantage of discounters and specialist chains. To the extent that large scale retailing has benefited patterns of tenure will be affected indirectly by such regulation.

Another aspect of regulation which has affected firm size and concentration is quotas. Until the 198()s large retailers have been permitted to purchase only a small proportion of their stock from overseas. Since the restrictions have been lifted the largest retailers, who tend to have better buying networks overseas, have been able to import from overseas more easily than many smaller enterprises (Aust. Bus 15.4.1982: 34-41).

Government support for franchising has been extensive in the United States and Europe as a way of stimulating employment. The U.S. Small Business Administration provides both financial aid and advice to potential franchisees. It also sponsors specific programs to target socially and economically disadvantaged groups for assistance in becoming franchisees. In Australia such assistance is very limited. While private consultants are available there are no publicly funded programs or courses to aid potential franchisees. Indeed there are few services directed at supporting small business in the service sector at all. The government initiatives which do affect small business tend to be directed at export oriented industries and at the development of high technology products (BIE,

1987: 111-130). Even the Centres for Entrepreneurs, which provide 'training, advice and assistance' (BIE, 1987: 126) to entrepreneurs, tend to encourage small business in

areas where innovative ideas suggest a high growth potential. The NEIS (National Enterprise Incentive Scheme) scheme, which provides training and income support for welfare recipients who wish to start small businesses, specifically excludes franchisees. Some government support for franchising exists for aboriginal people: The Aboriginal Enterprise Incentive Scheme does not exclude franchisees. The Aboriginal Development Commission has also investigated the possibility of establishing aboriginal franchisees in New South Wales funded by loans from the Commission (Guillaume, 1989).

Government interventions also occur through education and training provision. In Australia, public education institutions^ provide basic education, courses for sales staff, training for small business people (AGPS, 1989; DITAC 1985, 1989) and for overseas managers wanting to enter the Australian market. The latter introduce overseas managers to the Australian institutional framework, and culture (Inside Retailing Jan 30

1989: 7).

The Government has also assisted retailers by providing basic infrastructural support. For example, the government set up a working group to assess the likely impact of EFTPOS technology and to assist banks and retailers to establish systems which would minimise the costs to all parties (Wells, 1986: 166-211).

Bank regulation and de-regulation may have affected retailing more generally. Prior to the early 1980s, banks in Australia were highly regulated. Some of these regulations were removed in 1984 and 1985. Until de-regulation, stringent financial regulations excluded foreign ownership of banks and stipulated that no one entity could own more than 50% of a bank in extraordinary circumstances or 15% in ordinary circumstances (consortium banking). Following a series of reports on financial de-regulation in the early 1980s the government removed deposit maturity controls which had prevented trading banks from paying interest on short term deposits. This put the major trading banks back into competition with the merchant banks which had grown rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s precisely because they were not so restricted. In 1985 the government granted 16 new trading bank licences to both foreign and domestic groups, the legal maximum interest rate for housing loans was lifted and 45 new merchant bank licences were granted. In 1985 in Australia, there were about 20 licenced trading banks, 500 credit unions, 300 finance companies and 100 foreign banks operating in some capacity (Peat-Marwick, 1985; N.T. 26.7.85: 40). The increased competition and subsequent re- structuring in the banking industry may have been one of the factors which has facilitated the introduction of EFTPOS technology. It has led banks to investigate various means of cutting costs, and may have facilitated the emergence of an open (joint), rather than a closed, EFTPOS network.