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Following 'the Battle of the Bogside', in Derry, the Taoiseach 22

addressed the nation over Radio Telefis Eireann, in the course of which he claimed 'that the Irish Government [could] no longer stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse'. In addition, Lynch gave notice of his Government's intention to apply to the United Nations for a peace-keeping force and to request the British Government to enter into early negotiations with it to 'review ... the

23 constitutional position of the Six Counties ...'

18

Lemass resigned as Taoiseach in November 1966. 19

Taoiseach's Statement on Derry Incidents, Eire — Ireland: Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, No. 789, 15 October 1968, p. 4

(hereafter cited as Eire - I r e l a n d) . 20

Luncheon address to House of Commons Anglo-Irish Pariiamentary Group, 30 October 1968, as cited in Eire — Ireland, No. 791, 8 November,

1968, p. 4. 21

Throughout this text the term 'Irish Government' will apply to the Government of the Irish Republic.

22

Irish Radio and Television, abbreviated form: RTE. 23

The Taoiseach, John Lynch, T.D., Speeches and Statements on Irish Unity, Northern Ireland, Anglo-Irish Relations, August 1969-October 1971 (Dublin: Government Information Bureau, 1971), p. 2, (hereafter cited

which had existed throughout its period of office, took the form of abrupt and adamant refusals that the Republic of Ireland was in any way entitled to intervene. The final two paragraphs of the statement

issued by Home Secretary, James Callaghan, on the actual deployment 24

of the British Army in aid of the civil power', and the first two 25

paragraphs of the Downing Street Declaration, explicitly and without reservation rejected any suggestion that the situation was

international.

By a strictly legalistic construction, the British Government's exclusion of the Republic of Ireland rested on a solid foundation. But in the practise of its relations with Northern Ireland, and the perceptions and assumptions upon which this was based, it is apparent that the Downing Street Declaration concealed an increasing level of disingenuousness. In the area of assumptions it is significant that Callaghan opposed the deployment of British troops in Northern Ireland in early August 1969, in part, because of the anticipated

pc

'sensitivity that would be aroused South of the border,' and the 27 actions that the Irish Government might take at the United Nations. And it was the assumed Irish reaction at the United Nations which, in August 1969, decided the British Government against the blowing up of

28

border roads. Both anxieties were justified. The introduction of the British Army, although a domestic prerogative of Westminster, entailed

The British Government's reaction to this departure from a policy,

as Lynch, Statements and Speeches). There is some controversy as to the accuracy of this version of Lynch's speech. According to many Lynch actually said '... can no longer stand idly by ... ' (emphasis added). For example, Conor Cruise O'Brien in States of Ireland (St. Albans, Herts: Panther, 1974), p. 171, states that video-tape

recordings verify this allegation. 24

As cited in James Callaghan, A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland} (London: Collins, 1973), p. 44 (hereafter cited as Callaghan, A House Divided) ,

25

Downing Street Declaration, as cited in Callaghan, A House Divided3 pp. 191-2.

7 ibid., p. 28. 28 ., . , co ibid., p. 52.

the internationalisation of the situation in Northern Ireland in 29

precisely the terms Callaghan had foreseen.

In practice the British Government revealed a curious attitude by appointing a succession of Foreign Office diplomats as what

30

Callaghan termed,'its representative at Stormont'. The first of these was Oliver Wright, appointed in August 1969; the second was Ronald Burroughs, who succeeded Wright in February 1970. Other

Foreign Office officials filled posts below this level throughout the period 1968-1972 as Westminster's indirect role in Northern Ireland

31

increased. Furthermore there is a considerable body of evidence

which points to a growing understanding of the Northern Ireland Question in this initial period, by Labour Government Cabinet Ministers, in terms of the eventual re-unification of Ireland. In practice, also, there was little doubt in Sir John Peck's mind that the position taken by the British Government in this period was other than 'an initial attempt to

32 treat an international situation as if it were a domestic one'.

(emphasis added). Indeed, it was the acceptance of the inadequacy of this position by the Labour Government between 1968 and 1970, and increasingly by its Parliamentary Party in Opposition thereafter, that was a major theme in Anglo-Irish relations throughout this first period.

It was, as suggested by the preceding passage, a process interrupted by the change of government as a result of the British General Election of 18 June 1970. In the immediate period following this, Anglo-Irish relations, with regard to Northern Ireland, reverted to a pattern of claim and counter-claim, the resolution of which was effected only in the second period of analysis. What successive British governments failed to account for, in the periods in which they denied the Irish — and hence international dimensions of the situation — was the existence of compelling reasons for the Republic to intervene which could take

little or no cognisance of attempts to limit the scope of its interests.

See Chapter 5, 'The United Nations'. 30

Callaghan, A House Divided> p. 65; a more formal title of this position, if it had one, is not given in any of the reference works of the period.

"31

Dublin Trish Times, 18 October 1971. Peck, Dublin From Downing S t r e e tp. 100.

Of the immediate considerations, the first related to the

perception, by the Irish Government, of the Catholic community in the Six Counties; they were, in Taoiseach John Lynch's terminology, 'our

33

Northern brethern'. The second related to the failure of the 0'Nei11-sponsored civil rights reforms to be implemented in such a way that they represented the reality, rather than the legislative

34

intention, of reform to the Catholic community. The third reason was a corollary of the first two: in the absence of reform, and in the face of extremist Protestant violence, the obvious place for Catholics to turn to for refuge, protection, and even arms, was the Republic. And if the Taoiseach had attempted to neglect his

'obligations' in this matter, then it is evident from the Official Report accounts of the times set aside for Questions in Dail Eireann

35 .

that there were numerous TDs who were willing to ensure his attention returned to them. Finally, there was the assertion of a 'legitimate interest' which stemmed from the Irish Government's perception that its views 'on how peace and justice [could] be ensured in such a small

36 island as ours [were] relevant and entitled to be heard'.

The long-term reason was provided by the objective of Irish re-unification, which was seen not only as an end in itself, but also as a means by which short-term objectives, such as equality of treatment for Catholics, could be effected. As the Taoiseach told a London

audience on 30 October 1968 in relation to the recent violence in Derry:

Taoiseach's Statement on Civil Rights and Irish Unity, Eire — Ireland, No. 797, 12 February 1969, p. 4.

34

Sunday Times 'Insight' Team, Ulster, new ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p. 59, (hereafter cited as Sunday Times, Ulster).

35

TDs - in Irish Teachtai Dala — Delegates to Parliament, commonly referred to as Deputies.

36 **

Dail Eireann, Pariiamentary Debates, Official Report, vol. 241, 22 October 1969, col. 1407 (hereafter cited as Dail Eireann, Official Report) .

... those incidents are surface manifestations of a sense of injustice felt by a large proportion of the population of Northern Ireland for many years ... The clashes in the streets of Derry are an expression of the evils which partition has brought in its train.37 More explicitly, but to the Irish nation on 13 August 1969, he said

'... the re-unfication of the national territory can provide the only 38

permanent solution for the problem ...' The civil rights campaign and its attendant violence was, therefore, integrated by the Irish Government, within a perspective which viewed Irish unity as the outstanding political question in its relations with Britain. The force of both of these in conjunction was a point well made by the

39

Taoiseach in his address to the Fianna Fail Ardfheis of February 1971:

The basic issue remains what it has always been. No words of mine could express it better than Yeats in his speech to the Seanad^^ in 1925 when he said 'it is perhaps the deepest political passion with this nation that the North and South be united in one nation.'^!

The Irish Government's objective of a united Ireland, however, determined more than its conviction that the 'troubles' were its

legitimate concern and that it had a right to intervene in the

situation; re-unification also ensured that its subsequent course of action would be guided by principles of nationalist doctrine, of which two were important. The first was Dublin's refusal to recognise the

37

Luncheon address to House of Commons Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Group, 30 October, 1968 as cited in Eire -Ireland. No. 791, 8 November 1.968, p. 4.

3ft **

Lynch, Address over Radio Telefis Eireann on 13 August 1969, Statements and Speechess p. 3.

39

Ardfheis: High (or Principal) Gathering; in this context, the Fianna Fail Party annual conference or convention.

^ Se(anad Eireann: the Irish Senate.

^ 'Fianna Fail Ardfheis Statement by the Taoiseach', E i r e — Ireland3 No. 835, 31 March 1971, p. 7. Lynch here is unnecessarily modest: his own Address to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis the previous year contained a reference to Partition that is both eloquent and moving. Statements and Speechess p. 16, para 1.

Stormont Government as other than 'the executive instrument of a 42

subordinate Parliament'. The second was explained by Patrick Keatinge, as follows:

Given the essential, 'natural' Irishness of northern unionists, the fact of partition was seen as the

fulfilment of deliberate and skilfully executed British policy. The conclusion is drawn that 'partition can only be ended constitutionally as it began, by an Act of the British Parliament', ^ and the first priority is therefore to persuade the British government to abandon its

imperialistic claim.44

The strategy which resulted, therefore, was known as the 'Britain

first' strategy which, as Keatinge observed,1 tended to cast the question 45

of unity in a diplomatic mould'. It was, moreoever, a strategy which was supported by the restrictions placed upon Stormont by Westminster, particularly since 1969. Paragraph 2 of the Downing Street Declaration states:

The United Kingdom Government again affirm that responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is

entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international

relationships.46

The reasons for so constraining the Northern Ireland Government from an international role related, in the first instance, to its subordinate position vis-a-vis Westminster and secondly, to the international

47

embarrassment caused by the Northern Ireland disturbances. Britain and the Republic of Ireland were, therefore, in agreement, albeit for

Taoiseach's Speech in Tralee, Co. Kerry, 20 September 1969, Eire — Ireland., No. 813, 1 October 1969, p. 5, and Lynch, Statements and Speeches, p. 12.

43

Eamon de Valera, Partition of Ireland, as cited in Kevin Boland, ’We Wont ’t Stand (Idly) By', (Dublin: Kelly Kane, n.d.), pp. 89-90. 44

Keatinge, Issues in Foreign Policy3 pp. 101-02. 45 ibid., p. 102.

46

As cited in Callaghan, A House D i v i d e dp. 191. 47

different reasons, that Northern Ireland was to be excluded as an international actor. At the time (August 1969), however, this implied less an acceptance by each of the other's position than a common

consequence of their respective and opposed positions.

A common feature of Anglo-Irish relations was thereby emphasised: as it was Britain which exercised de jure and de facto sovereignty over Northern Ireland, the Republic, in its dealings with Britain, has frequently been in the positon of being able only to react to British stands or initiatives. Thus, in addition to the achievement of short-term (civil rights) goals in Northern Ireland which could be shared by both despite their fundamental disagreement as to interest, it became the major diplomatic objective of Irish foreign policy to achieve a change in British attitudes. (While it might be argued that Britain's position constituted an attempt to effect a change in the status quo of Irish attitudes, this is not confirmed by the evidence. Indications are that it was only the British position, with its adamant refusal to acknowledge the Irish Government's interest in Northern Ireland, which underwent a process of 'softening' as the period unfolded.)

In pursuit of these objectives the Irish Government relied upon 48 what Lynch called 'quiet diplomacy and personal conversation', — which v/as a natural extension of the unique relationship between

Ireland and Britain and, indeed, of the former's reliance upon the latter for the continuation of the favourable treatment it received therein. Insofar as the achievement of civil rights reforms was

concerned the Irish Government's policies found two types of diplomatic expression. The first took the form of contacts between it and the Catholic community in the Six Counties and v/as, according to Keatinge, characterised by

Speech at the Special Commemorative Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 22 October 1970, Ireland at the United Nations:

Text of the Main Speeches (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, n.d.), p. 11; also cited in Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish Foreign Policy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978, p. 118, hereafter cited as Keatinge, Issues of Irish Foreign Policy).

... exhortations on the part of the government to the minority to show patience, a repudiation of violence, and a trust in the reform programme. ... gestures which include[d] a measure of diplomatic risk, such as

Dr Hillery's^9 visit to Belfast in July 1 9 7 0 , but it more often [was] seen in direct public appeals of which

Mr Lynch's speech of 11 July 1970 was a notable example.51

The second expression was more orthodox and took the form of

appeals to the British Government as regards, in the Taoiseach's words, 'matters of concern to this country in relation to the North,

52

including the pace and quality of reforms'. In essence this was a summary of the Irish Government's concern with the implementation of reform measures and is sometimes referred to as its 'guarantee' of

53

this programme. (But this is a retrospective description: the extension of the Irish Government's asserted interest in Northern Ireland affairs, in these terms, was not made until July 1 9 7 0 ) .

This concentration upon civil rights reform — what Dr Hillery

54

referred to as '[dealing] with the immediate problem' — should not obscure the fact that unity continued to be expressed as a long-term goal, as the Taoiseach took care to emphasise:

But let nobody be under the illusion that these sentiments or our efforts to promote good relations between North and South or our sincere desire to see the vital forms ... speedily implemented — let nobody be under the illusion that all this in any way indicates the abandonment by us of our just claim that the

historic unity of this island be restored.

Dr Patrick Hillery, Irish Foreign Minister, 1969-73. 50

Lynch, Statements and Speeches, pp. 22-5. 51

Patrick Keatinge, 'Irish Foreign Policy', Collected Conference Papers on Ireland, Britain, and Europe, (London: University of London

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 62-3, (hereafter cited as

Keatinge, 'Irish Foreign Policy').

52

Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 2 5 1 , 28 January 1 971, col. 2 4 3 ;

cited in Keatinge, Foreign Policy, p. 63. 53

Keatinge, 'Irish Foreign Policy', p.63. 54

Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 2 5 5 , 16 July 1 9 7 1 , col. 1546.

55

Taoiseach's Statement on Civil Rights and Irish Unity, Eire — Ireland, Uo. 797 , 12 February 19 6 9 , p. 4. Statement v/as made to the

'permanent solution', but the way to this objective was to be by

56 57

agreement, by reconciliation. By these terms force was rejected. We are talking of land and people — and not of land

and people alone, but of trust, goodwill, brotherhood. Land and people can, and have been, grabbed by force but by force one cannot win the confidence, the

cooperation, and the brotherhood that will make all our land and all our people united and happy.

59 60

There were times, however, notably in August and December 1969 61

and between May and October 1970, when Anglo-Irish relations were complicated by an uncertainty, in the British Government's mind, as to whether 'quiet diplomacy', agreement and reconciliation were accurate expressions of Irish Government policy, or whether they were intended only to conceal designs of a sinister nature.

Even in 1981, well over a decade after Lynch's first dramatic statements on the North, it is still difficult to understand exactly why he was so prone to avoid a precise outline of his Government's policies. On balance, however, the reason must be ascribed to the Taoiseach's political personality. Had the 'troubles' fully erupted before the Irish General Election of mid-1969 it would have been tempting to have attributed the uncertainties of his pronouncements to the fact that Lynch was in a somewhat shaky position as leader of Fianna Fail ('the Republican Party'): he had succeeded Sean Lemass in 1966 only as a compromise candidate, and as might be expected of such a leader, was regarded as a moderate. He had, therefore, a need to reach

Unity, as was noted earlier (p. 3 8 ) was seen as providing the only

Lynch, Speech at Tralee, 20 September 1969, Statements and Speeches, p. 10.

57

Lynch, Speech at Bray, Co. Wicklow, 3 November 1969, Statements and Speeches, p. 14.

Jl’ Lynch, Address to the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, 17 January 1970, Statements and Speeches, pp. 16-17.

^ Lynch's 'We Won't Stand (Idly) By' speech.

tj° Blaney speech, Irish Times, 9 December 1969 (see pp. 53-4).

an accommodation with those in his Cabinet who were variously

62 6 3

described as ‘hard men' or 'broody hawks'. But the troubles didn't fully erupt until August 1969, and by that time, the objective constraints which otherwise may have limited Lynch in the exercise of his leadership did not obtain, as John A. Murphy observed:

In the 1969 general election he won back an overall majority for Fianna Fail, despite the predictions of the pundits. The Labour programme for a socialist Ireland was rejected overwhelmingly by a cautious electorate, and Fianna Fail's triumph was very much a personal

victory for Jack Lynch whose whistle-stop convent circuit tour revealed him as a consummate campaigner. ... the

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